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vi
Abstract
A productive framework to study phenotypic evolution is based on the notion of
“inclusive fitness”, which considers how an individual’s phenotype affects the fitness
of other individuals. A promising extension of the notion of inclusive fitness is that
of the “extended phenotype”, which considers how an individual’s phenotype affects
its environment, including the phenotype of other individuals. Affecting another
individual’s phenotype is sometimes referred to as manipulation (which introduces
indirect genetic effects). However, manipulated individuals may evolve resistance to
manipulation, possibly reducing or eliminating the manipulated behavior (and the
indirect genetic effects). In this dissertation I use mathematical modeling to identify
different ways in which acquiescence (i.e., no resistance) to manipulation evolves. In
Chapter 1, I show how costs of resistance may cause the evolution of acquiescence. In
Chapter 2, I find that manipulation may cause the evolution of social efficiency, which
can eliminate selection for resistance. In Chapter 3, I obtain that manipulation causes
the evolutionofmaternal exploitation,which can also eliminate selection for resistance.
In Appendices I-III, I present population genetics models of maternal manipulation
that prompted the general models of chapters 1-3. Together, the results presented in
this dissertation suggest that manipulationmay be a particularly powerful promoter of
stable social behavior.
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Introduction
The problem of acquiescence
During the 1910’s to the 1930’s, Fisher, Haldane, andWright showed how phenotypes or
behaviors with a genetic basis evolve when they are subject to natural selection. Their
work focusedmostly on phenotypes that affect the fitness of the individuals that express
the phenotype. Hamilton (1964a) extended this theory by focusing on phenotypes that
also affect the fitness of other individuals. He referred to such phenotypes as social.
In an attempt to further extend evolutionary theory, Dawkins (1982) introduced
the idea of phenotypes that affect the environment, including the phenotypes of other
individuals. Dawkins (1982) referred to such phenotypes as extended phenotypes.
In contrast to Fisher, Haldane, Wright, and Hamilton, Dawkins (1982) did not study
mathematically the evolutionary dynamics of extended phenotypes. Extended pheno-
types that alter the abiotic environment are often identified under the rubric of niche
construction (Odling-Smee, 1988). On the other hand, extended phenotypes that have
an effect on the phenotype of other individuals are sometimes referred to as involving
manipulation (Dawkins and Krebs, 1978; Dawkins, 1982; Krebs and Dawkins, 1984) and
therefore as involving indirect genetic effects (IGE’s; i.e., the genotypes of extended
phenotypes correlate with phenotypes of other individuals) (Kirkpatrick and Lande,
1989; Moore et al., 1997). Mathematical study of the evolution of niche-constructing
phenotypes or of phenotypes that are subject to indirect genetic effects has shown that
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the evolutionary dynamics may be substantially different to what happens when such
factors are not considered.
Niche constructing phenotypes modify the environment and thus the selection
pressures they are subject to. This effect can change the speed and direction of selection
relative to the dynamics when niche construction does not occur (Laland et al., 1996;
Odling-Smee et al., 2003). Similarly, phenotypes that are subject to indirect genetic
effects display peculiar evolutionary dynamics. Since in this case another trait partially
or completely controls (statistically, not necessarily causally) a focal trait, there is no
need for genetic variation in the focal trait for it to evolve (Kirkpatrick and Lande, 1989;
Moore et al., 1997; McGlothlin et al., 2010). The direction of selection for the focal trait
may be opposite to the direction of its evolution (Kirkpatrick and Lande, 1989; Moore
et al., 1997; McGlothlin et al., 2010). The evolutionary change can be dramatically
fast (Kirkpatrick and Lande, 1989; Moore et al., 1997; McGlothlin et al., 2010). Even
relatedness is not necessary for altruism to be favored if the altruismof focal individuals
is controlled by non-focal individuals (McGlothlin et al., 2010).
The biological importance of extended phenotypes does not come from their un-
usual evolutionary dynamics. Instead, their importance stems from their presumable
ubiquity. Phenotypes often influence their abiotic environment in sustained ways, with
important effects such as the production of oxygen, ecological succession, and nutrient
cycling (Odling-Smee et al., 2003). In addition, individuals constantly adjust their
phenotypes or behaviors according to those of other individuals, which is an essential
component of social interactions (Dawkins, 1982; Moore et al., 1997; Maestripieri
and Mateo, 2009). However, studies of the evolutionary dynamics of the extended
phenotypes that alter other individuals’ phenotype typically assume that individuals
allow others to partially or completely control their traits (Kirkpatrick and Lande, 1989;
Moore et al., 1997; McGlothlin et al., 2010). Suchmanipulationmay often go against the
fitness interests of themanipulated individuals. In such a case, manipulated individuals
would be selected to resist manipulation, possibly reducing or eliminating the IGE’s.
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In this dissertation I use mathematicalmodeling to study how acquiescence (i.e., no
resistance) tomanipulation can evolve. I definemanipulation as the partial or complete
control of another individual’s behavior or phenotype. Previous mathematical models
addressing problems relevant to th evolution of acquiescence tomanipulation are listed
in Tables 1-3. These approaches have either focused on specific traits and systems, or
have not addressed the evolution of acquiescence in general. To attack the problem in
an effective way, in the initially stages of this dissertation I also focused on eusociality as
possible acquiescence tomanipulation (appendices I-III). Thus, in the following section
I discuss the problem of acquiescence regarding eusociality.
The problem of acquiescence in eusociality
Alexander (1974), as others before him had in mind, suggested that the evolution
of eusociality may not involve altruism as indicated by Hamilton (1963, 1964b), but
parental manipulation instead. That is, worker behavior may be a result of parental
influence on the offspring’s behavior. This suggestion attracted some attention, but fell
out of favor for various reasons.
It attracted attention because queens appear to somehow inhibit the development
of nest mates into reproductives (Michener and Brothers, 1974). In addition, parental
manipulation is particularly easily selected for as it requires smaller benefit-cost ratios
than altruism (Alexander, 1974; Trivers, 1974; Charlesworth, 1978; Charnov, 1978).
However, parental manipulation immediately raises the question of why manipulated
offspring would not evolve resistance to manipulation. Alexander (1974) argued that
resistance to parental manipulation would be necessarily disfavored. His reasoning
was that resisting offspring would have lowered fitness because their own offspring
would resist their manipulation. The fallacy of this reasoning was exhibited by Dawkins
(1976, p. 145-148) who, by exchanging inversely related words in Alexander’s argument,
showed that it would also imply that manipulating parents would have lowered fitness
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Table 1: Selected previous modeling approaches to the evolution of manipulated
behavior. M: manipulation. R: resistance. Re: retaliation. E: eusociality. SR:
sex ratio. PI: parental investment. QG: quantitative genetics. GT: game theory.
PG: population genetics. PGS: population genetics simulation. IF: inclusive fitness
reasoning/modeling. A: arbitrary form of manipulation. P: policing. D: dispersal. m:
maternal manipulation. Pu: punishment. HB: host behavior. TF: Taylor and Frank
(1996) modeling approach. ∗ rebelling through resistance is their “ignore solicitation
model” while through inefficiency is their “proratamodel”. †Key paper.
Reference Contribution Approach
Griffing (1967) M present (A) QG
Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) M and R can evolve (Re) GT
Charlesworth (1978) M can evolve (E) PG
Charnov (1978) M (E) and R (SR) can evolve verbal
Stamps et al. (1978) M and R can evolve (PI) PG
Parker andMacnair (1978) M can evolve (PI) PG
Macnair and Parker (1978) M can evolve (PI) PG
Macnair and Parker (1979) M can evolve (PI) PG
Parker andMacnair (1979) † M and R coevolve (PI) ∗ PG
Craig (1979) M can evolve (E) PGS
Emlen (1982) M can evolve (E) verbal
Vehrencamp (1983) M and R can evolve (E) IF
Parker (1985) M can evolve (PI) GT
Stubblefield and Charnov (1986) M can evolve (E) verbal
Ratnieks (1988) M can evolve (P) PG
Taylor (1988) M can evolve (D) IF
Kirkpatrick and Lande (1989) M can evolve (m) QG
Pamilo (1991) M can evolve (E, SR) IF
Boyd and Richerson (1992) M can evolve (Pu) GT
Yamamura and Higashi (1992) M and R can evolve (E) verbal
Poulin (1994) M can evolve (HB) verbal
Frank (1995) M can evolve (P) TF
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Table 2: Continuation of Table 1. B: bribing. PDS: population dynamics simulation.
C: concessions. Ev: eviction. Ef: reproductive efficiency. Ma: mating. Mat: maternal
manipulation. AD: adaptive dynamics. MP: Markov process.
Reference Contribution Approach
Clutton-Brock and Parker (1995) † M and R coevolve (Pu) GT
Moore et al. (1997) M present (A) QG
Reeve and Keller (1997) M can evolve (B, P) IF
Pagel et al. (1998) M and R can evolve (Re) GT
Robert et al. (1999) M and R coevolve (Re) PDS
Wolf et al. (1999) M present (A) QG
Crespi and Ragsdale (2000) M can evolve (E) verbal
Johnstone (2000) M is present (C, Ev, Ef) IF
Gavrilets et al. (2001) † M and R coevolve (Ma) QG
Reuter and Keller (2001) † M and R coevolve (SR, E) IF
Wade (2001) M can evolve (m) PG
Boyd et al. (2003) M can evolve (Pu) S
Chapman (2003) M can evolve (E) IF
Reuter et al. (2004) † M and R can evolve (SR) IF, AD
Wenseleers et al. (2004a) M present (P) TF
Wenseleers et al. (2004b) M present (P) TF
Fowler (2005) M can evolve (Pu) GT
Helms et al. (2005) M and R coevolve (SR) S
Gavrilets and Hayashi (2006) M and R coevolve (Ma) QG
Lion et al. (2006) M can evolve (HB) S
Hauert et al. (2007) M can evolve (Pu) MP
Bijma andWade (2008) M present (A) QG
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Table 3: Continuation of Table 2. Ex: extortion.
Reference Contribution Approach
Gandon et al. (2009) M can evolve (HB) AD
McGlothlin et al. (2010) M present (A) QG
Shen and Reeve (2010) M present (E) IF
Queller (2011) M present (A) QG
Uller and Pen (2011) M and R coevolve (D) S
Press and Dyson (2012) M and R can evolve (Ex) GT
Doncaster et al. (2013) M and R can evolve (Ex) GT
Kawatsu (2013) M and R coevolve (Ma) AD
because their parents would have manipulated them. Alexander (1979, p. 38-39) later
acknowledged the inadequacy of his reasoning.
The problem with parental manipulation is then that it creates a parent-offspring
conflict (Trivers, 1974), the outcome of which is not straightforward. The biological
details of the trait at hand change the nature of the conflict, and thereby its outcome.
Models addressing the outcome of parent-offspring conflicts have tended to focus on
conflicts other than conflict over offspring help, e.g., weaning conflict and sex-ratio
conflict (see Tables 1-3). In a weaning conflict, the roles are flipped relative to a
conflict due to parental manipulation of offspring help: offspring manipulate parents
into providing additional parental care. Parental victory would then involve low costs
of resistance to parents and high costs of manipulation to offspring, but this may not
often be the case (Moreno-Rueda, 2007). For sex-ratio conflicts, early empirical studies
suggested that offspring often win the conflict. In particular, Trivers and Hare (1976)
showed that sex ratios in social insects followed offspring-favored outcomes rather than
mother-favored outcomes. This finding has been reassessed, and the current view is that
sex ratios are often partially controlled byworkers and sometimes controlledbymothers
(Boomsma, 1989; Chapuisat and Keller, 1999; Reuter and Keller, 2001; Reuter et al., 2004;
Meunier et al., 2008). However, a conflict over sex ratio may also differ from that over
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offspring help. For example, one could argue that if a mother loses less fitness by letting
offspring choose offspring sex ratio than what she gains by having them acquiesce for
helping, then she could let themwin the sex-ratio conflict while she pursues the conflict
over help.
Another set of difficulties faced by parental manipulation has been conceptual.
Alexander (1974) expressed parental manipulation as an alternative to nepotism, which
was quickly taken to mean that parental manipulation is an alternative to kin selection.
Papers were then written studying the evolution of altruism via either kin selection or
parental manipulation (e.g., Charlesworth, 1978). This has had the implication that
support for kin selection may be taken as evidence against parental manipulation, but
researchers have sought to emphasize that this dichotomy is not correct (Bourke and
Franks, 1995). As stated by Bourke and Franks (1995), parental manipulation is not
an alternative to kin selection. On the contrary, parental manipulation is subject to
kin selection. However, this has taken to yet another confusion according to which,
since parental manipulation falls within kin selection, then parental manipulation is
an unnecessary complication (e.g., Hölldobler and Wilson, 1990). The reasoning
that has prompted this conclusion is that if there is a parent-offspring conflict over
offspring help, for the parents to win the conflict it is necessary that offspring consent to
manipulation, which will only happen as dictated by kin selection. As illustrated in this
dissertation, some confusion may be cleared by considering a dichotomy, not between
kin selection and parental manipulation, but between spontaneous and manipulated
behavior.
This dissertation
Throughout this dissertation, I study the coevolution of manipulation and resistance to
manipulation. I assume that the behavior (or phenotype) that is manipulated is entirely
performed by the manipulated individual (e.g., helping) rather than being performed
in concert between manipulated and manipulated individuals (e.g., mating). This
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contrasts with previous mathematical studies, which have taken a modeling approach
that implicitly assumes that the manipulated behavior is expressed in concert between
manipulated andmanipulated individuals (e.g., Gavrilets et al., 2001; Reuter et al., 2004;
Frank and Crespi, 2011). That is, under my assumption, the manipulated trait is not
expressed if the manipulated individual resists, regardless of how hard the manipulator
tries. In contrast, under the assumption of previous approaches, the manipulated trait
can always be expressed if the manipulator tries hard enough. The relevance of one or
the other assumption depends on the nature of the trait of interest.
Chapters 1 and 2 study the coevolution of manipulation and resistance among
arbitrary social partners, not necessarily parental manipulation of offspring behavior.
Chapter 3 applies primarily to maternal manipulation. In Chapter 1, I study the
effect of costs of manipulation and resistance. I show that the occurrence of costs of
resistance allows manipulated behavior to evolve under less stringent conditions than
spontaneous behavior (i.e., behavior solely controlled by the focal individual). These
results appear consistent with so-called primitive eusociality. In Chapter 2, I study the
effect of the evolutionof helping (or harming) efficiency. I find that the evolutionof such
social efficiency can eventually eliminate selection for resistance. These results appear
consistent with worker specialization in so-called advanced eusociality. In Chapter 3,
I study the effect of the maternal ability to influence the condition of the recipients of
help. I assume that themother can decrease the condition of recipients by not providing
care to them. I obtain that such amother can then lose her tendency to providematernal
care and become highly fertile while her manipulated offspring become selected to
acquiesce to manipulation and raise their mother’s offspring. These results appear
consistent with queen specialization in advanced eusociality.
The methods used to derive the results of chapters 1–3 are based on techniques
derived from the Price (1970) equation (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Frank, 1997, 1998).
Such methods are very simple and very general, but they hide much complexity which
may bring confusion (Frank, 2013). In order to avoid confusion, I devoted most of
my years as a PhD student developing explicitly genetic mathematical models for the
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coevolution of manipulation and resistance. For those models, which I present in
appendices I–III, I focused on maternal manipulation of offspring helping behavior.
Appendix I develops a population genetics model for 72 different biological scenarios.
I use this model to explore scenarios that are particularly favorable for manipulated
helping (i.e., where manipulation and acquiescence evolve). This exploration shows
that manipulated helping evolves more easily when the helping is directed only toward
non-manipulated siblings (extendingwhat was found by Charlesworth, 1978), that both
conditional and constitutive costs of resistance can cause acquiescence to evolve, and
that additive and dominant allelic effects yield qualitatively similar conflict outcomes.
Appendix II focuses on the scenarioswhere recipients of help are only non-manipulated,
resistance costs are conditional, and allelic effects are additive. This appendix simplifies
the model of appendix I by assuming that mutation is rare and weak and that selection
is weak, an approach which is often known as invasion analysis. These assumptions
yield simple analytical results for the evolution of maternally manipulated helping for
haploids, diploids, and haplodiploids, with the added consideration of sex-differential
manipulation. I show that maternal manipulated helping is particularly likely if the
mother is able to direct her manipulation effort toward the more willingly helping sex.
Appendix III extends this invasion analysis to include the evolution of helping efficiency
(as defined in chapter 2) and the evolution of maternal care and fertility (as defined in
chapter 3). I obtain analytical expressions for the increase of each of the traits with the
possibility of sex-differential manipulation for haploids, diploids, and haplodiploids. I
explore this extension numerically, which yields analogous results to those presented in
chapter 3.
As championed by Dawkins and Krebs, the results presented in this dissertation
suggest that manipulation may be a particularly powerful force in nature for a broad
range of situations including eusociality, sexual conflict, host-parasite interactions,
intragenomic conflict, and cultural evolution.
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Chapter 1
Evolution ofmanipulated behavior
The following chapter is a reprint of a paper in press in the journal American Naturalist:
González-Forero M., & Gavrilets S. Evolution of manipulated behavior. Am. Nat. In
press.
The use of “we” in this part refers to my co-author and me. As the lead author of
this article I was responsible for this paper. My contributions to this paper included the
formulation and analysis of the model. I also wrote most of the paper.
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Abstract
Many social behaviors are triggered by social partners. For example, cells in a multi-
cellular organism often become soma via extrinsically regulated differentiation, while
individuals in a eusocial colony often become helpers via extrinsic caste determination.
One explanation for social triggering is that it informs when it is beneficial to express
the behavior. Alternatively, social triggering can represent manipulation where social
partners partially or completely control the focal individual’s behavior. For instance,
caste determination in primitively eusocial taxa is typically accomplished via differential
feeding or dominance hierarchies, suggesting some manipulation. However, selection
would favor resistance if manipulation is detrimental to manipulated parties, and the
outcome of the manipulation conflict remains intricate. We analyze the coevolution
of manipulation and resistance in a simple but general setting. We show that, despite
possible resistance, manipulated behavior can be established under less stringent
conditions than spontaneous (i.e., non-manipulated) behavior because of resistance
costs. The existence of this advantage might explain why primitive eusocial behavior
tends to be triggered socially and coercively. We provide a simple condition for the
advantage of manipulated behavior that may help infer whether a socially triggered
behavior is manipulated. We illustrate our analysis with a hypothetical example of
maternal manipulation relevant to primitive eusociality.
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1.1 Introduction
Behaviors that affect the reproductive success of other individuals are often referred to
as social (Hamilton, 1964a). The triggers of many social behaviors frequently do not
lie within the performing individual or its abiotic environment, but in the individual’s
social partners. For example, in social insects, differential feeding executed by nurses
frequently determines whether or not individuals develop as helpers (Wheeler, 1986;
Schwander et al., 2010). Similarly, in multicellular organisms, extracellular signaling
performed by neighboring cells induces focal cells to differentiate into germ or soma
(Extavour and Akam, 2003; Pera and Tam, 2010). Analogous socially triggered behaviors
have been documented in slime molds (Gregor et al., 2010), plant-bacteria mutualisms
(de Velde et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010), biofilms (López et al., 2009), host-parasite
interactions (Hughes et al., 2012; Shelley A, 2013), cooperatively breeding mammals
(Rood, 1980; Wasser and Barash, 1983; Abbott, 1984; French et al., 1984; Carter et al.,
1986; Russell and Lummaa, 2009), primitively and advanced eusocial taxa including
mole rats (Wheeler, 1986; Sherman et al., 1991; Bennett et al., 1994; O’Donnell, 1998;
Ramaswamy et al., 2004; Hanus et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2010a,b; Suryanarayanan
et al., 2011; Kamakura, 2011), social trematodes (Kamiya and Poulin, 2013), and other
mammals, birds, and fishes (Koyama and Kamimura, 2000; Hoover and Robinson, 2007;
Kustan et al., 2012).
There are at least three general evolutionary explanations for the occurrence of
socially-triggered social behavior. First, socially triggered behavior may allow for an
optimal functioning at the group level (group optimality explanation) (Oster andWilson,
1978; Schwander et al., 2010). Second, social triggering may inform the individual
about when it is beneficial to express a particular social behavior (communication
explanation) (Dawkins and Krebs, 1978; Bradbury and Vehrencamp, 2011). For ex-
ample, social interactions can inform helpers-to-be about high benefit-cost ratios
or relatedness (West Eberhard, 1975). These two explanations are closely related
given amathematical correspondence between group and individual selection (Queller,
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1992b; Frank, 2012). The third explanation is that social triggering may constitute
manipulation, where the social behavior is partly or completely under control of the
triggering individual (Alexander, 1974; Dawkins and Krebs, 1978; Dawkins, 1982; Krebs
and Dawkins, 1984). Under the first two explanations, social triggering is based on the
reliability of information. When the triggeringand triggered individuals conflict over the
latter’s social trait, there are incentives for the former to transmit unreliable information.
The reception of unreliable informationmay cause the recipient to attendmore reliable
sources of information, such as intrinsic or abiotic factors. In this case, social behavior
would be expected to be preferentially determined by non-social factors. In particular,
the social behaviorwould not be expected to be preferentially determinedby differential
feeding, aggression, punishment, etc. Among primitively eusocial taxa, conflict is often
substantial, yet these forms of determination of social behavior are typical (Alexander
et al., 1991). Hence, the group optimality and communication explanation may be
insufficient to account for social triggering among primitively eusocial taxa. In contrast,
these forms of social determination would be preferentially expected if social triggering
is manipulation. However, there are least two perceived difficulties with manipulation
as a source of social behavior.
Manipulation requires that individuals have the ability to control partially or com-
pletely another individual’s behavior. The power to do this has been documented for a
variety of agents, ranging from internal parasites to external social partners (Dawkins,
1982; Moore, 2002; Trivers, 2011; Hughes et al., 2012; Adamo and Webster, 2013). The
mechanisms by which parasites manipulate host behavior have been identified in good
detail for a number of cases (Hughes et al., 2012; Adamo and Webster, 2013). In
some cases, individuals (e.g., a wasp) may engage in second-order manipulation by
manipulating another individual (a caterpillar) tomanipulate a third (a plant) (Poelman
et al., 2012). On the other end, external social partners may have the opportunity to
canalize an individual’s behavior (Byrne and Whitten, 1988; de Waal, 1998; Perry and
Manson, 2008) for example via coercion, sensory exploitation, and deception (Clutton-
Brock and Parker, 1995; Holland and Rice, 1998; Cézilly and Thomas, 2012); asymmetric
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interactions or control of dominants over subordinates (Maynard Smith and Parker,
1976; Vehrencamp, 1983; Johnstone, 2000; Shen andReeve, 2010); and conformity biases
of individuals in groups with particular customs (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Whiten
et al., 2005). The ability of agents to manipulate social partners has been further
illustrated by an increasing number of observations of indirect genetic effects (i.e., the
genetic influence on a social partner’s phenotype; Wolf et al., 1998) which have been
documented both in animals and non-animals (Maestripieri and Mateo, 2009; Uller
et al., 2009; Genung et al., 2013).
Another key difficulty with manipulation is that it can lead to the evolution of
resistance, which may limit or eliminate the expression of the manipulated behavior.
The outcome of the evolutionary conflict between manipulating and manipulated
parties is in general affected by a variety of factors including the costs paid by each
party and life history details (Trivers, 1974; Blick, 1977; Macnair and Parker, 1978, 1979;
Parker and Macnair, 1978, 1979; Stamps et al., 1978; Harpending, 1979; Parker, 1985;
Yamamura and Higashi, 1992; Uller and Pen, 2011). The evolution of manipulation
and/or resistance has been studied theoretically for specific types of dyadic interactions
(e.g., host-parasite and male-female; Poulin, 1994; Pagel et al., 1998; Robert et al., 1999;
Gavrilets et al., 2001; Wenseleers et al., 2004a; Lion et al., 2006; Gandon et al., 2009;
Kawatsu, 2013). Below we study the coevolution of manipulation and resistance in
a general yet simple model that allows for rather arbitrary interactions. We consider
manipulated behaviors that are performed solely by manipulated parties (e.g., helping)
rather than being performed in concert betweenmanipulated andmanipulating parties
(e.g., mating). First, we identify conditions under which manipulated behavior is
established in the population despite the possible evolution of resistance. Then, we
show that manipulated behavior can be established under less stringent conditions
than spontaneous (i.e., non-manipulated) behavior because of costs of resistance. This
advantage of manipulated over spontaneous behavior may better explain “primitive”
forms of social triggering of social behavior than common explanations in terms of
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spontaneous behavior. We obtain a condition that may help infer in specific cases
whether a socially triggered behavior is manipulated rather than spontaneous.
1.2 Model
Fitness
We use techniques derived from the Price (1970) equation, and thus relatively few
assumptions are necessary for the evolutionary analysis. We consider a population in
which individuals can attempt to manipulate others to express a focal social behavior
(e.g., helping or harming). In turn,manipulated individuals can resist by refraining from
expressing the behavior. Individuals are, not necessarily permanently, in one of three
states: in “manipulator” state (m), in “subject of manipulation” state (s), or in “target of
manipulated behavior” state (t ). A single individual can be a manipulator at one time
and a target of manipulated behavior at another time. A manipulator m manipulates
reachable subjects of manipulation s with probability p, which is assumed to be under
control of themanipulator. A subject s ofmanipulation resists with probability q , which
is assumed to be under control of the subject. We assume that an individual expresses
the focal social behavior only when it is manipulated and acquiesces (i.e., it does not
resist). Therefore, the probability that a subject s of manipulation expresses the focal
behavior is ϕ = P (1− q), where P is the average manipulation probability among the
manipulators that can reach s. Thus, full resistance (q = 1) prevents the behavior from
being expressed regardless of how large themanipulation probability P is. We study the
coevolution of the population-averageprobabilities ofmanipulation p and resistance q .
When a manipulatorm manipulates its subjects of manipulation, it pays a cost cm
of manipulation (cm ≥ 0). Letting 1 be the baseline fitness, the payoff for a manipulator
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is thus
wm = p(1−cm)+ (1−p)
= 1−cmp. (1.1)
When amanipulated subject s acquiesces (which happenswith probability 1−q), it pays
a cost ca of acquiescence (ca ≥ 0). Alternatively, when it resists (which happens with
probability q), it pays a cost cr of resistance (cr ≥ 0). Hence, the payoff for a subject of
manipulation is
ws = P (1−q)(1−ca)+Pq(1−cr )+ (1−P )
= 1−caP (1−q)−crPq. (1.2)
Finally, a target t of manipulated behavior receives a fitness effect b (either positive
or negative) from its acquiescing social partners. Let Q be the average resistance
probability among the subjects of manipulation with which t interacts. Let Π be the
average manipulation probability among the manipulators that can reach the subjects
with whom t interacts. Then, the payoff for a target of manipulated behavior is
wt =Π(1−Q) (1+b)+ΠQ+ (1−Π)
= 1+bΠ(1−Q). (1.3)
We will make the simplifying assumption that costs of manipulation (cm) and resistance
(cr ) are constant and do not depend on themanipulation and resistance probabilities p
and q .
Both manipulation and resistance are social behaviors. Evolutionary changes of
social behaviors are affected by the correlation of the trait value of the actor (i.e.,
the individual expressing the trait) with the trait value of the actor’s social partners
(Hamilton, 1970; Queller, 1992a). This correlation can be measured in terms of the
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corresponding regression coefficient, which is customarily called relatedness. However,
the correlation refers to phenomenabroader than those covered by genealogical kinship
(kin selection), as it can arise via other processes such as conditional response to
partner’s behavior which is important for reciprocity (Queller, 1985; Fletcher and Zwick,
2006; Nowak, 2006), variation among groups which is needed for group selection
(Hamilton, 1975b;Grafen, 1984; Frank, 2012), andmanipulation,punishmentor partner
choice (Queller, 2011). The techniques of Taylor and Frank (1996) and Frank (1997)
allow one to easily obtain the effect of relatedness in this general sense, and hence we
use them below. Using these methods, the model can also be applied to non-genetic
evolution which is relevant when considering cultural manipulation. In addition,
these techniques can capture rather arbitrary life-history details without making them
explicit, at the cost of a lack of specificity. Because genetic or life-history details will not
be made explicit, the fitness for each state ( j =m, s, t ) must be weighted by each state’s
reproductive value (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998).
The reproductive value k j of state j (=m, s, t ) is the probability that individuals in
the long-term future of the population descend from state- j individuals in the present
(
∑
k j = 1). Then the fitness of a random individual is w =
∑
j k jw j (Taylor and Frank,
1996) which in our model becomes
w = 1−kmcmp−ks [caP (1−q)+crPq]+ktbΠ(1−Q). (1.4)
Resulting dynamic equations
We show in Appendix A that, assuming no correlation between the traits, the rates of
change in manipulation and resistance can be approximated as
dp
dt
= vpkmhp (1.5a)
dq
dt
= vqkshq , (1.5b)
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where dx/dt denotes the derivative of x (= p,q) with respect to time, vp and vq are the
corresponding additive genetic variances, and
hp = brtm(1−q)− rsm[ca(1−q)+cr q]−cm (1.6a)
hq =−p[brt s − (ca −cr )]. (1.6b)
The quantities hp and hq represent the inclusive fitness effects (selection gradients)
of manipulation and resistance. The quantities r j i give the life-for-life relatedness of
actor i to recipient j (Hamilton, 1972). For manipulation (eq. (1.6a)) the actors are
manipulators (i = m), while for resistance (eq. (1.6b)) the actors are subjects (i = s).
For both manipulation and resistance, the recipients are subjects and targets ( j = s, t ).
These social interactions are described in figure 1.1. The inclusive fitness effect h
of a trait gives the sum of fitness effects for recipients of the trait weighted by the
corresponding relatedness of actor toward recipients. It will be important to keep in
mind that relatednesses r can benegative (Hamilton, 1970). Negative relatedness occurs
when actors are less related to recipients than is a random individual in the population
(Gardner andWest, 2004; West and Gardner, 2010). In particular, relatedness is negative
when actors are less related to recipients than to bystanders that are affected by the
interaction (Lehmann et al., 2006; West and Gardner, 2010), which will be relevant for
a particular case below.
In the inclusive fitness effect of manipulation (eq. (1.6a)), the first term is the
relatedness of manipulators toward targets (rtm) times the probability of subjects’
acquiescence (1− q) times the fitness effect (b) on targets of manipulated behavior.
The second term is the relatedness of manipulators toward subjects of manipulation
(rsm) times the expected fitness effect for subjects of manipulation {−[ca(1−q)+ cr q]}.
The third term is the direct fitness effect for manipulators (−cm) which is weighted by
the relatedness of manipulators toward themselves (i.e., 1). The inclusive fitness effect
of resistance (eq. (1.6b)) can be seen as the negative of the inclusive fitness effect of
acquiescence. The latter is the probability of manipulation p times a factor involving
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Figure 1.1: Relatednesses among social partners and their corresponding payoffs. At
a given time, individuals are either manipulators (m), subjects of manipulation (s), or
targets of manipulated behavior (t ). Arrows correspond to the life-for-life relatedness
r j i of actor i to recipient j . A manipulator m can at another time be a target t of
manipulated behavior, in which case rtm = 1. Also indicated are the payoffs for each
state: manipulatorsm pay the cost cm of manipulation, subjects of manipulation s pay
either the cost ca of acquiescence or the cost cr of resistance, and targets ofmanipulated
behavior t receive a fitness effect b from acquiescing subjects.
the following terms. The first term is the relatedness of subjects of manipulation
toward targets (rt s) times the fitness effect (b) on targets of manipulated behavior. The
second term is the direct effect of acquiescence on subjects of manipulation [−(ca−cr )],
weighted by the relatedness of subjects of manipulation toward themselves (i.e., 1). The
direct effect of acquiescence can be positive despite positive costs (when cr > ca).
To analyze the coevolutionary dynamics in our model, it is helpful to write the
selection gradients hp and hq (eqs. (1.6)) as
hp =M0−qM (1.7a)
hq = pR . (1.7b)
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where
M0 = brtm − rsmca −cm (1.8a)
M = brtm − rsm(ca −cr ) (1.8b)
R =−[brt s − (ca −cr )]. (1.8c)
M0 is the selection gradient for manipulation when resistance is absent, M is the
reduction in the selection gradient formanipulation fromM0when resistance is full, and
R is proportional to the selection gradient for resistance. It follows that manipulation is
disfavored with full resistance (i.e.,M0−M < 0) if manipulators’ relatedness to subjects
is sufficiently high (i.e., rsm > −cm/cr ). The direction of selection for manipulation
changes at
q∗ = M0
M
. (1.9)
Themodel dynamics are analyzed in Appendix B.
1.3 Results
Coevolution of manipulation and resistance
Generally, the system evolves either to a state where manipulation is established and
resistance disappears (p = 1, q = 0) or to a state where manipulation disappears (p = 0).
Under certain conditions, there is also the possibility that manipulation is established
but its effect is canceled by complete resistance (p = 1, q = 1).
Necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the evolution of manipulated behavior
(p = 1, q = 0) are that 1) resistance to manipulation is not favored by selection, and
2) manipulation is favored when resistance is absent. In terms of our model, the first
condition translates into inequality
brt s +cr > ca ; (1.10a)
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that is, the indirect fitness effect to manipulated individuals (brt s ) and the cost of
resistance (cr ) have to be sufficiently high relative to the cost of acquiescence (ca). The
second condition translates into inequality
brtm > carsm +cm . (1.10b)
That is, the direct or indirect fitness effect to manipulators (brtm) via their relatedness
to the targets of manipulated behavior must be greater than the indirect cost to
manipulators via their relatedness to acquiescing individuals and the direct cost of
manipulation (cm). If conditions (1.10) are not satisfied simultaneously, the population
generally evolves to a state in which manipulation disappears (p = 0). These conditions
are less likely to be satisfied if the cost of acquiescence (ca) and manipulation (cm) are
high and/or the effect of manipulation on targets (|b|) and the cost of resistance (cr )
are low. It is possible that both dynamic outcomes — the evolution of manipulated
behavior (p = 1, q = 0) and the disappearance of manipulation (p = 0) — are observed
for the same sets of parameter values depending on initial conditions. Specifically,
even if conditions (1.10) are satisfied, manipulation can still disappear if initial levels of
resistance are high enough. The additional condition for the outcome of manipulated
behavior (p = 1, q = 0) when rsm >−cm/cr is that initially
q < q∗+pu, (1.11)
where u =
√
−vqksR/(vpkmM) which measures the rate of change in acquiescence
relative to that of manipulation. Condition (1.11) states that for manipulated behavior
to be obtained when rsm >−cm/cr , resistance must be initially sufficiently small.
Figure 1.2 illustrates these dynamics. In the left column, where manipulation is not
favored in the absence of resistance (M0 < 0), manipulation disappears. In the right
column, if resistance is favored (R > 0), manipulation disappears as well. Yet in the
right column, if acquiescence is favored (R < 0), manipulated behavior is obtained if
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Figure 1.2: Coevolutionary dynamics of manipulation and resistance when rsm >
−cm/cr . Columns correspond to the sign of the selection gradient for manipulation
without resistance (M0). Rows correspond to the sign of the selection gradient for
resistance (R). The direction of selection for manipulation changes at the horizontal
dashed line (q∗). The arrows indicate the direction of evolutionary change for
manipulation (p) and resistance (q). Stable equilibrium points and lines are in thick
strokes.
resistance is initially small (gray area); if it is large, manipulation disappears. Figure 1.2
also describes the dynamics when rsm =−cm/cr . In such a case, the dashed line q∗ = 1,
which makes the line q = 1 stable when resistance is favored (R > 0).
The only exception to the outcomes described above is the establishment of manip-
ulation (p = 1) in spite of complete resistance (q = 1). This outcome can happen when
resistance is favored (inequality (1.10a) is not satisfied) and
rsm <−cm/cr . (1.12)
The latter inequality requires negative relatedness of manipulators toward subjects of
manipulation. Such negative relatedness can arise, for instance, when a manipulating
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parasite (m) is less genetically related to its manipulated host (s) than to the targets
(t ) of the manipulated behavior (Lehmann et al., 2006; West and Gardner, 2010). It
is possible that the outcomes of full manipulation and resistance (p = q = 1) and of
the disappearance of manipulation (p = 0) are observed for the same sets of parameter
values depending on initial conditions. Specifically, if manipulation is disfavored when
resistance is absent (i.e., condition (1.10b) is violated), manipulation increases only if
the initial levels of resistance are high enough. This result may seem counterintuitive,
but it arises because manipulators indirectly benefit from harming their subjects of
manipulation. This indirect benefit is larger if the subject of manipulation resists and,
thus, pays the costs of resistance. In this case, manipulation is favored even if the
manipulatedbehavior is canceled by resistance. Figure 1.3 illustrates these dynamics. In
the left column,manipulation is not favored in the absence of resistance (M0 < 0), but it
becomes favored if resistance is favored (R > 0) and is large enough. When acquiescence
is favored (R < 0) manipulation disappears. In the right column, when manipulation
is favored (M0 > 0), sustained manipulation is canceled by resistance if resistance is
favored (R > 0). If acquiescence is favored (R < 0) manipulated behavior is obtained
(gray area).
Comparison to spontaneous behavior
When a social behavior is socially triggered, it is difficult to determine whether or not
it is manipulated if it could also be spontaneous (e.g., due to high relatedness between
actors and recipients). In this section we use our model to yield a condition that may
help infer whether or not a socially triggered behavior is manipulated (see Doncaster
et al. (2013) for a similar objective). We compare the conditions for the evolution of
manipulated behavior to those for non-manipulated behavior; that is, behavior that is
fully under control of the individuals expressing it. As stated above, we refer to non-
manipulated behavior as spontaneous behavior.
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Figure 1.3: Coevolutionary dynamics of manipulation and resistance when rsm <
−cm/cr . See the legend in figure 1.2 for explanation.
Let the probability ϕ that an individual expresses the same focal social behavior as
before be now under entire control of this individual. Define ϕ in such a way that the
fitness effect b to recipients is the same as formanipulatedbehavior. Let cs be the cost to
actors of this spontaneous social behavior (cs > 0). Spontaneous social behavior evolves
when br > cs where r is the life-for-life relatedness of actor to recipient (Hamilton, 1972;
Frank, 1998). We assume that the cost of spontaneous behavior (cs) is approximately the
same as the cost of acquiescence (ca ; i.e., cs ≈ ca) and that relatedness for spontaneous
behavior (r ) is analogous to that of manipulatedbehavior (rt s ; i.e., r ≈ rt s ). Manipulated
behavior can be established under less stringent conditions than spontaneous behavior
when inequalities (1.10) hold and brt s < ca . This happenswhenmanipulation is favored
in the absence of resistance (inequality (1.10b) holds) and the following condition holds:
0< ca −brt s < cr . (1.13)
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When the parameters involved in these inequalities can be measured, satisfaction of
these conditions would suggest that the behavior is manipulated, provided that the
assumptions of the model are approximately met. Condition (1.13) cannot be met if
the cost of resistance cr = 0, which makes it explicit that the advantage of manipulated
behavior over spontaneous behavior in terms of its less stringent conditions to be
favored is due to the cost of resistance.
This comparison also allows one to relate the notion of manipulation that we
followed to another traditional notion of manipulation; that is, when the manipulated
behavior goes against the fitness interests of the manipulated individual (Alexander,
1974; Hughes et al., 2012). Although it is a matter of interpretation, manipulated
behavior can be said to follow this notion when it is established but spontaneous
behavior is not favored.
Hypothetical example for maternal manipulation
We now illustrate our model by applying it to the evolution of eusociality via maternal
manipulation. The relevant genetic variation for manipulation may be available to
mothers due to the substantial maternal influence on offspring phenotype (Linksvayer
and Wade, 2005; Schwander et al., 2008; Russell and Lummaa, 2009; Uller et al., 2009;
Maestripieri and Mateo, 2009). The evolution of maternal (or parental) manipulation
has been studied from various perspectives, sometimes with an account of offspring’s
resistance (Alexander, 1974; Trivers, 1974; Michener and Brothers, 1974; Charlesworth,
1978; Charnov, 1978; Parker and Macnair, 1978; Stamps et al., 1978; Craig, 1979; Emlen,
1982; Vehrencamp, 1983; Stubblefield and Charnov, 1986; Kirkpatrick and Lande, 1989;
Ratnieks, 1988; Pamilo, 1991; Frank, 1995;Moore et al., 1997;Wolf et al., 1999; Johnstone,
2000; Crespi and Ragsdale, 2000; Chapman, 2003; Wenseleers et al., 2004a; Shen and
Reeve, 2010;McGlothlin et al., 2010;Uller and Pen, 2011). Ourmodel integrates, extends,
and generalizes various features of these studies. Herewe only illustratewhen ourmodel
would predict that amaternally triggered social behavior ismanipulated. This inference
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has been particularly challenging because high relatednesses also allow for the behavior
to be spontaneous (Bourke and Franks, 1995).
Consider a sexual population in which mothers produce two broods. One or
both parents provide parental care (e.g., provisioning or defense), and adult offspring
disperse from the maternal site to mate and start a new site. Suppose that mothers
can manipulate first-brood offspring to stay in the maternal site for a fraction of
their adulthood. Acquiescing offspring stay, and may express parental care at the
maternal site increasing fitness of the second-brood offspring. Resisting offspring
disperse without delay. Manipulationmay occur, for example, by disrupting offspring’s
development physiologically or psychologically; specifically, by feeding offspring poorly
(Brand and Chapuisat, 2012; Tibbetts et al., 2013) or by inducing stress via aggression
(Young et al., 2006). How manipulation is executed affects the nature of costs and
benefits. For instance, the cost of resistance would in principle be more substantial
for differential feeding than for psychological manipulation (Metcalfe and Monaghan,
2001), yet differential feeding might make poorly-fed individuals able to help only in
moderate amounts.
In this setting, the manipulator is the mother, the subjects of manipulation are first-
brood offspring, and the targets of manipulated behavior are second-brood offspring.
Assuming outbreeding, single mating, even sex ratios and no sex discrimination, the
relevant relatednesses for either diploids or haplodiploids take the following values
(Bulmer, 1994): for first-brood offspring to second-brood offspring rt s = 1/2, for
mother to first-brood offspring rsm = 1/2, and for mother to second-brood offspring
rtm = 1/2. From condition (1.10b), it follows that when the benefit b is greater than
Tp = (cm + carsm)/rtm , manipulation is favored in the absence of resistance. From
condition (1.10a), we have that when b is greater than Tq = (ca−cr )/rt s , acquiescence is
favored. Similarly, when b is greater than Ts = ca/rt s , spontaneous behavior is favored.
Finally, from condition (1.11), if resistance q is initially smaller than T ∗p = q∗+pu, then
manipulated behavior is obtained when bothmanipulation in the absence of resistance
and acquiescence are favored. Assume that manipulation is of little cost to the mother;
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Figure 1.4: Illustration for maternally manipulated behavior. (a) When the benefit
b is greater than Tp manipulation in the absence of resistance is favored, than Tq
acquiescence is favored, and than Ts spontaneous behavior is favored. (b) When
resistance q is initially below T ∗p manipulatedbehavior is obtained if bothmanipulation
in the absence of resistance and acquiescence are favored. Parameter values are ca = 1,
cm = 0.1, and rt s = rtm = rsm = 12 . For T ∗p , we let p = 0 and lines from bottom to top are
for b from 1.3 to 2.
in particular, of 10% the baseline fitness: cm = 0.1. Suppose further that individuals
staying in the maternal nest as adults entirely give up their reproduction (i.e., ca = 1),
and that manipulation is initially absent (i.e., p = 0). Figure 1.4(a) plots thresholds Tp ,
Tq , and Ts and shows a region in which manipulated behavior is obtained although
spontaneous behavior is not favored (gray area), provided that resistance is initially
below the thresholds T ∗p in figure 1.4(b). In the gray region, manipulated behavior
requires smaller benefits than spontaneous behavior. If, for a given system, parameters
could be measured that fall in the gray region, this would suggest that the behavior is
manipulated to the extent that the assumptions of the model hold.
1.4 Discussion
Many social behaviors are triggered by social partners. The social triggermay sometimes
be the result of manipulation, where a behavior is partly or completely under control of
social partners. When this is the case, the evolution of resistance to manipulation may
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reduce or eliminate themanipulated behavior. Previous theoretical research has studied
the evolutionofmanipulationand/or resistance for specific systems (Poulin, 1994; Pagel
et al., 1998; Robert et al., 1999; Wenseleers et al., 2004a; Lion et al., 2006; Gandon
et al., 2009; Kawatsu, 2013). Here we have studied the coevolution of manipulation and
resistance in a simple but general setting. We focused onmanipulated behaviors that are
performed entirely by the manipulated parties, rather than on manipulated behaviors
that are performed in concert between manipulated and manipulating parties. In
our model, if acquiescence to manipulation is not favored (i.e., condition (1.10a) is
violated), then manipulated behavior is eliminated. When acquiescence is favored,
manipulated behavior can be established. It has been thought that the requirement
of acquiescence, or consent, essentially makes manipulated behavior equivalent to
spontaneous behavior (e.g., Hölldobler and Wilson, 1990; Bourke and Franks, 1995).
We compared the conditions for the establishment of manipulated behavior with those
for spontaneous behavior making use of a few assumptions. Such comparison showed
that manipulated behavior can be established under less stringent conditions than
spontaneous behavior. The comparison yielded an expression for the advantage of
manipulated over spontaneous behavior (expression (1.13)) that may allow to infer
whether an observed behavior is either manipulated or spontaneous when the as-
sumptions of the model are approximately met. This approach can be modified to
accommodate assumptions relevant to specific systems. The advantage of manipulated
over spontaneous behavior is a consequence of conditional costs of resistance that do
not apply to spontaneous behavior. Costs of resistance allow for manipulated behavior
to evolve and be maintained with zero relatedness between actors and recipients
despite positive costs (ca ,cr ) if resistance is costlier than acquiescence (inequality
(1.10a)). This contrasts to spontaneous costly behavior, for which genetic or phenotypic
relatedness between actor and recipient is required. Below we discuss themodel and its
applications.
As stated, we have considered manipulated behaviors that are expressed by the
manipulated parties alone (e.g., helping rather thanmating). Wemodeled this by taking
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as multiplicative the contribution of each party to trait expression (i.e., ϕ = p(1− q),
where ϕ refers to the manipulated behavior, p is the contribution of the manipulating
parties and 1− q is the contribution of the manipulated parties). In this approach,
the consent of manipulated individuals is required for the behavior to be expressed
at all. This is relevant to cases in which the manipulated behavior is fully performed
by an individual such as worker behaviors (Hölldobler and Wilson, 1990). In contrast,
other manipulated behaviors can be performed in concert between manipulating and
manipulated parties (Arnqvist and Rowe, 2005). This is typically modeled by taking as
additive the contribution of each party to trait expression (i.e., ϕ = f (x − y), where the
manipulated behavior ϕ is a function of the difference between manipulation effort
x and the opposition to it y ; e.g., Gavrilets, 2000; Gavrilets et al., 2001; Frank and
Crespi, 2011). Manipulated behaviors with additive contribution of parties can always
be expressed if manipulating parties try hard enough. The relevance of one or the other
modeling approaches depends on the nature of the behavior that is beingmanipulated.
In our model, because of multiplicative contribution to trait expression, resistance
must be initially sufficiently small (condition (1.11)) if manipulators’ relatedness to
subjects of manipulation is large enough (rsm >−cm/cr ). Initially small resistance may
occur when a new manipulation strategy arises since there is no previous selection
pressure for resistance to it. The requirement of small resistance is not necessary when
manipulators’ relatedness to subjects of manipulation is small enough (rsm ≤ −cm/cr )
because with such relatedness values, manipulators are either unaffected by or indi-
rectly benefit from resistance. We have made the simplifying assumption that costs are
independent of manipulation and resistance probabilities. This is unrealistic because
costs of manipulation and resistance may often be functions of manipulation and
resistance probabilities; for instance, the more subjects an individual manipulates, the
larger the cost of manipulation; or the more effective resistance is, the more resources
are to be invested in it. In this case, the equilibria of manipulated behavior (p =
1,q = 0) and neutralized manipulated behavior (p = q = 1) will not correspond to full
manipulation andno resistance,or to fullmanipulation and full resistance,but to partial
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manipulation with no resistance, or to partial manipulation and partial resistance
respectively. In addition, costs that are functions of manipulation or resistance can
cause cycles of manipulation and resistance (Robert et al., 1999) because as resistance
evolves high levels and eliminates manipulation, resistance becomes wasteful and
diminishes, which starts a new cycle. Payoffs may also vary for other reasons. Costs
and benefits vary as environmental conditions change in space and developmental or
evolutionary time. Depending on howmanipulation is executed, costs and benefitsmay
be influenced by the manipulating and manipulated parties, and hence they can be
subject to selection in conflicting ways. We have also made the standard assumption
of constant additive genetic variances for both manipulation and resistance. In models
with additive contribution to trait expression (Gavrilets, 2000; Gavrilets et al., 2001) the
magnitude of the genetic variances affects the outcomeof the conflict because the speed
of change is important,but in ourmodel non-zero genetic variances can only change the
basin of attraction towards either outcome.
The inclusive fitness effect of manipulation (eq. (1.6a)) depends on the evolving
resistance probability (q). As a result, theHamilton’s rule formanipulation (hp > 0) does
not determinewhethermanipulatedbehavior is obtained in the long run even if payoffs
are constant. The conditions for manipulated behavior regarding manipulation are 1)
that the inclusive fitness effect of manipulation in the absence of resistance is positive
(M0 > 0), and 2) for rsm > −cm/cr , that the inclusive fitness effect of manipulation
plus its relative rate of increase with acquiescence is also positive (hp +Mpu > 0; eq.
(A1.1)). On the other hand, the inclusive fitness effect of acquiescence (eq. (1.6b)) is
different from that of spontaneous behavior (br − ca). In particular, the direct fitness
effect of acquiescence [i.e.,−(ca−cr )] can be positive despite positive costs; that is, when
resistance is costlier than acquiescence (cr > ca) (Dawkins, 1982; Pagel et al., 1998).
This means that the “cost” term in the Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence (ca − cr ) can be
negative. In such a case, acquiescence is not altruistic in Hamilton’s sense (West et al.,
2006) and is favored even if relatedness of acquiescing subjects toward targets is zero.
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A negative “cost” is often referred to as a benefit in evolutionary parlance, but here it is
only an extorted benefit that arises from acquiescence being less costly than resistance.
Although we have referred to manipulation, our model is relevant to a variety of
mechanisms under other names: for example, coercion, punishment, and deception
(Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Holland and Rice, 1998; Cézilly and Thomas, 2012);
asymmetric interactions or control of dominants over subordinates (Maynard Smith
and Parker, 1976; Vehrencamp, 1983; Johnstone, 2000; Shen and Reeve, 2010); and
conformity biases of individuals in groups with particular customs (Richerson and
Boyd, 2005; Whiten et al., 2005). Some of these cases involve interactions among non-
kin (Clutton-Brock, 2009). Although manipulated behavior can be obtained with zero
relatedness between subjects of manipulation and targets of the manipulated behavior,
it is useful to keep in mind that the relatednesses involved in the model stem from
correlation coefficients that do not necessarily imply kinship (Queller, 1992a, 2011;
Frank, 2012).
Determining whether a socially triggered behavior is spontaneous or manipulated
is less difficult when there is little possibility that it confers direct or indirect benefits
(Hughes et al., 2012). In other cases, determining whether a behavior is spontaneous
or manipulated is particularly challenging. We used the example of workers in eusocial
taxa which may be spontaneous or manipulated helpers. In such cases, the inference of
ancestrally high relatedness (Hughes et al., 2008) is of little help at discerning between
these two sources of behavior because high relatedness can favor both spontaneous and
manipulated behavior (inequality (1.10a)). The lack of perpetual arms races and the
occurrence of honest signaling are sometimes taken as evidence against manipulation
(Keller and Nonacs, 1993; Keller, 2009; Heinze and d’Ettorre, 2009). However, if parties’
contribution to trait expression is multiplicative, perpetual arms races need not occur
as in our model above, and it is conceivable that manipulators may honestly signal
components of inequality (1.10a) (e.g., b or cr ) in which casemanipulatedparties can be
favored to attend the signal. In principle, subtle signaling such as drumming in wasps
(Suryanarayanan et al., 2011) could be enough to deter individuals from developing into
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reproductives if it provides reliable information on the benefit to recipients or costly
resistance. Deception and manipulation are not necessarily associated, and honest
signaling may sometimes say little regarding whether or not a behavior is the result of
manipulation.
Our analysis suggests a way in which inference regarding the above sources of
behavior could be made. Although inequality (1.13) offers a condition for manipulated
rather than spontaneous behavior to be expected, it is based on assumptions that are
not applicable to particular systems; in particular, our assumption of constant costs.
Our approach can be modified to incorporate relevant details. On the other hand, the
nature of costs impose restrictions on the evolutionofmanipulatedbehavior that do not
apply to spontaneousbehavior thereby allowing for further distinctionbetween the two.
While the expectation of manipulated behavior would depend on how manipulation is
exerted, the expectation of spontaneous behavior would not similarly vary with how
it is triggered. The fact that the typical modes of helping among primitively eusocial
taxa involve differential feeding or dominance interactions appears consistent with
manipulated behavior in that there seems to be less reason for spontaneous behavior
to be associated with these specific forms of social triggering.
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A1.1 Appendix A
Dynamic equations
In order to determine the evolutionary change of manipulation p and resistance q ,
consider a set of predictors (e.g., genetic loci) that specify how much of each trait is
expressed by an individual. Let xi j be the amount of predictor i for trait j (= p,q) in
a given individual. For instance, if xi j is the number of alleles at locus i contributing
to trait expression, then for diploids xi j = 0,1,2 if the individual has non-contributing
alleles, one contributing allele, or two contributing alleles respectively. Let βi j be the
partial regression coefficient of trait j on predictors xi j across individuals. The sum
g j =
∑
i βi j xi j is the additive effect of predictors, or breeding value, for trait j in a given
individual. Assume that these additive effects are approximately constant in time (e.g., if
there is little genetic variance and the trait changes by small amounts) and across states.
Then, the evolutionary change in trait j is given by d j/dt = v j∂w/∂g j evaluated at
the population-average j (Frank, 1997), where v j is the variance of breeding value g j
or additive genetic variance for trait j across individuals. For simplicity, we abuse the
notation and write p and q for their population averages.
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Life-for-life relatednesses are defined in terms of regression relatednesses (Hamil-
ton, 1972; Bulmer, 1994). A regression relatedness is the regression coefficient of recip-
ient’s breeding value on actor’s breeding value. For manipulation (eq. (1.5a)) the actors
are manipulators (m) while for resistance (eq. (1.5b)) the actors are subjects (s). The
state the focal individual is in gives the recipient state. Wemake the standard simplifying
assumption of a 1-1 relationship of breeding value to phenotype. Thus, dp/dgp =
ρmm = 1 is the regression relatedness of manipulators toward themselves, dP/dgp =
ρsm is that of manipulators toward reachable subjects, and dΠ/dgp = ρtm is that of
manipulators toward targets. Similarly, dq/dgq = ρss = 1 is the regression relatedness of
subjects toward themselves, whiledQ/dgq = ρt s is the regression relatedness of subjects
toward targets. Life-for-life relatednesses are obtained when regression relatednesses
are weighted by recipient-to-actor reproductive values. That is, r j i = ρ j ik j /ki .
A1.2 Appendix B
Analysis
Assume first that p 6= 0, so that somemanipulation is present. Then equation (1.6b) tells
us that if R < 0, then resistance disappears (q → 0). Once q ≈ 0, the selection gradient
hp ≈M0, so that manipulation p evolves to 1 or 0 depending on whetherM0 is positive
or negative. If R > 0, then complete resistance evolves (q→ 1). Once, q ≈ 1, the selection
gradient hp ≈M0−M , so that manipulation p evolves to 1 or 0 depending on whether
M0−M is positive or negative. There are thus four cases to consider.
• If q→ 0, and R < 0,M0 > 0, then the system evolves to p = 1,q = 0.
• If q→ 0, and R < 0,M0 < 0, then the system evolves to p = 0.
• If q→ 1, and R > 0,M0−M > 0, then the system evolves to p = 1,q = 1.
• If q→ 1, and R > 0,M0−M < 0, then the system evolves to p = 0.
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To complete the analysis we need to consider the model behavior along the line p = 0.
If q∗ < 0 or q∗ > 1, then the sign of hp does not depend on the value of q and the above
analysis extends to the area of the phase-plane where p ≈ 0. If 0< q∗ < 1, then the sign
of hp as a function of q changes as q crosses q∗. This implies that the border p = 0 of
the phase-plane will include a locally stable and a locally unstable segments separated
by q∗. Therefore depending on initial conditions some trajectories will evolve towards
the p = 0 line even when there are locally stable equilibria at p = 1,q = 0 or p = 1,q = 1.
The line delimiting the basin of attraction is obtained from the eigenvectors of the
Jacobian of system (1.5) evaluated at the equilibrium (p,q)= (0,q∗). These eigenvectors
define the lines q = q∗±pu. Convergence to the equilibrium p = 1,q = 0 thus requires
that the initial levels of resistance are q < q∗+pu, where u =
√
−vqksR/(vpkmM) (gray
region in figure 1.2). The inequality q < q∗+pu can be rearranged into
hp +Mpu > 0, (A1.1)
which states that, when rsm > −cm/cr , for manipulated behavior the inclusive fitness
effect for manipulation (hp) plus its relative rate of increase with acquiescence (Mpu)
must be positive.
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Chapter 2
Spontaneous resolution ofmanipulation
conflict
The following chapter is a reprint of a paper submitted for publication.
González-Forero M. Spontaneous resolution of manipulation conflict. Submitted.
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Abstract
In some circumstances, individuals have the possibility to manipulate (i.e., control
partially or completely) the behavior of other individuals. However, resistance to
manipulation would be favored under certain conditions, which may reduce or elim-
inate the manipulated behavior. Such evolutionary conflicts have been studied for
diverse settings including parent-offspring conflict, sexual conflict, and host-parasite
coevolution. Here I show that the manipulation conflict can be resolved in a previously
unidentified way that is of substantial generality. Manipulation of a social behavior
creates selection pressure for increasing efficiency of the behavior before resistance
is complete. The efficiency of the social behavior can become high enough so that
selection for resistance disappears. The outcome is a social behavior triggered by social
partners, yet the triggering and triggered parties are not in conflict anymore. Due to
the final absence of conflict, I refer to this outcome as induced behavior. Induced
behavior can be obtained under less stringent conditions than spontaneous (i.e., non-
manipulated) social behavior. I suggest grounds for thinking that the induction of
behavior is not lost after the conflict is removed. The induction may then appear as
communication. Applications of these results span biology and the social sciences.
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2.1 Introduction
Individuals, vaguely defined, may have the opportunity to influence the traits of other
individuals (Dawkins, 1982). Influencing another individual’s traits is sometimes re-
ferred to as partner control (West Eberhard, 1975; Taylor, 1988), manipulation (Alexan-
der, 1974; Dawkins and Krebs, 1978), indirect genetic effects (Kirkpatrick and Lande,
1989; Wolf et al., 1998) or part of an individual’s extended phenotype (Dawkins, 1982). I
will use the termmanipulationbecause it implies that the control of another individual’s
trait is not necessarily complete, and because of its implicit reference to resistance.
The ability to manipulate the traits of other individuals may be gained by direct
access to such individuals’ physiology, as internal parasites, parents, offspring or sexual
partners with internal fertilization may have (Arnqvist and Rowe, 2005; Maestripieri
and Mateo, 2009; Uller et al., 2009; Hughes et al., 2012). Manipulation can also
be accomplished remotely, for example via sensory exploitation, communication or
deception (Holland and Rice, 1998; Bradbury and Vehrencamp, 2011; Trivers, 2011). In
addition, manipulation can be done by altering the payoffs to other individuals. This
can be effected with power asymmetries, coalitions and alliances, punishment, and
dominance hierarchies (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976; Byrne and Whitten, 1988;
Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; de Waal, 1998; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Mesterton-
Gibbons et al., 2011).
However, manipulation may or may not match the fitness interests of the ma-
nipulated individuals. If so, manipulating and manipulated parties conflict, and the
manipulated individuals may be favored to resist manipulation. Resistance can then
reduce or eliminate the manipulated behavior (Parker and Macnair, 1978; Robert et al.,
1999; Gandon et al., 2009). Alternatively, the manipulated behavior can be maintained
if resistance is costly enough (Pagel et al., 1998; González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012) or
if there is little genetic variance for resistance (Gavrilets, 2000; Gavrilets et al., 2001).
It has been pointed out that competing interactions may evolve into cooperative
interactions when the evolution of payoffs is allowed (Worden and Levin, 2007; Akc˛ay
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and Roughgarden, 2011). In principle, the evolution of payoffs may similarly modify
the outcome of a manipulation conflict. I analyze here the effect of the evolution of
payoffs on the evolution of manipulated behavior. I identify one way in which the
evolution of payoffs can cause resistance to manipulation to become disfavored. This
produces an agreement in the interests of manipulating and manipulated parties as a
result of the selection pressures created by manipulation. Because of the absence of
conflict, I do not refer to the final behavior asmanipulatedbut as induced behavior. The
conditions for induced behavior can be less stringent than those for spontaneous (i.e.,
non-manipulated) behavior without the need of costly resistance or diminished genetic
variance for resistance. The outcome is a highly efficient socially induced behavior over
which there is no actual or potential conflict between inducing and induced parties.
This outcomematches someof the key features of advanced eusociality,which is one the
most extreme forms of sociality (Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009). I briefly discuss further
applications of these results.
2.2 Model formanipulated behavior with social efficiency
I extend the model in González-Forero and Gavrilets (2012) that studies manipulated
behavior by including the evolution of social efficiency.
Consider a populationwhere individuals can be in one of three states at a given time:
“manipulator” state (m), “subject of manipulation” state (s), or “target of manipulated
behavior” state (t ). A single individual can be at one time a manipulator and at another
time a target of manipulated behavior. A manipulatorm manipulates with probability
p subjects of manipulation s that are within its reach. I let p be under control of
the manipulator. A manipulated subject s resists manipulation with probability q ,
which I let be under control of the subject. Alternatively, a manipulated subject s that
acquiesces (i.e., that does not resist) expresses a focal social behavior with probability
ϕ. Specifically,ϕ= P (1−q), where P is the averagemanipulation probability among the
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manipulators that can reach the focal subject. Targets ofmanipulatedbehavior t receive
the fitness effects of the social behavior ϕ expressed by neighboring subjects.
An acquiescing subject pays the cost c of acquiescence and causes a fitness effect
b to targets. I let c be positive, but b may be positive or negative reflecting helping or
harming. A highly efficient acquiescing individual causes greater fitness effects |b| than
a lowly efficient individual. For example, if the social trait ϕ refers to the probability
that an individual stays in the maternal nest as an adult, social efficiency y may refer to
the helping efficiency expressed by the individual in the maternal nest: ϕ and y can be
different in this example since an individual can stay (ϕ> 0) and express no help (i.e., be
totally inefficient y = 0), or any other combination of the two. To define social efficiency
y , I proceed as follows.
Let bmax be the fitness effect that an actor provides to recipients when expressing the
social behavior ϕ at maximum efficiency. bmax can be positive or negative depending
on whether the social behavior is a helping or a harming one. Let y be the normalized
efficiency at expressing the social behavior ϕ; that is, y is the fraction of bmax that an
actor expresses. I assume social efficiency y to be controlled by the actors expressingϕ.
The fitness effect b to a recipient of the social behaviorϕ is
b = bmaxY , (2.1)
where Y is the average social efficiency among the actors that reach the recipient of ϕ.
Social efficiency y can also affect the cost c of the social behavior ϕ. I partition the
cost c into a part cb due to social efficiency y and a part c¬b due to social inefficiency 1−y
(“¬” means “not”; I let cb ,c¬b ≥ 0). In the above example, the cost of social efficiency
cb may occur if effort spent helping is not spent reproducing, while the cost of social
inefficiency c¬b may happen if lack of helping translates into ineffective reproduction,
for example due to overcrowding of the maternal nest with siblings and own offspring
or to poor parenting skills from lack of alloparenting practice (Emlen, 1982). Hence, the
40
cost of the social traitϕ is
c = ycb+ (1− y)c¬b . (2.2)
This yields dynamic equations for the coevolution ofmanipulatedbehaviorϕ and social
efficiency y (Appendix).
2.3 Results
Equations (2.9) in the Appendix specify the Hamilton’s rule for increase in each trait
(i.e., hi > 0). They involve the life-for-life relatedness r j i of actor i toward recipient
i , as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Life-for-life relatedness measures the correlation of
the heritable component of the trait values between the social partners (Hamilton,
1972). Because the model uses techniques that allow for non-genetic inheritance
(e.g., via learning), relatedness here need not refer to genetic relatedness (Frank, 1998).
Manipulation increases when brtm > crsm as long as resistance is not complete (eq.
(2.9a)). Acquiescence to manipulation increases when brt s > c provided there is some
manipulation (eq. (2.9b)). Social efficiency increases when brt s > c − c¬b if there is
some manipulated behavior (eq. (2.9c)). The different condition for social efficiency
when compared to that for acquiescence allows for social efficiency to increase when
acquiescence is not favored. As a result, Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence can become
satisfied in the long run.
Fig. 2.2 shows that the evolution of social efficiency can eliminate resistance.
The process is the following. Under conditions of conflict, as soon as there exists
manipulation, resistance becomes favored and if there is no genetic variation for
social efficiency, then resistance eliminates the manipulated behavior (Fig. 2.2A). With
some genetic variation, social efficiency is favored to increase even though resistance
is also favored (Fig. 2.2B). For example, before resistance is complete, an offspring
manipulated by its mother to help stays in the maternal nest with some probability; in
41
I 
O P 
Næà 
Nçæ 
Nçà 
? > 
Figure 2.1: Relatednesses among social partners and their corresponding payoffs.
Individuals at a given time are either manipulators (m), subjects of manipulation (s), or
targets ofmanipulatedbehavior (t ). Arrows correspond to the life-for-life relatedness r j i
of actor i to recipient j . A manipulatorm can be a target of manipulation t at another
time, in which case rtm = 1. Also indicated are the payoffs to each state: subjects of
manipulation s can pay the cost of acquiescence c, and targets of manipulated behavior
t receive a fitness effect b from acquiescing subjects.
such a case, the manipulated offspring can be favored to be an efficient helper if there
is a cost for inefficiency (see above). Social efficiency can then increase up to a point
where resistance becomes selected against (Fig. 2.2B). At the end of the process, there
is no conflict between manipulator and subject, as both agree on the expression of the
social behavior by the latter. I characterize the conditions for this to happen.
The coevolutionary dynamics between resistance and social efficiency are in Fig.
2.3. If Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence cannot be satisfied for any social efficiency
(Fig. 2.3a), resistance eliminates the manipulated behavior. In contrast, if Hamilton’s
rule can be satisfied for some social efficiency (i.e., above the dashed line in Fig. 2.3b),
the system can converge to a point of full manipulation, no resistance, and maximum
social efficiency (dot in Fig. 2.3b). In this point, there is no (actual or potential) conflict
between manipulator and subject and I refer to it as induced behavior. The system
converges to induced behavior if it starts in the gray area of Fig. 2.3b. This shows that
Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence need not be initially satisfied for induced behavior,
provided that resistance probability is initially sufficiently small. Instead, the condition
for induced behavior is that the system starts above the oblique line delimiting the gray
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Figure 2.2: Coevolution of manipulation p, resistance q , and social efficiency y .
Numerical solutions to the differential equations defined by (2.9)are plotted. (a) Genetic
variation for social efficiency is zero (vy = 0) and resistance evolves and eliminates
any manipulated behavior [i.e., the manipulated behavior ϕ = p(1− q) = 0 in the end].
(b) Genetic variation for social efficiency is non-zero (vy = 0.001) and social efficiency
increases causing resistance to eventually decrease and be eliminated. The remaining
parameter values for A and B are p(0) = q(0) = 0, y(0) = 0.11, rt s = rsm = rtm = 1/2,
cb = c¬b = 1, bmax = 10, vp = 0.001, vq = 0.1, km = ks = kt = 1/3, and hence S = Sm = 5.
area in Fig. 2.3b. This line is determined in the SI, and hence the condition thatmust be
met at the start of the evolutionary process is
brt s + (1−q)S
√
vy/vq > c, (2.3a)
where
S = bmaxr − (cb −c¬b). (2.3b)
The quantity Smeasures individuals’ evolutionary interest in their own social efficiency,
as shown by the right-most expression in eq. (2.9c). vy and vq are the additive genetic
variances of social efficiency and resistance respectively. Condition (2.3a) is a relaxed
Hamilton’s rule, and its relaxing term [(1−q)S√vy/vq ] measures the speed of increase
in social efficiency relative to resistance.
In the online Supporting Information, I build an analogous model in which the
probability of expressing the focal trait ϕ is completely under control of the individuals
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Figure 2.3: Coevolutionary dynamics of resistance q and social efficiency y . The
arrows indicate the direction of change. The dashed line is the level y∗ = c¬b/S of
social efficiency at which Hamilton’s rule for spontaneous behaviorϕ becomes satisfied
(br = c). Thick strokes indicate stable equilibria. In the gray area, the system converges
to acquiescence and maximum social efficiency. For initially small probability of
resistance, Hamilton’s rule for the focal behavior need not be satisfied initially.
expressing it. I refer to this case as spontaneous behavior. The coevolution of spon-
taneous behavior ϕ and social efficiency y also allows for the spontaneous behavior
to be obtained when a relaxed Hamilton’s rule is satisfied (condition (S7a) in SI).
The relaxed Hamilton’s rule for spontaneous behavior is entirely analogous to that for
manipulated behavior (2.3a), except that the factor 1−q is replaced by the probabilityϕ
of expressing the spontaneous behavior. As a result, if the probabilityϕ of spontaneous
behavior is initially small, the relaxed Hamilton’s rule for spontaneous behavior reduces
to Hamilton’s rule (br > c). In contrast, if the probability q of resistance is initially
small, the relaxed Hamilton’s rule for manipulated behavior is maintained. In principle,
initially small probability of resistance may be expected when a novel manipulation
strategy arises. The reason is that before the new manipulation strategy arises, there
is no selection pressure for resistance. This, however, is an empirical question thatmust
be addressed on a case by case basis and whose answer may be affected by selection for
homeostasis in particular systems.
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A numerical illustration of the coevolution of manipulation, resistance, and social
efficiency is given in Fig. 2.4. The gray plane, defined by condition (2.3a), specifies
the region for convergence to induced behavior. The full set of conditions for induced
behavior are the following (see SI). When manipulation and resistance are initially
small, fully efficient socially induced behavior [(p,q, y) = (1,0,1)] is obtained when the
following conditions hold:
brt s +S
√
vy/vq > c (2.4a)
bmaxrt s > cb (2.4b)
brtm > crsm if rsm > 0 (2.4c)
bmaxrtm > cbrsm if rsm ≤ 0. (2.4d)
Condition (2.4a) states that acquiescence must become favored for some social effi-
ciency; condition (2.4b) that acquiescence can be favored for some social efficiency;
condition (2.4c) that manipulation is favored; and condition (2.4d) that manipulation
does not become disfavored at high social efficiency. The latter condition stems from
the fact that manipulation is favored when it harms sufficiently unrelated subjects
(González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012).
Comparison between spontaneous and induced behavior.
Comparing the models for manipulated and spontaneous behavior yields a condi-
tion that specifies when induced behavior can require less stringent conditions than
spontaneous behavior. This occurs when induced behavior is obtained even though
spontaneous behavior is not. This is the case when initially the relaxed Hamilton’s
rule for acquiescence is satisfied (ineq. (2.3a)), but the relaxed Hamilton’s rule for
spontaneous behavior is not (ineq. (S7a) in SI does not hold). Assume that spontaneous
behavior, manipulation, and resistance are all initially small (i.e., ϕ,p,q ≈ 0 initially).
Also assume that the relatedness of actors to recipients for the spontaneous behavior is
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Figure 2.4: Example of numerical solutions for the three dimensional system of
manipulation, resistance and social efficiency (p,q, y). Numerical solutions for different
initial conditions are in gray, and arrows indicate the direction and speed (length of the
arrow) of change. The outcome of induced behavior is indicated by the dot, where
(p,q, y) = (1,0,1). The plane is y = y∗ − (1− q)√vy/vq (or equivalently, brt s + (1−
q)S
√
vy/vq = c) which is constant with respect to manipulation p. No solution crosses
the plane, which divides the basin of attraction for any manipulation p. The parameter
values are vp = 0.001, vq = 0.1, vy = 0.05, km = ks = 1/3, rt s = rsm = rtm = 1/2,
cb = c¬b = 1, and bmax = 4.
analogous to the relatedness of subjects to targets for themanipulatedbehavior (i.e., r ≈
rst ). Therefore, induced behavior requires less stringent conditions than spontaneous
behavior if at the start of the process
0< c−brt s < S
√
vy/vq , (2.5)
provided that the remaining conditions (2.4) hold. Expression (2.5) makes it transparent
that it is the evolution of social efficiency (measured by S and vy ) that allows for the
advantage of induced behavior to occur, since expression (2.5) cannot be satisfied if
Svy = 0.
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2.4 Discussion
The expression of social behaviors often requires the proper triggering by social part-
ners. Signals are a pervasive feature in nature. The seemingly high incidence of
social triggering of behavior relative to other means (e.g., abiotic cues or information
intrinsic to the individual expressing the behavior, such as age) may be the result
of the benefits of information or of the relatively lax conditions for manipulation to
evolve. A difficulty with the latter case is that manipulation may favor the evolution
of resistance which can reduce or eliminate the expression of manipulated behavior
(Trivers, 1974; Dawkins and Krebs, 1979; Keller and Nonacs, 1993; Bourke and Franks,
1995; Ratnieks and Wenseleers, 2008). I have shown that manipulated behavior could
persist despite the evolution of resistance because of the evolution of payoffs. The
outcome is socially induced behavior over which there is no (actual or potential) conflict
between manipulating and manipulated parties. Due to the lack of conflict, I have
referred to this outcome as induced behavior. The conditions for induced behavior
to evolve can be less stringent than the conditions for spontaneous behavior (i.e.,
behavior fully under control of the individuals expressing it). Below I discuss themodel,
reinterpretations of data as suggested by the model, and possible applications.
The model presented above is deliberately simple so that complete analytic treat-
ment is possible. I obtained analytical conditions for induced behavior and compared
them to those for spontaneous behavior. Induced behavior can require less stringent
conditions than spontaneous behavior because of the evolution of the fitness effect
b to recipients of the manipulated behavior. This advantage of induced behavior is
possible for two reasons. First, the conditions for selection of a social trait (hϕ) may
be different from the conditions for selection of the social trait’s efficiency (hy ). This
difference arises because of costs of social inefficiency c¬b . The selective difference
between the social trait and its efficiency allows for social efficiency to evolve when the
social trait is not favored. The evolution of social efficiency can make the Hamilton’s
rule for the social trait to become eventually satisfied even though it initially is not. In
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a sense, the evolution of social efficiency rescues the social trait. Second, the initial
conditions that allow for rescue of the social traitmightmore easily holdwhen the social
trait is manipulated rather than spontaneous. In particular, when the social behavior is
manipulated, the resistance probability to manipulation may be initially small, which
translates into initially large probability of acquiescence. This allows for social efficiency
to evolve when the social behavior is not favored. While the first reason above applies
to both spontaneous and induced behavior, the second reason preferentially holds for
induced behavior to the extent that the probability of expressing spontaneous social
behavior is initially small. Therefore, it is the second reason that can ultimately cause
induced behavior to require less stringent conditions than spontaneousbehavior, which
is made explicit by expression (2.5).
As a result of these two reasons, induced behavior can be obtained when a relaxed
Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence holds (ineq. (2.3a)). The relaxing term is a function
of how much social efficiency is favored from the point of view of the subjects of
manipulation (measured by S). In addition, the relaxing term is also a function of the
genetic variances of social efficiency vy and resistance vq . Depending on the value of
these quantities, themagnitude of the relaxing term can be substantial. It is a noticeable
fact that the relaxing term is not eliminatedwith initially smallmanipulationprobability
p as illustrated by Fig. 2.4. This is because p multiplies the entire inequality (2.3a), as it
equally affects the rate of change of resistance and social efficiency.
The simplicity of the model, however, gives room for an objection, that in turn sug-
gests a hypothesis that links manipulation to communication. When social efficiency
crosses the point at which acquiescence becomes favored (y∗ in Fig. 2.3), the social
behavior is favored regardless of whether or not there is manipulation. This raises the
question of what would maintain the social triggering of behavior after this threshold
is crossed. In particular, manipulation would be wasteful if the social behavior is
expressed evenwithout it, and the social behavior does not needmanipulationanymore
for it to be expressed. These were not issues in the model above because manipulation
was assumed to be costless, and the social behavior could only be expressed if there
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was manipulation. Even if these two aspects were modified in the model, an interesting
possibility is that the reduction of social triggering causes dissipation of the high fitness
effect b that made the spontaneous behavior favored in the first place. For example,
if manipulators are mothers of two subsequent broods where first-brood offspring
are subjects of manipulation and second-brood offspring are targets of manipulated
behavior, reduction of social triggering may cause some second-brood offspring to
develop as helpers. The helping offered to second-brood helpers would be a waste if
second-brood helpers are unable to help further broods or reproduce themselves. The
fitness effect b averaged across recipients would then be smaller if offspring developed
as helperswithout information about the brood they belong to. As a result, spontaneous
behavior that ignores manipulation can be disfavored because it dissipates the fitness
effect b. If so, the spontaneous behavior would be expressed only when manipulated,
and hence reducedmanipulationwould be disfavored because the focal social behavior
would also be reduced. To the extent that this holds, the social triggering may be
interpreted as being coopted to serve communication purposes. Manipulation would
thus produce induced behavior that is maintained by the cooption of manipulation as
communication. However, a formal exploration of this possibility is beyond the scope
of the present paper.
The results reported here are immediately relevant to discussions of the evolution
of eusociality. Parental manipulation, where eusocial workers are manipulated by their
parents to help, is a classic hypothesis for the evolution of eusociality (Alexander, 1974;
Michener and Brothers, 1974; Bourke and Franks, 1995). However, offspring consent to
manipulation is considered to be necessary for offspring to express helping, specially in
the large colonies of advanced eusocial taxa where mothers would not be able to coerce
offspring into helping (Hölldobler and Wilson, 1990; Bourke and Franks, 1995; Keller
and Nonacs, 1993; Ratnieks and Wenseleers, 2008). Evidence supporting offspring-
favored outcomes in parent-offspring conflicts has served to support this view (Trivers
and Hare, 1976; Keller and Nonacs, 1993; Heinze and d’Ettorre, 2009; West, 2009). The
results reported here show that manipulation can create consent in the manipulated
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parties. The outcome of a parent-offspring conflict may thus appear as if offspring
have won, given that in the end helping occurs and its Hamilton’s rule is satisfied.
However, in a sense, both parties win. For example, queen pheromones, which are
subtle mechanism for social triggering of behavior in advanced eusocial taxa, often
honestly signal queen fertility (Keller and Nonacs, 1993; Heinze and d’Ettorre, 2009).
Such honesty has suggested that queen pheromones are not manipulative (Keller and
Nonacs, 1993; Heinze and d’Ettorre, 2009). A different interpretation suggested by
the results reported here is that queen pheromones might be the result of ancestral
manipulation. The results above show how Hamilton’s rule could mark the end point
at which the social trait becomes favored, while the initial points that bring the system
toward satisfaction of the rule may be decisive in the final form of the social behavior
observed.
The evolution of social efficiency y can in the case of eusociality represent worker
specialization. Worker specialization is one of the key components of advanced euso-
ciality (where another component is queen specialization which is not captured by the
model above) (Hölldobler andWilson, 2009). The results above show that manipulation
could produce socially induced behavior, worker specialization, and low level of conflict
between inducing and induced parties, all of whichmatch defining features of advanced
eusociality (Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009). More broadly, these results offer a distinct
mechanism for the evolution of division of labor applicable to a variety of contexts. In
particular,manipulationof social behavior can bring specialization that only later in the
process becomes in the interests of the highly specialized laborers. This contrasts with
previous theories that regard specialization as bringing direct or indirect benefits from
the start of the process (Smith, 1776; Oster and Wilson, 1978; Beshers and Fewell, 2001;
Wahl, 2002).
The model is general in that it does not imply particular kinds of interactions such
as parent-offspring, male-female, or unrelated host and parasite. Interactions can
be between rather arbitrary social partners. The type of interaction can be specified
by the relatednesses involved. Relatednesses are here defined in their general form
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(Frank, 1998, 2013): they measure the correlation in the heritable components of the
traits between actors and recipients of the traits. These correlations need not arise
from kinship (kin selection) (Hamilton, 1964a, 1970), but may arise through condi-
tional response to partner’s behavior (which allows for reciprocity to evolve) (Queller,
1985; Frank, 1994; Fletcher and Zwick, 2006), biased assortment among groups (which
allows for group selection) (Queller, 1985; Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009), manipulation,
punishment, partner choice (Queller, 2011), or any other mechanism that creates such
correlations. In addition, the traits need not have a genetic basis. Heritability can be
cultural (e.g., through learning) or in any other way that correlates the phenotype of
“parents” and “offspring” (Frank, 1998; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Therefore, these
results are also relevant to cultural manipulation.
As an example, central governments are regarded as particularly powerful drivers
of social change (Hobbes, 1651; Rousseau, 1762; Pettit, 1997). For instance, they have
been suggested to be key promoters of a large-scale tendency of violence decline across
human history (Pinker, 2011). The results presented here illustrate one way in which
government effectiveness can be achieved. In particular, the introduction of a new
policy by a ruling government can cause citizens to revolt. As affected citizens pursue
attempts to revert the policy, such citizens may be simultaneously favored to find ways
of thriving in the recently established system (e.g., in terms of the model, if there is a
cost of social inefficiency). Citizens may then eventually become sufficiently proficient
in the new system so that reasons to attempt policy reversal dissolve. If one had not
seen that the initial process started from governmental influence (as would be the case
for ancestral biological manipulation), the outcome of the manipulation conflict would
in the end appear as if the subjects of manipulation had won since Hamilton’s rule for
acquiescence is satisfied. However, in a certain sense, both parties win given that the
conflict disappears.
The models presented here are deliberately simple so that complete analytical
treatment is possible. Enhancing their realism will necessarily affect many of their
specifications. Stochastic effects can take the evolutionary trajectories out of the basin
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of attraction toward induced behavior. Variable costs of manipulation and resistance,
and time-dependence of quantities that were here assumed to be constant will change
the dynamics. However, the qualitative understanding provided by the models may
prove more robust.
Appendix
For simplicity, I assume that there are no costs of manipulation and resistance. Because
manipulators pay no cost of manipulation and the fitness effects of the social behavior
ϕ are received by targets, the fitness payoff to a manipulator m is the baseline fitness
which I let bewm = 1. On the other hand, an acquiescing subject of manipulation s pays
the cost of acquiescence c. Then, the payoff to a subject of manipulation is
ws = P (1−q)(1−c)+Pq + (1−P )
= 1−cP (1−q). (2.6)
A target of manipulated behavior t receives a fitness effect b from its acquiescing
neighbors. The fitness effect b can be positive or negative. The average resistance
probability among subjects of manipulation in the focal patch is Q. Thus, the payoff
to a target of manipulated behavior is
wt = P (1−Q) (1+b)+PQ+ (1−P )
= 1+bP (1−Q). (2.7)
As before, let k j be the reproductive value of state j (=m, s, t ). Therefore, the fitness of a
random individual is w =∑k jw j which becomes
w = 1−kscP (1−q)+ktbP (1−Q). (2.8)
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The payoffs b and c are defined as in equations (2.1)and (2.2), where the social efficiency
y of an acquiescing subject is under the acquiescing subject’s control and Y is the
average social efficiency among acquiescing subjects in the patch.
Resulting dynamic equations.
Assuming negligible association between the traits, the resulting dynamic equations
are di/dt = vikacthi , where di/dt is derivative of i with respect to time (i = p,q, y ,
which denote population averages) (Frank, 1998). vi is the additive genetic variance
of i (“genetic” is the customary name, but it also refers to non-genetic inheritance–e.g.,
via learning). kact is the class reproductive value of the actors of trait i . The actors for
the equation of manipulation p are manipulatorsm while the actors for the equations
of resistance q and social efficiency y are subjects of manipulation s. hi is the inclusive
fitness effect of trait i . They are
hp = (1−q)(brtm −crsm) = (1−q)(ySm −c¬brsm) (2.9a)
hq =−p(brt s −c) =−p(yS−c¬b) (2.9b)
hy =
p(1−q)
y
[brt s − (c−c¬b)] = p(1−q)S. (2.9c)
Here r j i = k j /kiρ j i is the life-for-life relatedness of actor i to recipient j (where i =
m, s, and j = s, t ). The regression relatednesses ρ j i are: for manipulators to subjects
ρsm = dP/dgp , for manipulators to targets ρtm = dP/dgp , for subjects to themselves
ρss = dq/dgq = dy/dg y = 1, and for subjects to targets ρt s = dQ/dgq = dY /dg y . The
quantity Sm = bmaxrtm−rsm(cb−c¬b) measuresmanipulators’ interest in subjects’ social
efficiency.
The inclusive fitness effects of resistance and social efficiency (eqs. (2.9b) and
(2.9c)) are analogous to those of spontaneous behavior and social efficiency in the
spontaneous behavior model (eqs. (S5) in SI), except that the one for resistance (eq.
(2.9b)) has the opposite sign to that of spontaneous behavior (eq. (S5a) in SI). This
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only means that when the Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence (i.e., brt s > c) is satisfied,
resistance decreases. The inclusive fitness effect of manipulation (eq. (2.9a)) shows
that manipulation is favored under different conditions than acquiescence (eq. (2.9b)),
which allows for conflict over the social trait ϕ between the controlling parties. A
more subtle difference with the system of the spontaneous behavior model which is
key for the results reported here is that the inclusive fitness effect of social efficiency
in the manipulated behavior model (eq. (2.9c)) depends on p(1−q), rather than on the
spontaneously controlledϕ in eq. (S5b) in SI. In consequence, p(1−q) can becomenon-
zero when manipulation is favored (brtm > crsm) even if acquiescence is not (brr s < c)
as long as resistance is small. This contrasts with the model for spontaneous behavior
forwhichϕbecomes non-zero only if the spontaneous behavior is favored (br > c). That
is, social efficiency can here start evolving when manipulation arises rather than when
the spontaneous behavior arises.
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A2.1 Supporting Information
The models use techniques (Frank, 1998) derived from the Price (1970) equation and
hence relatively few assumptions are necessary.
A2.2 Spontaneous behavior
In this section, I develop a simple model for the evolution of payoffs in a common
evolutionary model of social behavior (Hamilton, 1970; Taylor and Frank, 1996; Frank,
1998). This illustrates the basic effect of the evolution of payoffs that will be of interest
in the manipulated behavior section. Here I assume that the social trait is fully under
control of the individual expressing it and I refer to such a trait as spontaneous.
A2.2.1 Model for spontaneous behavior
Fitness
Consider a population of individuals so that at a given time, each individual is in one of
two states: actor or recipient. An individual in the actor state expresses some focal social
trait (e.g., helping or harming) with probabilityϕ, which is under control of the actor. A
reachable individual in the recipient state receives a fitness effect b from the actor. The
fitness effect b can either be positive or negative, reflecting the helping or harming of
recipients respectively.
Actors that express the social trait pay a cost c (I let all direct fitness effects of the
social trait be non-negative, reflecting costs). Letting the baseline fitness be 1, the fitness
payoff for an actor is
wact =ϕ(1−c)+ (1−ϕ)
= 1−ϕc. (A2.1)
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The average probability of expressing the social trait over actors that can reach a focal
recipient isΦ. Then, the payoff to a recipient is
wrec =Φ(1+b)+ (1−Φ)
= 1+Φb. (A2.2)
Actors and recipients may have intrinsically different possibilities of leaving descen-
dants (e.g., if actors are typically older than recipients (Charlesworth, 1994), or if the
genetic system is haplodiploid so that males are haploid and always contribute the
same genes to their female offspring but no genes to next generation’s males (Bulmer,
1994)). For the sake of generality, I do not specify how the intrinsic differences in leaving
descendants arise. As a result, the calculation of fitness of a random individual in the
population requires that the fitness of an individual in a given state (or class) is weighted
by the state’s reproductive value (Taylor, 1990; Taylor and Frank, 1996). The reproductive
value of state j , which I will denote by k j , is the probability that an individual in the
long-term future of the population descends from a state j individual in the current
population (
∑
k j = 1). Therefore, the fitness of a random individual in the population is
w =∑k jw j (Taylor, 1990; Taylor and Frank, 1996) which in the present model becomes
w = 1−kactϕc+krecΦb. (A2.3)
This is a standard expression for the fitness of socially behaving individuals that applies
to arbitrary genetic (and non-genetic) systems (Hamilton, 1970; Frank, 1998).
I use this model to illustrate the effect of the evolution of payoffs b and c on the
evolution of the social behavior ϕ. Payoffs b and c are defined by eqs. (2.1) and (2.2)
in the main text. I study the coevolution of the spontaneous behavior ϕ and social
efficiency y .
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Resulting dynamic equations
I use the techniques of (Taylor and Frank, 1996) and (Frank, 1997) to obtain dynamic
equations for the approximate evolutionary change in trait i (= ϕ, y) due to selection.
The equation for trait i is given by vi∂w/∂gi evaluated at the population average values,
where vi is the additive genetic variance of trait i and gi is the trait’s breeding value (or
heritable component) in the actor (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Frank, 1997). The additive
genetic variance vi is the variance in the breeding value gi which need not refer to genes
if the trait can be inherited by othermeans (e.g., via learning). Thus, neither the additive
genetic variance vi nor the breeding value gi assume that the trait is necessarily under
genetic control. This is important for cultural evolution and other applications.
Therefore, assuming that the traits are uncorrelated, the dynamic equation for trait i
is
di
dt
= vikacthi , (A2.4)
where hi is the inclusive fitness effect of trait i on actors. The inclusive fitness effects of
spontaneous behaviorϕ and social efficiency y are
hϕ = br −c = yS−c¬b (A2.5a)
hy =
ϕ
y
[br − (c−c¬b)] =ϕS. (A2.5b)
Here r = krec/kactρrec,act is the life-for-life relatedness of actors to recipients (Hamilton,
1972; Bulmer, 1994),which is defined in terms of the regression coefficient of relatedness
of actors to recipients ρrec,act = dΦ/dgϕ = dY /dg y (Hamilton, 1970; Queller, 1992a;
Taylor and Frank, 1996). The regression relatedness ρrec,act is the regression coefficient
of recipients’ breeding value on actors’ breeding value, and therefore relatedness here
can be caused by but does not necessarily refer to genetic association.
The dynamic analysis of system (A2.4) is facilitated by rearranging inclusive fitness
effects hi in terms of the quantity S as defined by eq. (2.3b) in themain text. S measures
actors’ evolutionary interest in their own social efficiency, as shown by eq. (A2.5b).
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When social efficiency is minimal (y = 0), the inclusive fitness effect of spontaneous
behavior becomes hϕ =−c¬b in which case the spontaneous behavior decreases. When
social efficiency is maximal (y = 1), the inclusive fitness effect of the spontaneous
behavior reduces to hϕ = bmaxr − cb . Hence, if bmaxr < cb , the spontaneous behavior
decreases for any social efficiency y . The dynamics in this case are illustrated in Fig.
A2.1A.Whether or not social efficiency y increases depends on the sign of S. In any case,
the outcome is the loss of the spontaneous social behavior [(ϕ, y)= (0, y)].
If bmaxr > cb , Hamilton’s rule for the spontaneous behavior becomes satisfied when
y > y∗, where y∗ = c¬b/S is the critical social efficiency at which the Hamilton’s rule for
the spontaneous behavior becomes satisfied. The point (ϕ, y)= (0, y∗) is an equilibrium
and defines the global dynamics because of the linearity of system (A2.4). It is easily
checked that this equilibrium is a saddle and, therefore, that the dynamics of the system
are as illustrated in Fig. A2.1B.
The line delimiting the gray region in Fig. A2.1 can be obtained from the eigenvectors
of the Jacobian of system (A2.4) that define lines with negative slope with respect to ϕ.
Such eigenvectors are proportional to (−√vϕ/vy ,1). Because the intercept with the y
axis is at y∗, these eigenvectors occur in the line y = y∗−ϕ√vy/vϕ. This shows that the
condition for the system to be in the gray region is
y > y∗−ϕ
√
vy/vϕ. (A2.6)
A2.2.2 Results for the spontaneous behaviormodel
Eqs. (A2.5) show that the Hamilton’s rules (i.e., hi > 0) for spontaneous behavior and
its efficiency are different. That is, the spontaneous behavior ϕ and its efficiency y
can increase under different conditions. The former increases when br > c, while
the latter increases when br > c − c¬b provided that the probability of expressing the
spontaneous behavior is non-zero (ϕ > 0). This difference in selection, caused by
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the cost of social inefficiency c¬b , allows for social efficiency to increase even though
spontaneous behavior is not favored.
In thismodel, there are two possible outcomes: either the spontaneousbehavior dis-
appears [(ϕ, y)= (0, y)] or it evolves tomaximumefficiency [(ϕ, y)= (1,1)]. Spontaneous
behavior withmaximum social efficiency (ϕ, y)= (1,1) is obtained when
br +ϕS
√
vy/vϕ > c (A2.7a)
bmaxr > cb . (A2.7b)
Inequality (A2.7a) is a rearrangement of inequality (A2.6). Inequality (A2.7b) guarantees
both that Hamilton’s rule for spontaneous behavior can be satisfied for some social
efficiency y and that social efficiency is favored (i.e., that S > 0). Inequality (A2.7a) is a
relaxedHamilton’s rule for spontaneousbehavior since it requires a smaller br /c ratio to
be satisfied than the Hamilton’s rule for spontaneous behavior. This is because the term
ϕS
√
vy/vϕ is non-negative if condition (A2.7b) holds. This termmeasures selection for
social efficiency (ϕS) and the genetic variation of social efficiency relative that for the
social behavior (
√
vy/vϕ). Hence, the Hamilton’s rule for spontaneous behavior need
not be satisfied initially for fully efficient social behavior to be obtained if the term
ϕS
√
vy/vϕ is large enough. For Fig. A2.1A, the Hamilton’s rule for the spontaneous
behavior cannot be satisfied and the spontaneous behavior always disappears. For Fig.
A2.1B, the Hamilton’s rule for the spontaneous behavior is not satisfied in the region
below the dashed line (br < c), but it becomes satisfied in the region above it (br > c).
When the system starts in the gray region, it converges to spontaneous behavior and
maximum social efficiency [(ϕ, y) = (1,1)]. Hence, to obtain fully efficient spontaneous
behavior it is not required that theHamilton’s rule for the spontaneousbehavior (br > c)
is satisfied initially (Fig. A2.1). That is, if the spontaneous behavior ϕ is not favored but
it is initially high enough so that the system falls in the gray area, the evolution of social
efficiency y causes the spontaneous social behavior to eventually become favored as its
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Figure A2.1: Coevolutionary dynamics of spontaneous behavior ϕ and social efficiency
y . The arrows indicate the direction of change. The dashed line is the level y∗ = c¬b/S of
social efficiency at which Hamilton’s rule for spontaneous behaviorϕ becomes satisfied
(br = c). Thick strokes indicate stable equilibria. In the gray region the system converges
to spontaneous behavior. For initially small probability of spontaneous behavior,
Hamilton’s rule for the focal behavior must be satisfied initially.
Hamilton’s rule becomes satisfied. The exact condition for the system to be in the gray
area is given by inequality (A2.7a).
However, the term ϕS
√
vy/vϕ in inequality (A2.7a) is proportional to ϕ. At the start
of the coevolutionary process, the spontaneous behaviorϕmay often be generally close
to zero in which case the relaxing term disappears. In this case, spontaneous behavior
still requires its Hamilton’s rule to be satisfied. This feature is reverted for manipulated
behavior.
A2.3 Results for themanipulated behaviormodel
Dividing by p the system specified by eqs. (2.9) in the main text produces equations
on q and y that are independent of p and hence can be studied independently. The
analysis of the dynamics of the resulting system (q, y) is analogous to that for the system
of spontaneous behavior (ϕ, y) (eqs. (A2.5)). This analysis shows that the system of
resistance and social efficiency (q, y) is a mirror image of the system for spontaneous
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behavior (Fig. 2.3 in the main text). This system has two outcomes: either resistance
becomes complete [(q, y)= (1, y)], or fully efficient acquiescence is established [(q, y)=
(0,1)]. In particular, for Fig. 3A resistance is established, while for Fig. 3B fully efficient
acquiescence is obtained in the gray region. As before, Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence
becomes satisfied above the dashed line (brt s > c), but the evolution of social efficiency
allows for convergence to acquiescence even if its Hamilton’s rule is not satisfied (dark
gray region). This requires that resistance is initially small so that the system falls within
the dark gray region.
Proceeding as before, the reduced system (q, y) converges to acquiescence and
maximum social efficiency (q, y)= (0,1) when
brt s + (1−q)S
√
vy/vq > c (A2.8a)
bmaxrt s > cb . (A2.8b)
Inequalities (A2.8) have analogous interpretations to those of inequalities (A2.7). Thus,
condition (A2.8b) allows the Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence to be satisfied for some
social efficiency, and condition (A2.8a) is a relaxed Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence.
However, the relaxing term (1− q)S√vy/vq is now proportional to 1− q instead of ϕ,
and hence such a term is not necessarily negligible if resistance is small. Initially small
resistance may occur if the initial absence of manipulation causes an initial absence of
selection pressure for resistance. When this is so, the Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence
does not need to be satisfied initially for highly efficient acquiescence to be obtained.
An important feature of the relaxed Hamilton’s rule (A2.8a) is that it holds for any
manipulation p, and hence its relaxing term is not the only one multiplied by p in
the full system (p,q, y). Therefore, the relaxing term in (A2.8a) does not disappear for
initially small p in the full system (p,q, y). This is illustrated in Fig. (2.4) in the main
text. In the figure, solutions for the full system (p,q, y) are plotted. Condition (A2.8a)
holds above the gray plane. No evolutionary path crosses the plane, which delimits the
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basin of attraction for any p. That is, the relaxing term (1−q)S√vy/vq applies to the full
system (p,q, y) and does not disappear for small p.
System (2.9) in the main text can also be divided by 1− q and the resulting system
produces equations for p and y that are independent of q and can then be studied
independently. The dynamics are as follows. When social efficiency is minimal (y = 0),
the inclusive fitness effect for manipulation becomes hp = −c¬brsm , the sign of which
depends on the sign of the relatedness of manipulators toward subjects rsm . When
social efficiency ismaximal (y = 1), the inclusive fitness effect formanipulation becomes
hp = bmaxrtm − cbrsm . Therefore, when rsm > 0 and bmaxrtm < cbrsm , manipulation
decreases for any social efficiency y , as illustrated in Fig. A2.2A,C. In contrast, when
rsm > 0 and bmaxrtm > cbrsm , manipulation becomes favored at some social efficiency.
Specifically, manipulation increases if y > y∗p , where y∗p = c¬b/Sm is the social efficiency
at which Hamilton’s rule for manipulation becomes favored (i.e., brtm > crsm). This
defines an equilibrium at (p, y) = (0, y∗p ) which, because of the linearity of the reduced
system, defines the global dynamics. It is easy to verify that the equilibrium is a center if
S < 0 and a saddle if S > 0. Hence, the dynamics are those in Fig. A2.2B,D. The basin of
attraction towards the equilibrium (p, y)= (1,1), calculated as before, is given by
y > y∗p −p
√
vyksS/(vpkmSm). (A2.9)
For rsm < 0, when social efficiency is minimal (y = 0), the inclusive fitness effect
for manipulation is positive (hp = −c¬brsm > 0). Manipulation is thus favored even
though subjects are entirely socially inefficient (y = 0). If the inclusive fitness effect
of manipulation at maximal social efficiency is negative (hp = bmaxrtm − cbrsm < 0),
manipulation becomes disfavored at the social efficiency y = y∗p . In this case, the
equilibrium (p, y) = (0, y∗p ) is a saddle if S < 0 and a center if S > 0, producing the
dynamics in Fig. A2.3A,C. If the inclusive fitness effect ofmanipulation atmaximal social
efficiency is positive (hp = bmaxrtm−cbrsm > 0). The resulting dynamics are those in Fig.
A2.3B,D. These dynamics arise because the negative relatedness ofmanipulators toward
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Figure A2.2: Coevolutionary dynamics of manipulation p and social efficiency y with
positive relatedness of manipulators toward subjects of manipulation (rsm > 0). See the
legend of Fig. A2.1 for explanation. Here the dashed-and-dotted line corresponds to the
critical social efficiency for manipulation y∗p = c¬b/Sm above which the Hamilton’s rule
for manipulation becomes satisfied (i.e., above which manipulation becomes favored).
In the gray area the system converges to manipulation and full social efficiency.
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Figure A2.3: Coevolutionary dynamics of manipulation p and social efficiency y with
negative relatedness of manipulators toward subjects of manipulation (rsm < 0). See
the legend of Fig. A2.2 for explanation. In the gray area, full manipulation and social
efficiency is obtained.
subjects causes manipulation to be favored even if subjects are completely inefficient
since manipulation harms the subjects (provided that c¬b > 0) (as in (González-Forero
and Gavrilets, 2012)).
Hence, in the reduced system of manipulation and social efficiency (p, y), there are
three possible outcomes: 1) no manipulation [(p, y) = (0, y)], 2) full manipulation of
inefficient behavior [(p, y) = (1,0)], or 3) full manipulation of fully efficient behavior
[(p, y) = (1,1)]. If relatedness of manipulators to subjects of manipulation is positive
(rsm > 0), the reduced system (p, y) converges to manipulation of efficient behavior
[(p, y)= (1,1)] when
bmaxrtm > cbrsm (A2.10a)
bmaxrt s > cb −c¬b (A2.10b)
brtm +pSm
√
vyksS/(vpkmSm)> crsm . (A2.10c)
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Condition (A2.10a) guarantees that the Hamilton’s rule for manipulation is satisfied for
sufficiently high social efficiency (i.e., that brtm > crsm for some high y). Inequality
(A2.10b) is the condition for social efficiency to be favored (i.e., S > 0). Condition
(A2.10c) is a relaxed Hamilton’s rule for manipulation. The evolutionary dynamics for
the reduced system (p, y) when rsm > 0 are illustrated in Fig. A2.2. Similarly to the
results above, in Fig. A2.2A,C, manipulation cannot be favored. In Fig. A2.2B,D, the
Hamilton’s rule for manipulation is not satisfied below the dashed-and-dotted line (i.e.,
brtm < crsm) but it is satisfied above the line (brtm > crsm). The gray area gives the
region for which manipulation of efficient behavior is obtained. As seen from both Fig.
A2.2D and from the relaxing termof condition (A2.10c), if p is small initially, the relaxing
term in the Hamilton’s rule for manipulation is negligible.
The evolutionarydynamics of the systemofmanipulationand social efficiency (p, y)
are different when manipulators’ relatedness to subjects is negative (rsm < 0). In this
case, the reduced system (p, y) converges to manipulation of efficient behavior (p, y) =
(1,1) in the same conditions (A2.10) except that condition (A2.10c) is not necessary. The
dynamics when relatedness ofmanipulators toward subjects is negative are described in
Fig. A2.3. Because of the negative relatedness of manipulators toward subjects, for Fig.
A2.3B,D theHamilton’s rule for manipulation holds for any social efficiency y . However,
for Fig. A2.3A,C, manipulation becomes disfavored above the dashed-and-dotted line.
The reason is that sufficiently high social efficiency can cause the Hamilton’s rule for
manipulation to be unsatisfied due to either high harming of targets that are related to
manipulators or high benefits to targets that are negatively related tomanipulators. The
outcome of full manipulation of inefficient behavior [(p, y) = (1,0); outcome 2 above]
is thus made possible by rsm < 0. The case in which rsm = 0 is captured by Fig. A2.3
by setting y∗p = 0 in all panels. In such a case, the outcomes for Fig. A2.3A-B are 1)
no manipulation [(p, y) = (0, y)] or 2’) no social efficiency [(p, y) = (p,0)], while the
outcomes for Fig. A2.3C-D remain the same. Hence, the conditions for the outcome
of manipulation of efficient behavior given above still apply.
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Chapter 3
Queen specialization eliminates
manipulation conflict
The following chapter is a reprint of a paper to be submitted for publication.
González-Forero M. Queen specialization eliminates manipulation conflict. To be
submitted.
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Abstract
Advanced eusociality is a quintessential form of sociality (Wheeler, 1911; Hölldobler
and Wilson, 2009). Advanced eusocial colonies are composed of up to millions of
members produced by a single or relatively few individuals (Wilson, 1971; Seeley, 1995).
Colonymembers divide labor sometimes through extrememorphological specialization
while displaying negligible conflict (Seeley, 2010; Bignell et al., 2011). The evolution of
advanced eusociality is currently explained by kin-selected altruism (Hamilton, 1964b;
Boomsma, 2009) compounded with policing (Ratnieks, 1988; Frank, 1995) and colony
efficiency (Oster and Wilson, 1978; Ratnieks and Helanterä, 2009). A classic alternative
for the evolution of eusociality is parental manipulation (Alexander, 1974; Michener
and Brothers, 1974), but it is thought to be of little relevance to advanced eusociality
(Keller and Nonacs, 1993; Bourke and Franks, 1995). Here I show that a key factor
of advanced eusociality, namely queen specialization, can be more likely to stem
from maternal manipulation than from altruism. In particular, maternal manipulation
of offspring social behavior causes the evolution of queen specialization (decreased
maternal care and increased maternal fertility) which eliminates offspring resistance to
manipulation. That is, queen specialization eliminates the mother-offspring conflict
created by manipulation, which in principle may allow the mother to induce helping
by non-coercive means such as pheromones. I also show that queen specialization
can evolve under less stringent conditions with manipulation than purely as a result
of altruism. Recent work (González-Forero, 2013) has found that worker specialization
can also evolve under less stringent conditions via manipulation than via altruism.
Together, these results indicate that defining aspects of advanced eusociality (queen and
worker specialization, queen pheromones, large colony sizes, and negligible conflict)
may simultaneously be better explained by maternal manipulation than by altruism.
Thus, some of the quintessential examples of socialitymay be particularly likely to occur
via the long-neglected alternative of manipulation.
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3.1 Introduction
Eusociality involves groups of individualswhere some groupmembers donot reproduce
and instead help group mates do so (Michener, 1969; Wilson, 1971). Eusociality can
be subdivided into so-called primitive and advanced (Michener, 1969; Wilson, 1971).
Primitive eusociality involves relatively small colonies (up to hundreds of members) in
which the division of reproductive labor is primarily behavioral rather than morpho-
logical, and conflict among members is substantial. In contrast, advanced eusociality
comprises relatively large colonies (up to millions of members) in which the division of
reproductive labor can be morphological and permanent, and in which conflict among
members is remarkably small. A currently prominent explanation for the evolution
of advanced eusociality can be summarized as follows: 1) Selection initially favors
altruism towards sufficiently close kin under certain ecological conditions (Hamilton,
1964b; Boomsma, 2009). 2) Altruists become highly specialized due to kin or group
selection for colony-level efficiency (Oster and Wilson, 1978). Specialization causes
altruists to become unable tomate (Oster andWilson, 1978). 3) Despite their inability to
mate, conflict remains favoring hymenopteran (e.g., wasps, bees, and ants) workers to
produce male offspring asexually (Trivers and Hare, 1976). 4) Queens are then favored
to mate multiply (polyandry) as this increases colony productivity (Mattila and Seeley,
2007), partly because workers become favored to police conflicting mates (Ratnieks,
1988). That is, with polyandry, workers become favored to destroy other workers’
offspring rather than attempt to become reproductively independent given that they are
already unable to mate (Ratnieks and Helanterä, 2009). As a result, policing diminishes
conflict and enhances the levels of cooperation within the colony (Frank, 1995), thereby
yielding advanced eusociality.
Two key difficulties can be identified with this explanation. First, objections can
be raised regarding the purported inability of workers to regain their ability to mate.
Second, this explanation applies only to hymenopteran advanced eusociality, which
involves haplodiploid genetics wheremales are produced asexually. However, advanced
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eusociality also occurs in termites (Bignell et al., 2011) and to some extent in naked
mole rats (Sherman et al., 1991), which have diploid genetics. In principle, the selection
pressures that produced advanced eusociality in diploidsmight also have been relevant
for haplodiploids. This point raises the question of whether advanced eusociality
actually needed policing even for hymenoptera.
Here I develop a different pathway to advanced eusociality, in particular via ma-
ternal manipulation. Maternal manipulation is a classic alternative to altruism for
the evolution of eusociality (Alexander, 1974; Michener and Brothers, 1974). The
hypothesis states that, instead of helpers being favored to help spontaneously (hereafter,
“altruism”), mothers manipulate some of their offspring to help raise their siblings
(Alexander, 1974;Michener and Brothers, 1974). However, this hypothesis has remained
neglected, partly because manipulation can promote the evolution of resistance to
manipulation (Trivers, 1974; Trivers and Hare, 1976; Keller and Nonacs, 1993). Acquies-
cence (i.e., no resistance) to manipulation has recently been found to evolve under less
stringent conditions than those required for altruism (González-Forero and Gavrilets,
2012; González-Forero, 2013). The social behaviors obtained via manipulation appear
consistent with both primitive eusociality (González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012) and
worker specialization in advanced eusociality (González-Forero, 2013). In both cases,
the initial point is a population where the only social behavior present is parental
care. Here I show how maternal manipulation can produce specialized queens as in
advanced eusociality, also from an initial population with only parental care. Despite
the possible evolution of resistance to manipulation, acquiescence to manipulation is
obtained because of the evolution of maternal exploitation. That is, once the mother
has help available due to manipulation, she becomes a better exploiter of this help by
increasing her fertility and decreasing her maternal care. The latter two are defining
features of the highly specialized queens in advanced eusociality. This process causes
selection for resistance to manipulation to disappear. In addition, queen specialization
can evolve and be stable via manipulation under less stringent conditions than those
required via altruism.
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The key factors yielding these results are that the benefit to the recipients of help
depends on the recipient’s condition, and that an individual’s condition is under
maternal influence. I assume that poor-condition individuals get larger benefits from
receiving the same amount of help than good-condition individuals (West Eberhard,
1975). Hence, when a manipulating mother has help from manipulated offspring, she
can become favored to decrease the maternal care to the offspring who will instead be
cared for by helpers. The decrease in maternal care makes the to-be-helped offspring
be in poor-condition at the time of receiving help. This can yield sufficiently large
average benefits to the recipients of help, so that helpers stop being selected to resist
manipulation. That is, Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence becomes satisfied when the
mother becomes a sufficiently good exploiter despite Hamilton’s rule not being satisfied
at the start of the process. I obtain these results using a set of simple mathematical
models.
3.2 Model
Consider a population where mothers produce two subsequent broods (Fig. 3.1). One
or both parents provide parental care to offspring. Adult offspring disperse from the
maternal site, mate, and start a new site. With probability p, mothers manipulate
first-brood offspring to stay in the maternal site as adults. Manipulation may occur,
for example, by disrupting offspring’s development by feeding them poorly (Brand and
Chapuisat, 2012; Tibbetts et al., 2013). Manipulated offspring resist manipulation with
probability q in which case they disperse without delay. Alternatively, manipulated
offspring acquiesce to manipulation with probability 1− q in which case they stay as
adults in the maternal site. Acquiescing offspring pay the cost of acquiescence c. In
addition, acquiescing offspring express parental care in thematernal site,giving a fitness
benefit b to second-brood offspring (see ref. (González-Forero, 2013) for the conditions
for which such helping is selected).
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Figure 3.1: Life cycle. The mother produces two subsequent broods. When individuals
are young (white) they stay in the maternal site, but disperse as adults (gray). The
mother manipulates a fraction p of the first brood to stay as adults.
Mothers providematernal care to a fraction z of their second-brood offspring, hence
paying the cost cc of providing maternal care. A second-brood individual receiving
maternal care is in good condition at the time in which it receives help from first-brood
offspring. Alternatively, a second-brood individual not receivingmaternal care is in poor
conditionwhen it receives help. Poor-condition individuals pay the cost of not receiving
maternal care c¬c . A second-brood individual in good (poor) condition receives a benefit
bg (bp ) when helped by a random first-brood individual. I assume bp > bg . Thus, an
acquiescing individual provides a benefit to a random second-brood offspring of
b = zbg + (1− z)bp . (3.1)
Although poor-condition individuals benefit more from receiving the same amount of
help than good-condition individuals, it is possible that poor-condition individuals are
costlier to raise if they demand more care. The cost of acquiescence then depends on
whether recipients are in good or poor condition. Hence, the cost of acquiescence is
c = zcg + (1− z)cp , (3.2)
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where cg (cp ) is the cost of acquiescence due to helping recipients in good (poor)
condition. I study the coevolution of maternal manipulation p, offspring resistance q ,
and the probability z that second-brood offspring receivematernal care. The probability
z is the ratio of the number m of second-brood offspring the mother provides care to
(hereafter, “maternal care”) and the number n of second-brood offspring (hereafter,
“maternal fertility”). I assume offspring resistance q to be under offspring control, and
the remaining variables (maternal manipulation p, carem, and fertility n) to be under
maternal control. These considerations yield an expression for the fitness of a random
individual in the population,which specifies the coevolutionarydynamics (seeMethods
Summary).
3.3 Results
An illustration of the resulting coevolutionary dynamics is given in Fig. 3.2. The
process shown in the figure is the following. Once there exists manipulation and before
resistance to manipulation is complete, the mother has help available. She is then
selected to reduce her maternal care and increase her fertility. This yields an increasing
proportion of poor-condition recipients of help, which causes the benefit b to increase
up to a point where Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence becomes satisfied. As a result,
resistance becomes selected against and in the end, the mother manipulates her entire
first brood, all showing no resistance. The secondbrood is at this point raised only by the
first brood. In addition, at the end of the process, themother ismaximally fertile in terms
of the number of second-brood offspring. Notice that the evolution of maternal fertility
in terms of her first-brood offspring is not modeled here explicitly. For simplicity, I refer
to the outcome ofmanipulation, acquiescence, nomaternal care andmaximum fertility
in terms of second-brood offspring (p,q,m,n) = (1,0,0,nmax) as queen specialization
via maternal manipulation.
Simple conditions for this outcome can be obtained (see Supplementary Informa-
tion). To simplify the analysis, I assume the cost to the mother for providing maternal
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Figure 3.2: Conflict resolution with the evolution of maternal exploitation. Numerical
solutions for a given set of initial conditions. a, Resistance q initially increases but is later
eliminated by the evolution of reducedmaternal carem and increasedmaternal fertility
n. In the end, there is no mother-offspring conflict. The time span is 2000 generations.
b, The same scenario is shown but the time span is 106 generations. Maternal fertility
increases up to its maximum nmax at the decreasing rate of m/n2. For both panels the
parameter values are: vp = vq = 0.01, vm = vn = 0.1 (vi : additive genetic variance of trait
i ), km = k1 = 1/3, rm = r = 1/2 (rm ,r : life-for-life relatedness (Hamilton, 1972; Bulmer,
1994) of mother to offspring and of first-brood offspring to second-brood offspring
respectively), bp = 2.5, bg = 1.5, nmax = 10, cp = cg = 1, cc = 0.4, and c¬c = 1.
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care is approximately the same as the cost to offspring for not receiving maternal care
weighted by the life-for-life relatedness (Hamilton, 1972; Bulmer, 1994) of mother to
offspring (i.e., cc ≈ rmc¬c ). In such a case, whenmanipulationand resistance are initially
small, queen specialization via maternal manipulation is obtained if at the start of the
evolutionary process the following four conditions hold:
bpr > cp (3.3a)
bp −bg > cp −cg (3.3b)
b > c (3.3c)
br + A
n
> c, (3.3d)
where Ameasures the increase in selection for acquiescence asmaternal care decreases
(defined in the Methods Summary). Condition (3.3a) states that acquiescence must
be favored for poor-condition recipients of help; condition (3.3b) that the probability
z of giving maternal care must be favored to decrease if the mother has some help;
condition (3.3c) that maternal manipulationmust be favored; and condition (3.3d) that
acquiescence can become favored as a result of the evolution of maternal exploitation.
That is, Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence (i.e., br > c) need not be initially satisfied.
Analogous conditions can be obtained for queen specialization via altruism (i.e.,
when first-brood offspring stay in the maternal nest without being manipulated by the
mother; the conditions for queen specialization via altruism are inequalities (S8) in SI).
If the probability of expressing altruism is initially small, then queen specialization via
manipulation can be obtained under less stringent conditions than via altruism if at the
start of the process
0< c−br < A
n
. (3.4)
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This advantage of queen specialization viamanipulation is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. Fig. 3.3
shows that in the outcome of queen specialization via maternal manipulation, Hamil-
ton’s rule for acquiescence is satisfied. That is, there is not mother-offspring conflict in
the end. However, as shown in Fig. 3.3, Hamilton’s rule need not be satisfied at the start
of the process. The rule can become satisfied as maternal care decreases and maternal
fertility increases, which eliminates themother-offspring conflict. Instead of Hamilton’s
rule, the necessary condition for queen specialization via maternal manipulation is
a relaxed Hamilton’s rule (inequality (S50e) in SI) that, when resistance probability is
initially small, reduces to condition (3.3d).
3.4 Discussion
These results show how queen specialization can be obtained under less stringent
conditions (smaller b/c ratios) via maternal manipulation than via offspring altruism.
This occurs because of the evolution of maternal exploitation (measured by A/n; see
condition (3.3d)). Offspring can eventually become favored to acquiesce to manipu-
lation without the need of resistance costs (González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012) or
the evolution of helping efficiency (González-Forero, 2013). Because resistance costs
are not necessary, manipulation may occur via non-coercive means, for instance,
via pheromones. Queen specialization via maternal manipulation yields maternally-
induced workers with no conflict with the mother: both mother and helping offspring
agree on the latter helping status despite the latter not being initially selected to
help. As with the evolution of helping efficiency (González-Forero, 2013), the evolution
of maternal exploitation can cause the evolution of offspring consent to maternal
manipulation. Queen specialization and socially induced, yet non-conflicting, workers
are consistent with key features of advanced eusociality (Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009).
A remaining defining feature of advanced eusociality, namelyworker specialization, can
also be obtained under less stringent conditions via manipulation than via altruism
(González-Forero, 2013).
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Figure 3.3: Relaxed Hamilton’s rule due to the evolution of maternal exploitation.
Evolutionary trajectories (gray lines; numerical solutions for system (A3.28)) are
shown for different initial conditions for the complete system (p,q,m,n). Only three
dimensions are plotted (q,m,n). Arrows indicate the direction of change. Hamilton’s
rule for acquiescence is satisfied (unsatisfied) in the region below (above) the gray
plane. A relaxed Hamilton’s rule for acquiescence (inequality (S50e) in SI) is satisfied
(unsatisfied) below (above) the black plane. Trajectories starting below the black
plane (blue arrows) converge to queen specialization (p,q,m,n) = (1,0,0,nmax) (black
dot), otherwise (red arrows) they converge to full resistance (p,q,m,n) = (p,1,m,n).
Hence, Hamilton’s rule is not necessary for convergence to queen specialization via
manipulation if resistance is initially incomplete. Parameter values are: vp = vq = 0.01,
vm = vn = 0.1, km = k1 = 1/3, rm = r = 1/2, bp = 2.5, bg = 1.5, cp = cg = 1, cc = 0.5, c¬c = 1,
nmax = 10 and the time span is 106. The initial manipulation probability is p(0)= 0.1.
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Maternal manipulationmay thus account for advanced eusociality in both diploids
(e.g., termites) and haplodiploids (e.g., wasps, bees, and ants). In the mechanism
developed here, polyandry is not a cause of advanced eusociality, but may instead be
a consequence. For instance, as high benefits to recipients evolve as a result of maternal
exploitation or helping efficiency (González-Forero, 2013), the lower relatedness caused
by polyandry still allows for acquiescence to be favored. The evolution of polyandry,
for example favored because of benefits to the mother (Mattila and Seeley, 2007), need
not then disrupt sufficiently advanced eusociality. The results presented here offer a
novel mechanism for the origin of advanced eusociality which, as shown here, may be
comparatively particularly powerful.
Methods Summary
For simplicity, I assume no costs of manipulation or of resistance to manipulation. The
baseline fitness is 1. The cost to a mother for providing maternal care is cc . The fitness
payoff to a mother is
wm = z(1−cc )+ (1− z)
= 1−ccz. (3.5a)
The fitness payoff to first-brood offspring is
w1 = p(1−q)(1−c)+pq + (1−p)
= 1−cp(1−q). (3.5b)
The average resistance probability among the first-brood offspring of amother isQ. The
cost to second-brood offspring for not receiving maternal care is c¬c . The fitness payoff
77
to second-brood offspring is
w2 = z[p(1−Q)(1+bg )+pQ+ (1−p)]
+ (1− z)[p(1−Q)(1−c¬c +bp )+pQ(1−c¬c )+ (1−p)(1−c¬c )]
= 1+bp(1−Q)− (1− z)c¬c . (3.5c)
The fitness of a random individual is w = ∑k jw j where k j is the reproductive value
of state j (= m,1,2 for mother, first-brood offspring, and second-brood offspring
respectively) (Taylor, 1990; Frank, 1998). That is,
w = 1−kmccz−k1cp(1−q)+k2[bp(1−Q)−c¬c (1− z)]. (3.6)
This expression yields the dynamic equations derived in §2 of the Supplementary
Information.
The quantity A involved in condition (3.3d) is
A =
√√√√kmrmHm
k1H
vmH2+vnH20
vq
, (3.7a)
where H0 measures selection for acquiescence in the absence of maternal care, H is
the reduction in H0 when there is full maternal care, and Hm measures the increase in
selection for manipulation as maternal care decreases. The latter three terms are given
by:
H0 = bpr −cp (3.7b)
H = (bp −bg )r − (cp −cg ) (3.7c)
Hm = bp −bg − (cp −cg ). (3.7d)
If H < 0, then condition (3.3d) implies br > c and in such case condition (3.3d) is
unnecessary.
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A3.1 SupplementaryMethods
A3.2 Spontaneous helping (altruism)
In this section I analyze a model where helping is only under control of the helper. I
refer to this case as spontaneous helping. Let x be the probability that a first-brood
individual stays as an adult in the maternal site (i.e., the individual’s probability of
spontaneous helping or altruism). Assume x to be under the control of the first-brood
individual. Hence, the fitnesses of mother (wm), first-brood offspring (w1) and second-
brood offspring (w2) take analogous forms to eqs. (5) in themain text. They are
wm = z(1−cc )+ (1− z)
= 1−ccz, (A3.1a)
w1 = x(1−c)+ (1−x)
= 1−cx, (A3.1b)
w2 = z[X (1+bg )+ (1−X )]
+ (1− z)[X (1−c¬c +bp )+ (1−X )(1−c¬c )]
= 1+bX − (1− z)c¬c , (A3.1c)
where X is the average probability of spontaneous helping among first-brood offspring.
The fitness of a random individual (w =∑k jw j ) is thus
w = 1−kmccz−k1cx+k2[bX −c¬c (1− z)]. (A3.2)
Let vi be the additive genetic variance of trait i (= x,z), and gi the breeding value for trait
i in the actor (i.e., the individual controlling trait i ). Hence, assuming that association
between the traits is negligible, the evolutionary change in trait i can be approximated
by di/dt = vi∂w/∂gi (Frank, 1998).
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A3.2.1 Maternal care probability
In this subsection I do not specify the components of the maternal care probability z,
which allows for a simpler analysis. This yields that the evolutionary change in trait i
is di/dt = vikacthi where kact is the class reproductive value of actors (i.e., first-brood
offspring for spontaneous helping x andmothers for the maternal probability z) and hi
is the inclusive fitness effect of trait i on actors. Specifically,
hx = br −c =H0− zH (A3.3a)
hz = −{rmx[bp −bg − (cp −cg )]+cc − rmc¬c } =−(rmxHm +cc − rmc¬c ), (A3.3b)
where rm is the life-for-life relatedness of mother to offspring. For simplicity, I will
assume throughout that the mother is equally related to both her first- and second-
brood offspring. rm is defined as ρmki/km for both first- and second-brood offspring
(i.e., i = 1,2), where ρm = dz/dgz is the regression relatedness of mother to first- and
second-brood offspring. H0, H and Hm are defined in the main text. I will make the
simplifying assumption throughout that cc ≈ rmc¬c . Hence, the systemdefined by (A3.3)
has an equilibrium in (x,z)= (0,z∗), where z∗ =H0/H . I also let r ≤ 1; hence, Hm >H .
The dynamics are then determined by the signs of H0, H0−H , and Hm . There are
four cases:
• If H0 < 0 and H0 − H < 0, then spontaneous helping always decreases. The
maternal care probability increases or decreases depending on the sign of Hm .
In any case, the outcome is no spontaneous helping [(x,z)= (0,z)].
• If H0 < 0 and H0 − H > 0, then spontaneous helping decreases for a small
probability of maternal care, but increases for large probability of maternal care.
There are two subcases: 1) ifHm > 0, thenmaternal care probability decreases and
the outcome is no spontaneoushelping [(x,z)= (0,z) for z < z∗]. 2) IfHm < 0, then
maternal care probability increases and the outcome is either no spontaneous
helping [(x,z)= (0,z) for z < z∗] if maternal care probability is initially sufficiently
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small, or full spontaneous helping and fullmaternal care probability [(x,z)= (1,1)]
if maternal care probability is initially sufficiently large.
• If H0 > 0 and H0−H < 0, then spontaneous helping increases for a small proba-
bility of maternal care and decreases for large probability of maternal care. Since
necessarily H > 0, then Hm > 0. Therefore, maternal care probability decreases
and the outcome is either no spontaneous helping [(x,z) = (0,z) for z > z∗] if
maternal care probability is initially sufficiently large, or full spontaneous helping
and zero maternal care probability [(x,z) = (1,0)] if maternal care probability is
initially sufficiently small.
• IfH0 > 0 andH0−H > 0, then spontaneous helping always increases. The outcome
is full spontaneous helping and either full maternal care probability [(x,z)= (1,1)]
or zero maternal care probability [(x,z)= (1,0)] depending on the sign of Hm .
I here am interested in the outcome of spontaneous helping with zero maternal care
probability [(x,z) = (1,0)]. For reasons that become clear later, I refer to this outcome
as queen specialization via spontaneous helping. This outcome can be obtained in the
third case above or in the fourth case when Hm > 0. The dynamics of the third case
are in Fig. A3.1. The line in Fig. A3.1 that delimits the basin of attraction to the queen
specialization outcome is given by the system’s eigenvector with negative eigenvalue
(this can be easily seen by solving for x and z in the system defined by (A3.3) and then
determining the solutions that cross the equilibrium (x,z)= (0,z∗)). That is, the basin of
attraction is specified by the linewith positive slopewith respect to spontaneous helping
shown in Fig. A3.1. The eigenvectors of system (A3.3) are proportional to
v=
(
±
√
vxk1H
vzkmrmHm
,1
)T
. (A3.4)
Hence, the slopes of the lines defined by these eigenvectors are ±
√
vzkmrmHm
vxk1H
. The
intercept of these lines at x = 0 is z∗. Because the basin of attraction (gray area in Fig.
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Figure A3.1: Dynamics of queen specialization via spontaneous helping. The dynamics
shown are for the case in which H0 > 0, H0−H < 0, and Hm > 0. The arrows indicate
the direction of evolutionary change. The dashed line is the critical maternal care
probability z∗ at which selection for spontaneous helping changes. Thick strokes
indicate stable equilibria. When the population starts in the gray area it evolves to queen
specialization via spontaneous helping [(x,z)= (1,0)].
A3.1) lies below the linewith the positive slopewith such an intercept, then convergence
to queen specialization via spontaneous helping requires that the initial conditions
satisfy
z < z∗+x Ez
H
. (A3.5)
where
Ez =
√
vzH2
vx
kmrmHm
k1H
. (A3.6)
Since z∗ =H0/H , rearranging this inequality yields
br +xEz > c. (A3.7)
If initially the probability of spontaneous helping is small, inequality (A3.7) reduces to
br > c.
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Therefore, from the third and fourth cases above, queen specialization under spon-
taneous helping is obtained when
bpr > cp (A3.8a)
bp −bg > cp −cg (A3.8b)
br +xEz > c. (A3.8c)
If H < 0, then condition (A3.8c) is unnecessary. Inequality (A3.8a) states that Hamilton’s
rule for helpingmust be satisfied for poor-condition recipients. Inequality (A3.8b) states
that mothers must be favored to decrease their probability of providing maternal care.
The third condition (A3.8c) is a relaxed Hamilton’s rule that reduces to Hamilton’s rule
for an initially small probability of spontaneous helping.
A3.2.2 Maternal care andmaternal fertility
In this subsection, I express the maternal care probability in terms of the number of
second-brood offspring, n (hereafter, maternal fertility), and the number of which the
mother provides maternal care to, m (hereafter, maternal care). Hence, z = m/n. I
assume that both maternal carem and maternal fertility n are under maternal control.
This slight change will yield the same results as §A3.2.1, but the speed of evolutionary
change is affected. This will only be of relevance for maternally manipulated helping
and hence, this subsection is primarily to illustrate the method that will be used in the
slightly more complex model of maternallymanipulated helping.
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Substituting z = m/n in eq. (A3.2) yields a three-dimensional system di/dt =
vikacthi (i = x,m,n) where
hx = br −c =H0− zH (A3.9a)
hm = −
1
n
{rmx[bp −bg − (cp −cg )]+cc − rmc¬c } =−
1
n
(rmxHm +cc − rmc¬c )
(A3.9b)
hn =
m
n2
{rmx[bp −bg − (cp −cg )]+cc − rmc¬c } =
m
n2
(rmxHm +cc − rmc¬c ). (A3.9c)
Here rm is similarly ρmki/km (i = 1,2) for ρm = dz/dgm = dz/dgn . Assuming that cc ≈
rmc¬c , this system has an equilibrium line in (x,m,n)= (0,m∗,n), wherem∗ = nH0/H .
The same four cases as before are also obtained here:
• If H0 < 0 and H0−H < 0, then spontaneous helping always decreases. Maternal
care m and fertility n increase or decrease depending on the sign of Hm . The
outcome is no spontaneous helping [(x,m,n)= (0,m,n)].
• If H0 < 0 and H0 − H > 0, then spontaneous helping decreases for a small
probability of maternal care, but increases for large probability of maternal care.
There are two subcases: 1) if Hm > 0, then maternal care decreases and maternal
fertility increases, so the outcome is no spontaneous helping [(x,m,n) = (0,m,n)
for m < m∗]. 2) If Hm < 0, then maternal care increases and maternal fertility
decreases, so the outcome is either no spontaneous helping [(x,m,n) = (0,m,n)
for m < m∗] if maternal care is initially sufficiently small, or full spontaneous
helping, full maternal care and minimal fertility [(x,m,n) = (1,1,1)] if maternal
care is initially sufficiently large (I takeminimal fertility to be one because benefits
and costs of helping are not defined if there are no recipients).
• If H0 > 0 and H0 − H < 0, then spontaneous helping increases for a small
probability of maternal care and decreases for large probability of maternal care.
Since Hm > 0, then maternal care decreases and maternal fertility increases, so
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the outcome is either no spontaneous helping [(x,m,n) = (0,m,n) for m > m∗]
if maternal care is initially sufficiently large, or full spontaneous helping, zero
maternal care, and maximum fertility [(x,m,n) = (1,0,nmax)] if maternal care is
initially sufficiently small.
• IfH0 > 0 andH0−H > 0, then spontaneous helping always increases. The outcome
is full spontaneous helping and either full maternal care and minimal fertility
[(x,m,n) = (1,1,1)] or zero maternal care and maximum fertility [(x,m,n) =
(1,0,nmax)] depending on the sign of Hm .
As in the previous section, queen specialization [(x,m,n) = (1,0,nmax)] can be
obtained in the third case or in the fourth case when Hm > 0. The dynamics of the third
case are as in Fig. A3.1, replacing z bym and with the n axis projecting out of the page.
The intercept of the dashed line in Fig. A3.1 increases with n in this three-dimensional
extension. The line that delimits the basin of attraction toward queen specialization
in the two-dimensional representation is a plane in the full three-dimensional system.
This plane is defined by the dominant eigenvectors with origin along the equilibrium
line (x,m,n) = (0,m∗,n) defining lines with positive slope with respect to spontaneous
helping x.
I obtain this plane as follows. The Jacobian of the system evaluated at the equilib-
rium line is
J|x=0,m=m∗ =

0 −vxk1 1nH vxk1 1nH0
−vmkmrm 1nHm 0 0
vnkmrm
1
n
H0
H
Hm 0 0
 . (A3.10)
Then, the dominant eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix are proportional to
v1 = (U ,−V ,1)T , (A3.11)
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where
U =∓
√
vx
vn
k1H
kmrmHm
[
1+ vm
vn
(
H
H0
)2]
(A3.12a)
V = vm
vn
H
H0
. (A3.12b)
These eigenvectors have origin along the equilibrium line (x,m,n) = (0,m∗,n) which
defines two planes that govern the dynamics around the equilibrium line. Equations for
such planes can be obtained by determining another pair of vectors in the plane that are
not parallel to v1; for example,
v2 = (U ,
H0
H
−V ,2)T . (A3.13)
v2 are found by shifting the origin of the eigenvectors defined by v1 by an amount of 1
along the n axis, which corresponds to an increment of m∗ |n=1 = H0/H along the m
axis. A normal vector to the planes containing v1 and v2 specifies the plane equation.
The vectors
N= v1×v2 = (−V −
H0
H
,−U ,U H0
H
)T (A3.14)
are normal to the two planes governing the dynamics. Since the equilibrium line lies
in the planes and crosses the point (x,m,n) = (0,0,0), Ni being the i-th entry of N, the
equation for these planes is
N1x+N2m+N3n = 0. (A3.15)
After rearrangement, this equation becomes
m =±x E
H
+nH0
H
, (A3.16)
where
E =
√
vmH2+vnH20
vx
kmrmHm
k1H
. (A3.17)
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The plane with a positive slope with respect to x delimits the basins of attraction.
The condition for convergence to spontaneous helping,nomaternal care andmaximum
fertility (x,m,n)= (1,0,nmax) is thatm is initially below such a plane. Rearrangement of
this condition yields
br +x E
n
> c. (A3.18)
Although the magnitude of the relaxing term (the term proportional to x in eq. (A3.16))
is independent of n, condition (A3.7) indicates that the relative relaxation it confers
decreases with n. Comparing this inequality to condition (A3.7) shows that
vz =
1
n2
vmH
2+vnH20
H2
. (A3.19)
As obtained in §A3.2.1, condition (A3.7) reduces to br > c for an initially small probabil-
ity of spontaneous helping.
Therefore, as for §A3.2.1, queen specialization via spontaneoushelpingwhenmater-
nal care and fertility are explicitly allowed to evolve is obtained when conditions (A3.8)
hold (and Ez = E/n).
A3.3 Maternallymanipulated helping
In this section I study the model of maternally manipulated helping described in the
main text.
A3.3.1 Maternal care probability
In this subsection, I analyze the simpler version of the model where the components
of the probability of maternal care z are not specified. That is, I study the coevolution
of manipulation, resistance, and the probability of maternal care (p,q,z). The resulting
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inclusive fitness effects are
hp = rm(1−q)(b−c) = rm(1−q)(H0m − zHm)
(A3.20a)
hq = −p(br −c) =−p(H0− zH) (A3.20b)
hz = −{rmp(1−q)[bp −bg − (cp −cg )]+cc − rmc¬c } =−[rmp(1−q)Hm+cc − rmc¬c ],
(A3.20c)
where rm = ρ1mk1/km = ρ2mk2/km is the life-for-life relatedness of mother to first- and
second-brood offspring. The respective regression relatednesses are ρim = dp/dgp =
dz/dgz for i = 1,2 for first- and second-brood offspring. Similarly, r = ρ21k2/k1 is the
life-for-life relatedness of first- to second-brood offspring. The indicated regression
relatedness is ρ21 = dQ/dgq . Finally, direct life-for-life relatedness arises as ri i =
ρi iki/ki = 1, with the corresponding regression relatedness of ρi i = dq/dgq = dz/dgz
for i = m,1 for mother and first-brood offspring. The quantities H , Hm , and H0 are
defined in the main text while H0m = bp −cp . As before, I will assume that cc ≈ rmc¬c .
Reduced system (p,z)
The dimensionality of the system (A3.20) can be reduced by dividing it by 1− q . The
resulting equations for p and z are independent of q :
dp
dτ1
= vpkmrm(H0m − zHm) (A3.21a)
dz
dτ1
=−vzkmrmpHm , (A3.21b)
where τ1 = (1− q)t . This system has an equilibrium in (p,z) = (p,z∗p ), where z∗p =
H0m/Hm .
The dynamics of this system depend on the signs of H0m , H0m −Hm , and Hm . We
have the analogous four cases as before:
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• IfH0m < 0 andH0m−Hm < 0, thenmanipulation always decreases. The probability
of maternal care increases or decreases depending on the sign of Hm . In any case,
the outcome is nomanipulation [(p,z)= (0,z)].
• H0m < 0 and H0m −Hm > 0, then manipulation decreases for a small probability
of maternal care, but increases for large probability of maternal care. Since
necessarily Hm < 0, then maternal care probability increases and the outcome is
either no manipulation [(p,z) = (0,z) for z < z∗p ] if maternal care probability is
initially sufficiently small, or full manipulation and full maternal care probability
[(p,z)= (1,1)] if maternal care probability is initially sufficiently large.
• If H0m > 0 andH0m−Hm < 0, thenmanipulation increases for small maternal care
probability but decreases for high maternal care probability. Since necessarily
Hm > 0, then maternal care probability decreases. The outcome is either no
manipulation [(p,z) = (0,z) for z > z∗p ] if maternal care probability is initially
sufficiently large or full manipulation and zero maternal care probability [(p,z) =
(1,0)] if maternal care probability is initially sufficiently small.
• If H0m > 0 and H0m −Hm > 0, then manipulation always increases. The outcome
is full manipulation and either full maternal care probability [(p,z)= (1,1)] or zero
maternal care probability [(p,z)= (1,0)] depending on the sign of Hm .
Therefore, full manipulation and zero maternal care probability [(p,z) = (1,0)] is
obtained when
bp > cp (A3.22a)
bg −bg > cp −cg (A3.22b)
b+pMz > c, (A3.22c)
where
Mz =
√
vzH
2
m
vp
. (A3.23)
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Condition (A3.22c) is obtained from the third case above using the method shown in
§A3.2.1. Condition (A3.22a) states thatmaternalmanipulationmust be favored for poor-
condition recipients of help. Condition (A3.22b) indicates that a decreased probability
of maternal care must be favored once the mother has some help. Condition (A3.22c)
is a relaxed Hamilton’s rule for manipulation that converges to b > c if manipulation is
initially small.
Reduced system (q,z)
The dimensionality of system (A3.20) can also be reduced by dividing it by p. The
resulting equations for q and z are independent of p:
dq
dτ2
=−vqk1(H0− zH) (A3.24a)
dz
dτ2
=−vzkmrm(1−q)Hm , (A3.24b)
where τ2 = pt . This system has an equilibrium in (q,z)= (q,z∗), where z∗ =H0/H .
We have the four cases as in §A3.2.1:
• If H0 < 0 and H0 − H < 0, then resistance always increases. Maternal care
probability increases or decreases depending on the sign of Hm . In any case, the
outcome is full resistance (q,z)= (1,z).
• If H0 < 0 and H0 −H > 0, then resistance increases for a small probability of
maternal care, but decreases for large probability of maternal care. There are
two subcases: 1) if Hm > 0, then maternal care probability decreases and the
outcome is full resistance [(q,z) = (1,z) for z < z∗]. 2) If Hm < 0, then maternal
care probability increases and the outcome is either full resistance [(q,z) = (1,z)
for z < z∗] ifmaternal care probability is initially sufficiently small,or no resistance
and full maternal care probability [(q,z) = (0,1)] if maternal care probability is
initially sufficiently large.
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• If H0 > 0 and H0 −H < 0, then resistance decreases for a small probability of
maternal care and increases for large probability of maternal care. Maternal care
probability always decreases. The outcomes are either full resistance [(q,z)= (1,z)
for z > z∗] or no resistance and no maternal care [(q,z)= (0,0)] depending on the
initial conditions.
• If H0 > 0 and H0 − H > 0, then resistance always decreases. The outcome is
no resistance and either zero [(q,z) = (0,0)] or full probability of maternal care
[(q,z)= (0,1)] depending on the sign of Hm .
Hence, full acquiescence and nomaternal care is obtained
bpr > cp (A3.25a)
bp −bg > cp −cg (A3.25b)
br + (1−q)Az > c, (A3.25c)
where
Az =
√
vzH2
vq
kmrmHm
k1H
. (A3.26)
If H < 0, then condition (A3.25c) is unnecessary. Condition (A3.25c) is obtained as
in §A3.2.1. The conditions (A3.25) for acquiescence are entirely analogous to those
for spontaneous helping (A3.8). However, if initial absence of manipulation causes an
initially small probability of resistance, then the relaxation term in condition (A3.25c)
causes the condition for acquiescence to be a relaxed Hamilton’s rule (br + Az > c).
This is similar to the effect caused by the evolution of social efficiency (González-
Forero, 2013), but here the effect is caused by the evolution of maternal exploitation
(i.e., decreased maternal care and increased maternal fertility).
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Full system (p,q,z)
Bringing together conditions (A3.22) and (A3.25), queen specialization via manipulated
helping [(p,q,z)= (1,0,0)] is obtained when
bp > cp (A3.27a)
bpr > cp (A3.27b)
bp −bg > cp −cg (A3.27c)
b+pMz > c (A3.27d)
br + (1−q)Az > c. (A3.27e)
If H < 0, then condition (A3.27e) is unnecessary. These conditions have simple
interpretations given above.
A3.3.2 Maternal care andmaternal fertility
In this subsection, I proceed as in §A3.2.2 and express the probability z of providing
maternal care to the second brood in terms of the number of second brood offspring n
and of those that receive maternal care m: z =m/n. As in §A3.2.2, this only changes
the speed of evolutionary change. I study the coevolution of manipulation, resistance,
maternal care, and maternal fertility (p,q,m,n). This produces a four-dimensional
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system di/dt = vikacthi (i = p,q,m,n) where the resulting inclusive fitness effects are
hp = rm(1−q)(b−c) = rm(1−q)(H0m − zHm)
(A3.28a)
hq = −p(br −c) =−p(H0− zH) (A3.28b)
hm = −rm
1
n
p(1−q)[bp −bg − (cp −cg )+cc − rmc¬c ] =−
1
n
[rmp(1−q)Hm +cc − rmc¬c ]
(A3.28c)
hn = rm
m
n2
p(1−q)[bp −bg − (cp −cg )+cc − rmc¬c ] =
m
n2
[rmp(1−q)Hm +cc − rmc¬c ].
(A3.28d)
H , Hm , H0, and H0m are defined as before. I continue to assume that cc ≈ rmc¬c .
Reduced system (p,m,n)
The dimensionality of the system can be similarly reduced by dividing by 1− q . The
resulting equations for p,m and n are independent of q :
dp
dτ1
= vpkmrm(H0m −
m
n
Hm) (A3.29a)
dm
dτ1
=−vmkmrm
1
n
pHm (A3.29b)
dn
dτ1
= vnkmrm
m
n2
pHm , (A3.29c)
where τ1 = (1−q)t . As before, the dynamics of this system depend on the signs of H0m ,
H0m −Hm , and Hm . This system has an equilibrium line in (p,m,n) = (0,m∗p ,n), where
m∗p = nH0m/Hm .
The same four dynamic cases as in §A3.3.1 are obtained with the same outcomes,
replacing z∗p bym
∗
p/n. The basin of attraction toward queen specialization in the third
case can be found as in §A3.2.2 by determining the dynamics of the system around
the line of equilibria (p,m,n) = (0,m∗p ,n). This is given by the Jacobian of the system
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evaluated at the equilibrium line:
J|p=0,m=m∗p =

0 −vpkmrm 1nHm vpkmrm 1nH0m
−vmkmrm 1nHm 0 0
vnkmrm
1
n
H0m 0 0
 . (A3.30)
Using the same procedure as in §A3.2.2, the equations for the planes governing the
dynamics are
N1p+N2m+N3n = 0. (A3.31)
where Ni is the i-th entry of
N= v1×v2 = (−V −
H0m
Hm
,−U ,U H0m
Hm
)T (A3.32)
and
v1 = (U ,−V ,1)T (A3.33a)
v2 = (U ,
H0m
Hm
−V ,2)T (A3.33b)
U =±
√
vp
vn
[
1+ vm
vn
(
Hm
H0m
)2]
(A3.33c)
V = vm
vn
Hm
H0m
. (A3.33d)
Rearranging equation (A3.31), it becomes
m =∓p M
Hm
+nH0m
Hm
, (A3.34)
where
M =
√√√√vmH2m +vnH20m
vp
. (A3.35)
The plane with a positive slope with respect to p delimits the basins of attraction.
The condition for convergence to manipulation, no maternal care and maximum
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fertility (p,m,n) = (1,0,nmax) is that m is initially below such a plane. Rearrangement
of this condition yields
b+pM
n
> c. (A3.36)
As before, even though themagnitudeof the relaxing term (the termproportional to p in
eq. (A3.34)) is independent of n, condition (A3.36) indicates that the relative relaxation
it confers decreases with n. Comparing this inequality to condition (A3.22c) shows that
vz =
1
n2
vmH
2
m +vnH20m
H2m
(A3.37)
regarding the evolution of manipulation.
Therefore, as for §A3.3.1, when maternal care and fertility are explicitly allowed to
evolve, full manipulation with zero maternal care and maximum fertility [(p,m,n) =
(1,0,nmax)] is obtained when conditions (A3.22) hold (andMz =M/n).
Reduced system (q,m,n)
The dimensionality of system (A3.28) can similarly be reduced by dividing it by p. The
resulting equations for q ,m and n are independent of p:
dq
dτ2
=−vqk1(H0−
m
n
H) (A3.38a)
dm
dτ2
=−vmkmrm
1
n
(1−q)Hm (A3.38b)
dn
dτ2
= vnkmrm
m
n2
(1−q)Hm , (A3.38c)
where τ2 = pt . As before, the dynamics of this system depend on the signs of H0m ,
H0m −Hm , and Hm . The system has an equilibrium line in (q,m,n) = (1,m∗,n), where
m∗ = nH0/H .
The same four dynamic cases as in §A3.3.1 are obtained with the same outcomes,
replacing z∗ with m∗/n. The basin of attraction for the third case can be determined
as before by determining the dynamics of the system around the line of equilibria
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(q,m,n)= (1,m∗,n). The Jacobian of the system evaluated at such equilibrium is
J|q=1,m=m∗ =

0 vqk1
1
n
H −vqk1 1nH0
vmkmrm
1
n
Hm 0 0
−vnkmrm 1n
H0
H
Hm 0 0
 . (A3.39)
Since the equilibrium line lies in the planes and it crosses the point (q,m,n) = (1,0,0),
the equation for the planes governing the dynamics is
N1(q−1)+N2m+N3n = 0, (A3.40)
where Ni is the i-th entry of
N= v1×v2 = (−V −
H0
H
,−U ,U H0
H
)T (A3.41)
and
v1 = (U ,−V ,1)T (A3.42)
v2 = (U ,
H0
H
−V ,2)T (A3.43)
U =∓
√
vq
vn
k1H
kmrmHm
[
1+ vm
vn
(
H
H0
)2]
(A3.44)
V = vm
vn
H
H0
. (A3.45)
After rearrangement, equation (A3.40) becomes
m =∓(1−q) A
H
+nH0
H
, (A3.46)
where
A =
√√√√kmrmHm
k1H
vmH2+vnH20
vq
. (A3.47)
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The plane with a negative slope with respect to q delimits the basins of attraction.
The condition for convergence to no resistance, nomaternal care andmaximum fertility
(1,m,n) = (0,0,nmax) is that m is initially below such a plane. Rearrangement of this
condition yields
br + (1−q)A
n
> c. (A3.48)
Again, the magnitude of the relaxing term (the term proportional to 1−q in eq. (A3.46))
is independent of n, but from condition (A3.48) it follows that the relative relaxation it
confers decreases with n. Comparing this inequality to condition (A3.25c) shows that
vz =
1
n2
vmH
2+vnH20
H2
, (A3.49)
regarding the evolution of resistance.
Hence, as for §A3.3.1, when maternal care and fertility are explicitly allowed to
evolve, full acquiescence with zero maternal care and maximum fertility [(q,m,n) =
(0,0,nmax)] is obtained when conditions (A3.25) hold (Az = A/n).
Full system (p,q,m,n)
Substituting Mz = M/n and Az = A/n in conditions (A3.27), queen specialization via
manipulated helping [(p,q,m,n)= (1,0,0,nmax)] is obtained when
bp > cp (A3.50a)
bpr > cp (A3.50b)
bp −bg > cp −cg (A3.50c)
b+pM
n
> c (A3.50d)
br + (1−q)A
n
> c. (A3.50e)
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Assuming that r ≤ 1, inequality (A3.50a) can be dropped as it is satisfied from inequality
(A3.50b). If A is not real, then condition (A3.50e) can also be dropped. Letting p,q → 0
yields conditions (3.3) in the main text.
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Conclusion
Implications for evolutionary theory
The notion of the extended phenotype sought to expand evolutionary theory (Dawkins,
1982). The evolutionary dynamics of traits that are subject to the effects of extended
phenotypes (indirect genetic effects) has previously received mathematical treatment
(Kirkpatrick and Lande, 1989; Moore et al., 1997; McGlothlin et al., 2010). Such research
has shown a variety of peculiarities in the evolutionary dynamics. However, that
same work assumes that individuals allow others to influence their phenotype. In this
dissertation, I have studied how such a tolerance may evolve. Chapter 1 addresses
the effect of costs of resistance on the evolution of acquiescence to manipulation.
Chapters 2 and 3 show that acquiescence can result from intrinsic processes created
by manipulation itself.
These results show how indirect genetic effects can occur when manipulated indi-
viduals must consent to manipulation for the manipulated behavior to be expressed
at all. Even with the stringent assumption that consent by manipulated individuals
is required, these results show that, under a wide range of circumstances, a behavior
can be more likely to stem from manipulation than being spontaneous. For Chapter
1, this finding was due to the fact that Hamilton’s rule is more easily satisfied for
manipulated behavior than for spontaneous behavior due to the occurrence of costs
of resistance. In contrast, for Chapters 2 and 3, a behavior can be more likely to be the
result of manipulation rather than being spontaneous because when the probability of
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resistingmanipulation is initially small, induced behavior has a larger basin of attraction
than spontaneous behavior. That is, to use an illustrative analogy (thanks to David
McCandlish for pointing it out), Hamilton’s rule can be seen as a black hole, and
manipulation creates a larger event horizon within which any system evolves toward
satisfaction of Hamilton’s rule.
The processes described in Chapters 2 and 3 yield a final state where individuals are
induced by partners to behave socially, yet the inducing and induced individuals are not
in conflict anymore. At this point, it may appear that induced individuals are informed
by partners that it is in their interest to express the behavior. In a sense, manipulation
can produce a final state where individuals appear to communicate. This observation
indicates that honest communication need not count as evidence against the relevance
of manipulation.
Some guidelines to inferwhether or not a behavior is the result ofmanipulationwere
offered in the chapters above, and are summarized in the next section.
Implications for empirical research
The results obtained here suggest that both primitive and advanced eusociality might
often be better explained in terms of manipulation than of spontaneous behavior.
First, manipulated behavior may be more likely than spontaneous behavior when
conditional costs of resistance are present. Primitive eusociality often involves coercive
caste determination that would imply costs of resistance: helpers appear to be usually
induced through aggression, dominance hierarchies, or poor feeding (Weaver, 1966;
Wheeler, 1986; O’Donnell, 1998; Hunt, 2007). Hence, primitive eusociality could be
more likely to involve manipulated than spontaneous behavior. Estimation of the cost
of resistance in specific systems is required to assess this possibility.
Second, manipulated behavior may be more likely than spontaneous behavior
when there is genetic variation for social efficiency (i.e., the efficiency of manipulated
individuals at giving a benefit or cost to social partners) and social inefficiency is
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costly. When this is the case, manipulation can yield specialized workers that are
socially induced rather than spontaneous, yet that are not in conflict with their inducers.
This is consistent with the worker specialization observed in advanced eusociality.
Empirical assessment of this process requires the estimation of genetic variation of
social efficiency and cost of inefficiency in extant, ancestral species (i.e., not in already
advanced eusocial species). However, note that “genetic” here means heritable in a
general, abstract sense, which may occur for example via learning. That is, increased
efficiency through practice is also relevant to these observations.
Third, manipulated behavior may be more likely than spontaneous behavior when
individuals in poor condition benefit greatly from receiving help. When this happens,
the mother can become specialized into producing offspring, none of which she pro-
vides care to and all of which are cared for by maternally induced workers that are not
in conflict with their inducing mother. This is consistent with queen specialization
in advanced eusociality. Empirical test of this process similarly requires estimation of
the benefit received by helped offspring that were or were not previously cared for by
their mother and at least the genetic variation for maternal fertility, both in an extant,
ancestral species (i.e., not an advanced eusocial one; by ancestral species I mean a
species with the ancestral trait value of interest).
Phylogenetic analysis can then shed light on whether or not the queen or worker
specialization in a currently advanced eusocial species is the result of manipulation:
the occurrence of the conditions suggested above among ancestral species may be
used to infer whether or not the relevant ancestor of the advanced eusocial species of
interest had the required conditions. An affirmative answer would suggest that queen
or worker specialization in this species may have been the result of manipulation. In
contrast, the observation that queen signals are honest (Keller andNonacs, 1993;Heinze
and d’Ettorre, 2009) says little regarding this inference since the conflict over offspring
help may have already been substantially reduced. Also, the assumption that the
manipulated behavior is solely expressed by the manipulated individual substantially
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eliminates the possibility of perpetual arms races. Then, an observed absence of arms
races (Keller, 2009) need not rule out manipulation as a driving factor.
Available empirical evidence
There is ample circumstantial evidence for costs of resistance in diverse systems. Dead
female frogs (Rhinella proboscidea) release eggs after being forced by males to do so
(Izzo et al., 2012). In principle, failure to release eggs after being killed would be more
costly as there is no other reproductive option left. Cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus)
are induced to feed against their preference by threats of early termination of the
interaction with their hosts (Gingins et al., 2013). Keas (Nestor notabilis) coerce their
partners into helping them (Tebbich et al., 1996). Human acquiescence is vivid in war
events:
Here is how a British general described the carnage of World War I: ’Not
a man shirked going through the extremely heavy barrage, or facing the
machine gun and rifle fire that finally wiped them out.... I have never seen,
indeed could never have imagined, such a magnificent display of gallantry,
discipline, and determination.’ A sergeant described it differently: ’We knew
it was pointless, even before we went over—crossing open ground like that.
But you had to go. You were between the devil and the deep blue sea. If you
go forward, you’ll likely be shot. If you go back, you’ll be court-martialed
and shot. What can you do?’ (Valentino, 2004). (Pinker, 2011, p. 354)
Educated circles are not exempt frommanipulation tactics. Many journal editors appear
to strategically pressure authors into citing the editors’ journals (Wilhite and Fong,
2012).
However, socially triggeredphenotypes often involve less obvious costs of resistance.
Mothers determine offspring dispersal in great tits (Parus major) (Tschirren et al., 2007).
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In zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata), maternal state prior to breeding determines off-
spring’s fecundity (Gorman and Nager, 2004). Male great bowerbirds (Ptilonorhynchus
nuchalis) make use of visual illusions to persuade potential partners into choosing
them (Kelley and Endler, 2012). Mud dauber wasps (Sceliphron caementarium) sting
spiders which become paralyzed for later consumption by wasp larvae (Milne and
Milne, 2003). Female guppies (Poecilia reticulata) canmanipulate the aging of the sperm
stored by them (Gasparini and Evans, 2013). In honeybees (Apismellifera) and harvester
ants (Pogonomyrmex rugosus), the queen controls the development of complex worker
phenotypes bymeans of one or a fewmolecules (Kamakura, 2011; Libbrecht et al., 2013).
In all these cases, direct costs of resisting social influence are either less obvious or
seemingly negligible. Although the results in this dissertation cannot possibly identify
the source of the apparent acquiescence in each of these cases, the results obtained here
do suggest that the seeming acquiescencemayhave deeper causes than usually thought.
In particular, a key observation in eusociality is difficult to explain without ma-
nipulation. That is, the occurrence of queen pheromones. A simple explanation
for the evolution of queen pheromones is the following. First, a mutation causing
mothers to manipulate coercively her offspring into helping spreads due to costs of
resistance. Second, the available help favors extra fertility in the mother. Thus, the
mother becomes sufficiently fertile so that manipulated offspring become selected to
help even if not coerced. However, offspring are not exceedingly numerous so that the
mother can still coerce all of them. Third, a mutation cases the mother to manipulate
non-coercively. Such a mutation can spread because coercion would be costlier for the
mother than non-coercion. As a result, coercive caste determination disappears. In
the end, non-coercive caste determination, for example via pheromones, is established.
This explanation can be simplified further since coercion is not really necessary in the
first place (large benefits to poor-condition offspring are instead sufficient; see chapter
3). In contrast, there is no available satisfactory explanation for queen pheromones
without appealing to manipulation.
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Implications formajor evolutionary transitions
The results obtained here also inform the evolution of new levels of organization in
a more conceptual way. A long-appreciated feature of living systems is that, key
evolutionary events have involved the origin of new levels of organization (Mayr, 1982;
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995). For instance, prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells,
multicellular individuals, and advanced eusocial colonies are all thought to be upper-
level individuals that originated from the association of lower-level individuals. In order
to see how the findings of this dissertation shed light on the origins of new levels of
organization, it is useful to consider a relatively recent definition of individual. In this
definition, an individual is an entity whose parts display very high levels of cooperation
and very low levels of conflict (Queller and Strassmann, 2009). Alternatively, an entity
could be formed by parts with low levels of cooperation and high levels of conflict
(competitors), low levels of cooperation and low levels of conflict (simple groups), or
high levels of cooperation andhigh levels of conflict (societies) (Queller andStrassmann,
2009).
The evolutionary question posed by this scheme is how a group of competitors can
become an individual. The results of Chapter 1 show that, when resistance is costly,
manipulation can create high levels of cooperation. However, conflict remains in the
form of what is sometimes called potential conflict (i.e., if the cost of resistance is not
present, cooperation disappears). That is, in the light of the notions of Queller and
Strassmann (2009), the cost of resistance may bring a group of competitors into society
status. On the other hand, Chapters 2 and 3 show that the evolution of social efficiency
and maternal exploitation may not only create high levels of cooperation, but also low
levels of conflict. That is, manipulation could bring a group of competitors, through the
evolution of social efficiency andmaternal exploitation, into individual status.
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Testingmanipulation theory
A note of caution may be in order. The empirical tests suggested above are tests of
the models developed from manipulation theory. Manipulation theory may be taken
as considering that a phenotype is the result of partial or complete (either current
or past) control of the phenotype by another individual. The models are necessarily
much more specific than manipulation theory, so the rejection of a model does not
reject manipulation theory as a whole. Other models can be devised for specific
situations and a rejection of manipulation theory would involve a general failure of the
models developed from it. This is not a peculiarity of manipulation theory. Natural
selection theorymaybe taken as considering that a phenotype is the result of heritability
and differential reproduction, and a myriad of models have been devised from this
consideration. Only the general failure of models devised from the theory can speak
against it.
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Appendix I
Population genetics of maternally
manipulated helping: exploration of
favorable scenarios formanipulated
helping
I.1 Introduction
The models developed in the previous chapters are general in the sense that they
apply to arbitrary genetic (and non-genetic) systems with rather arbitrary life histories.
Such general treatment is possible because the techniques that were used to derive the
dynamic equations are based on the Price (1970) equation. A problem with that level
of generality is that many details are hidden, and hence confusion may arise. Here we
use population genetics models for the evolution in frequencies of genes controlling
maternal manipulation and offspring resistance. These models give an explicit account
of genetic systems and life histories, which brings clarity at the expense of complexity
and lack of generality. We use these models to explore the evolution of maternally
manipulated helping in 72 different biological scenarios.
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I.2 Model
The models here build upon that of Charlesworth (1978). We consider an infinite,
randomly mating population where manipulation and resistance are controlled by
a single locus each. That is, one locus is expressed in the mother and controls
maternal manipulation. The other locus is expressed in the offspring and controls
offspring resistance. We consider resident alleles that cause no manipulation and no
resistance respectively, and study the change in gene frequency of alleles that cause
some manipulation and some resistance. Generations are quasi non-overlapping (the
mother coexists with young offspring, but when counting gene frequencies we only
count genes of the new generation). The life cycle consists of the following steps: a
mated female produces offspring; young offspring receive maternal care; the mother
dies, adult offspring disperse from the maternal site, and all mate singly and randomly;
males die and each female starts the cycle again. A manipulating mother attempts to
have a portion p of her manipulable offspring stay in the maternal site for a fraction of
their adult life and help her raise further offspring. Manipulation may occur through
poor feeding, zygotic effects, or behavioral coercion. Acquiescing (i.e., not resisting)
individuals express maternal care while at the maternal site toward their siblings.
Acquiescing individuals pay the cost of acquiescence ca . Alternatively, a manipulated
individual resists manipulationwith probability q . A resisting individual disperses from
the maternal site, mates, and starts a new site without paying the cost of acquiescence
ca . Instead, a resisting individual pays a cost of resistance cr . One helper increases the
fitness of a recipient up to an amount b; however, the helper distributes this amount b
of allomaternal care uniformly among the recipients in the site. Thus, the fitness benefit
received by an individual of a given genotype in a given brood is
B = b # of helpers
# of recipients
.
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We consider two alleles per locus. One allele has no phenotypic effect, while
the other has either completely dominant or additive phenotypic effect. For the
manipulation locus, allele a has no effect while allele A causes a mother to manipulate
a fraction p of her offspring (or p/2 if the mother is heterozygous and allelic effects are
additive). For the resistance locus, allele b has no effect, while allele B causes offspring
to resist with probability q (or q/2 if offspring are heterozygous and allelic effects are
additive). We study the change in gene frequencies numerically and analytically.
We assume the following possibilities. There are two kinds of manipulable individ-
uals: both sexes (as would correspond to termites, eusocial thrips, and eusocial mole-
rats) or females only (as would correspond to eusocial hymenoptera). We consider three
possible recipients: only non-manipulated siblings (as would correspond to partially
bivoltine life cycles, where a mother lays two subsequent broods; thus, the first brood
can be constituted by helpers who raise the second brood formed by reproductives),
only non-helpers (e.g., if manipulation is behavioral and the winner of a dominance
contest still receives help, as may be the case in primitively eusocial taxa), or everyone
in the maternal site (i.e., helpers also receive allomaternal care, as in advanced eusocial
taxa). We consider two forms of cost of resistance: conditional, which is paid only if
the individual resists (as would be the case with behavioral resistance) or constitutive,
which is paid just by having a resistance allele (as would be the case with physiological
resistance). The genetic system can either be haploid (either clonal or sexual), diploid or
haplodiploid. For brevity, haploid below refers to the sexual case, as the description of
the clonal case is rather trivial and is not included here. Allelic effects can be additive
or dominant. Combinations of these considerations produce 72 different scenarios.
We study the coevolution of the frequencies of the genes controlling manipulation and
resistance. We refer to manipulated helping as the case when manipulation is fixed and
resistance is lost. We seek to study scenarios that promote the evolution of manipulated
helping.
Let xi be the frequency of genotype i . Let Ri jk be the probability that genotype i is
produced by amother of genotype j and a father of genotype k. Hence, Ri jk depends on
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the genetic system (haploid, diploid, or haplodiploid), on the recombination frequency
ρ between the two loci, and on the sex allocation s (the probability of male offspring
produced by a female). Let wi jk be the (viability) fitness of genotype i in a brood
produced by the pair jk. Assuming random mating the frequency of i in the next
generation is
x′i =
1
w¯
∑
jk
x j xkRi jkwi jk , (I.1)
where w¯ = ∑i jk x j xkRi jkwi jk is the population-average fitness (counting genotypic
frequencies is simpler than counting gamete frequencies; see §I.5.4). Let Pi j be the
probability that a mother of genotype j manipulates offspring of genotype i , and Qi
be the probability that genotype i resists manipulation. A general fitness function that
applies to all 12 scenarios mentioned above is
wi jk = Pi j (1−Qi )(1−ca)(1−Cr,i1)(1+B jk1)
+Pi jQi (1−Cr,i2)(1+B jk2)
+ (1−Pi j )(1−Cr,i3)(1+B jk3).
The first line corresponds to the event in which i is manipulated and does not resist.
Then, i pays the cost ca of acquiescence and, depending on the scenario, it may also
pay the resistance cost or get the benefit from being helped. The second line is for when
i is manipulated but resists. The third line is when it is not manipulated. Cr,i l is the
cost of resistance for genotype i at fitness position l . When the cost of resistance is
constitutive, Cr,i l = cr for all l = 1,2,3. When it is conditional, Cr,i l = cr only for l = 2,
otherwise it is zero. B jkl is the fitness benefit at fitness position l for an individual in
a brood produced by pair jk. The benefit B jkl depends on the number of helpers and
recipients, and hence B jkl is defined as follows.
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Let H jk be the frequency of helpers produced by a jk mating. Supposing that
selection occurs after dispersal, we count helpers before selection. Then,
H jk =
∑
i
Ri jkPi j (1−Qi ). (I.2)
The frequency of helpers in the population is
h =
∑
jk
x j xkH jk .
Thus, the benefit from being helped is,
B jkl =

b
H j k
1−∑i Ri j kPi j for l = 3, when recipients are only non-manipulated
b
H j k
1−H j k for l = 2,3, when recipients are only non-helpers
bH jk for l = 1,2,3, when recipients are everyone.
I.3 Results
Numerical results
The initial conditions were specified as follows. We drew randomly sixteen initial
frequencies for alleles A and B between 0 and 0.1, and calculated the initial genotypic
frequencies from their linkage equilibriumdistribution. We then iterated the recurrence
equations (I.1) for 20,000 generations (30,000 for the haploid case). We stopped
iterations if genotypic frequencies reached quasi-equilibrium to an approximation of
10−10. Parameter values evaluated were b = 0.9,1.1,2.1; ca = 1; p = 0.1,0.5,0.9; q =
0.1,0.5,1; cr = 0,0.1,0.5; s = 0.25,0.5,0.75; and ρ = 0,0.05,0.5. We evaluated the 72
scenarios. We did tests with no selection by setting b = ca = cr = 0 in which no change
in gene frequency ever occurred. With selection, the quasi-equilibrium frequency of
helpers in the expected region of conflict (i.e., when b = 1.1) in general was:
• larger when both sexes are manipulable than when only females are;
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• usually zero when recipients are everyone, but can reach significant values when
recipients are non-manipulated or non-helpers. It was subtly larger when recipi-
ents where non-manipulated compared to non-helpers;
• larger for constitutive costs than for conditional costs of resistance;
• similar for haploid and diploid, but substantially smaller for haplodiploid;
• similar for additive and completely dominant effects.
Some of the different dynamical regimes observed are in Fig. I1.1. Helper fre-
quencies at quasi-equilibrium are given in Fig. I1.2 for different genetic systems and
parameter values. Figures for all the results are available at
http://neko.bio.utk.edu/~mgonzal7/Eusociality/Chapter_1/Numerically/.
In haplodiploids, sex ratio evolves for several reasons, in decreasing order of influ-
ence: 1) if only females are manipulable, males have higher fitness; 2) if dominance
is additive, males can only resist with half the ability of homozygous females; 3) if
recombination rate is very small or resistance cost is large.
Analytical results
Here we focus on the scenarios in which only non-manipulated are recipients and re-
sistance cost is conditional. We assume that cr < ca and that the equilibrium genotypic
frequencies are in linkage equilibrium, which implicitly assumes that selection is weak.
Table I.1 gives equilibrium values for gene frequencies, helper behavior and sex ratio.
It can be shown that for haploids, the frequency of helpers for any gene frequency is
h = PXA
(
1− 1
2
qXB
)
− 1
2
PqxAB,
which, under linkage equilibrium, reduces to
h = PXA
(
1−qXB
)
,
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(a)Diploids; additive effects
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(b)Diploids; additive effects
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Helpers help only non−manipulated 
 Constitutive cost 
 b=1.1 c=1 cR=0.1 p=0.9 q=1.0 rho=0.50 s=0.50
A
B
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time
h
(c)Diploids; additive effects
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(d)Haploids
Figure I1.1: Typical dynamical regimes. The top plot in each panel (blue lines)
shows the coevolution of gene frequencies of the manipulation allele (A) and the
resistance allele (B). The bottom plot in each panel (black lines) shows the frequency
of helpers (h) through time. In the four panels both sexes are manipulable. Regarding
helper frequency, in (a) it initially increases but subsequently goes to zero; in (b) it is
maintained; in (c) it is maintained for a number of generations but is subsequently lost;
and in (d) it cycles. In (a) and (b) resistance cost is conditional while in (c) and (d) it is
constitutive. In (a)-(c) recipients are non-manipulated while in (d) recipients are non-
helpers.
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(b)Diploids
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(c)Haplodiploids; only females are manipulable
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(d)Haplodiploids; both sexes are manipulable
Figure I1.2: A bar’s height gives the helper frequency obtained either at quasi-
equilibrium or at the end of the iteration, averaged over 16 random initial conditions.
Notice that for haplodiploids, if only females are manipulable a female-skewed sex
allocation produces a larger helper-equilibrium frequency while if both sexes are
manipulable a larger male-skewed sex allocation produces a larger helper-equilibrium
frequency.
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Table I.1: Equilibrium values for manipulation allele frequency (XˆA), resistance allele frequency
(XˆB), helper frequency (hˆ), and sex ratio (zˆ). Rows give the results for genetic system/manipulable
sexes. We show only results for additive effects, even though analytical results are also possible
for complete dominance. P = p when both sexes are manipulable and P = p(1 − s) when only
females are manipulable. σ1 = 2+p{2(b−ca )+[(ca−cr )−(2−s)b]q}2+p{2(b−ca )+(2−s)[(ca−cr )−b]q} < 1. σ2 =
1−p(1−s)(b−1)
[1−p(1−s)][1−p(1−s)(b−ca )] . σ3 =
1−p(1−s)[1−b(1−q)]
[1−p(1−s)]{1−p(1−s)[(1−q)(ca−b)+qcr ]} > 1. u
∗ = 12
1−p(1−s)
bps(1−s)
{
b[2+ (1− s)(4−3p)]−4[2−p(1− s)(ca −cr )]
}
, v∗ =
b−ca
q(b−ca+cr ) . h
∗ = 12
cr (1−s)(1−p(1−s))
b(b−ca+cr ) {[b−4(ca − cr )][2− p(1− s)]+2b(1− s)(2− p)}. For haplodiploids/both,
fixation of full resistance cannot eliminate helper behavior because males can only resist halfway under
the assumptions of the model.
(XˆA, XˆB) hˆ
Haploids (0,XB) 0
(1,0) P
(1,1) P (1−q)
(XˆA, XˆB) hˆ
Diploids (0,XB) 0
( 14 ,0)
1
4P
( 14 ,
1
4 )
1
4P (1− 14q)
( 14 ,1)
1
4P (1−q)
(1,0) P
(1, 14 ) P (1− 14q)
(1,1) P (1−q)
(XˆA, XˆB) hˆ zˆ
Haplodiploids/both (0,XB) 0 s
(1,0) sp(1− s) s
(1,1) sp(1− s)
[
1−q
(
1− s2
)]
sσ1
Haplodiploids/female (0,XB) 0 s
(1,0) sp(1− s)2 sσ2
(1,1) sp(1− s)2(1−q) sσ3
(u∗,v∗) h∗ s
where P = p when both sexes are manipulable, P = p(1− s) when only females are
manipulable and Xi is the frequency of allele i.
Numerical iterations generally converge to points that appear to match those ex-
pected analytically, except in three detected cases: 1) For diploids, the polymorphic
equilibria were not observed numerically. 2) For haplodiploids, the polymorphic
equilibrium deviates somewhat from its expected analytical value, to the point of there
being a polymorphic equilibrium in haplodiploids/both although none was expected
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analytically. 3) For haplodiploids/female, dynamics sometimes showed an elbow shape
in which an equilibrium, polymorphic for manipulation and monomorphic for fixed
resistance, was reached. A fourth discrepancy observed occasionally in all genetic
systems is that a line of equilibria at (XA,1) was observed but this appears to occur
when parameters are at the boundary of stability conditions. The reason for dis-
crepancies 1-3 appears to be the strength of selection. Discrepancy 2 occurred only
when cr = 0.5 in numerical runs. Discrepancy 3 seems to suggest that the scenario
haplodiploids/female is subject to stronger selection as it occurred even with cr = 0. To
avoid the linkage equilibriumassumption two alternativeswere attempted: i ) to look for
equilibriumgenotypic frequencies insteadof equilibriumgene frequencies or i i ) to look
for equilibriumgamete frequencies. The first alternative is computationally prohibitive.
The second alternative requires recurrence equations for gamete frequencies. Due
to parental effects, these equations would be non-Markov since the next generation-
gamete frequencies depend not only on the current generation frequencies, but also on
frequencies at each past generation (see §I.5.4). Hence, it is to be kept in mind that the
assumption of monomorphic equilibrium in invasion analyses below may not hold for
haplodiploids/female.
Below we give local stability conditions for the haploid case.
Stability for haploids
For the equilibrium (0,XB):
If p2 is much smaller than p, the line of equilibria (0,XB) is unstable if
b > ca +cr
XBq
1−XBq
for cr >K1
b > 22ρ+P (1−ρ)[ca(1−q+XBq)+cr q(1−XB)]
P (2−q)(1−ρ) for cr <K1,
where K1 = (1− XBq) caPq(1−ρ)(1−2XB )−4ρPq(1−ρ)(1−2XB )(2−XBq) provided that XB < 1/2. If XB > 1/2 the
inequalities for cr are reverted. P = p when both sexes are manipulable and P = p(1− s)
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when only females are manipulable. If ρ > 15 , K1 is negative and hence only the first
inequality matters in that case.
For the equilibrium (1,0):
The equilibrium (1,0) is stable if
b > 2(ca −cr ) for cr <
ca
2
b > ca for cr >
ca
2
.
For the equilibrium (1,1):
The equilibrium (1,1) is stable if (the third inequality was not proved explicitly; only the
equality was proved and the direction of the inequality was inferred from plots)
b < 2(ca −cr )
and b > ca +cr
q
1−q for cr >K2
and b > 2(k1ca −k2cr +k3) for cr <K2,
where k1 = 1
1+ 1−q1−2q/(1+ρ)
, k2 = 22−(1+ρ)(2−q)/q and k3 =
2ρ
P[2q−(1+ρ)(2−q)] . K2 =
1−q
2−q
[
ca + 4ρPq(1−ρ)
]
provided that ρ < 3q−22−q , which requires that q > 23 ≈ 0.66. If ρ >
3q−2
2−q , which requires
that q < 67 ≈ 0.86, the inequalities for cr are reverted. Hence, if q < 23 , cr needs to be
greater than K2 for the third inequality to apply. In such a case, from our assumption
that cr < ca , K2 needs to be smaller than ca and then ρ < 3−
p
5
1−3
p
5
≈ 0.13. Therefore, if q < 23
and ρ& 0.13 then the third inequality can be ignored.
In summary for haploids, if p is small, q < 23 , ρ > 15 and cr >
ca
2 , then for the
manipulationallele to spread to fixation and the resistance allele to be lost it is sufficient
that
b > ca +cr
q
1−q .
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The fact that cr > ca2 makes this is a stringent condition inwhich case there is no conflict.
I.4 Discussion
The equilibrium frequency of helpers is larger when both sexes are manipulable. This
is simply because males can also be helpers. When all siblings are recipients of help,
the equilibrium frequency of helpers is close to zero because much of the helping
effort is wasted into helping helpers who are unlikely to pass their genes to the future
generation. Constitutive resistance costs caused larger equilibrium frequency of helpers
than conditional costs because the resistance allele may be selected against even when
it is not expressed, which causes stronger selection pressure against resistance. The
substantially smaller equilibrium frequency of helpers in haplodiploids is seemingly an
artifact of our definition of Ri jk for haplodiploids (eqs. (I.3)). We weighted the Ri jk
for females by 1− s and that for males by s so that the sum of genotype frequencies
is 1. However, this causes genotype frequencies to be weighted by sex frequencies,
and thus the probability that genotypes i and j mate is s(1− s). Consequently, worker
frequencies are artificiallyweighted by the factor s(1−s) for haplodiploids (see Table I.1).
Therefore, our results for haplodiploids need to be corrected to account for this problem.
In any case, the results for haploids and diploids, and presumably for haplodiploids
once corrections are made, show that full resistance probability (q = 1) eliminates
worker behavior, which contrasts with other approaches to model conflict in which
contribution to trait expression by the conflicting parties is additive (e.g., Gavrilets,
2000; Frank and Crespi, 2011).
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I.5 Calculation details
I.5.1 Definition of Pi j andQi
Haploid and diploid with complete dominance: If genotype j has the manipulation
allele, Pi j = p when both sexes are manipulable or Pi j = (1− s)p when only females are
manipulable, where s is the proportion of males produced by a mating. Pi j is constant
over i in the haploid and diploid genetic systems. Qi = q when genotype i has the
resistance allele.
Diploid with additive effects: If genotype j is homozygote for the manipulation
allele, Pi j is defined as above. If j is heterozygote we let Pi j = p/2 when both sexes are
manipulable or Pi j = (1− s)p/2 when only females are manipulable. Similarly,Qi = q/2
for heterozygotes of the resistance allele.
Haplodiploid case: We arrange genotypes so that the first 16 genotypes are those of
females, while genotypes from 17 to 20 are those of males. With complete dominance,
Pi j = p for i = 1, ...,16 when only females are manipulable, or for i = 1, ...,20 when
both sexes are manipulable. With additive effects, Pi j = p or Pi j = p/2 depending on
whether j has two or one manipulation alleles. Notice that the weighting (1− s) when
only females are manipulable is not necessary in this account of the haplodiploid case.
Qi is defined as above, withQi = q/2 for males possessing the resistance allele.
I.5.2 Definition of Ri j k
Let ρ be the recombination frequency between the manipulation and resistance loci.
Let s be the fraction of male offspring produced by a mating (sex allocation). Let δi j be
the Kronecker delta, so δi j = 0 if i 6= j and δi j = 1 if i = j . Let il , jl ,kl , Il , Jl ,Kl = 0,1 here
denote the absence or presence of the allele A or B in locus l in haplotype i , j ,k, I , J ,K .
Then, following Nagylaki (1992, eq. (8.9)), Ri jk is given by the following expressions.
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For haploids:
R1+i1+2i2,1+ j1+2 j2 ,1+k1+2k2 =
1
2
δi1, j1[(1−ρ)δi2 , j2 +ρδi2,k2 ]
+ 1
2
δi1,k1 [(1−ρ)δi2,k2 +ρδi2, j2].
For diploids:
R1+4(i1+2i2)+I1+2I2,1+4( j1+2 j2)+k1+2k2 ,1+4(J1+2J2)+K1+2K2 ={
1
2
δi1, j1[(1−ρ)δi2, j2 +ρδi2,k2 ]+
1
2
δi1,k1 [(1−ρ)δi2,k2 +ρδi2, j2 ]
}
×
{
1
2
δI1,J1[(1−ρ)δI2,J2 +ρδI2,K2]+
1
2
δI1,K1[(1−ρ)δI2,K2+ρδI2,J2]
}
.
For female offspring of haplodiploids:
R1+4(i1+2i2)+I1+2I2,1+4( j1+2 j2)+k1+2k2 ,17+K1+2K2 =
(1− s)
{
1
2
δi1, j1 [(1−ρ)δi2, j2 +ρδi2,k2]+
1
2
δi1,k1 [(1−ρ)δi2,k2 +ρδi2, j2]
}
× (δI1,K1δI2,K2). (I.3a)
For male offspring of haplodiploids:
R17+i1+2i2,1+4( j1+2 j2)+k1+2k2 ,17...20 =
s
{
1
2
δi1, j1 [(1−ρ)δi2, j2 +ρδi2,k2 ]+
1
2
δi1,k1 [(1−ρ)δi2,k2 +ρδi2, j2 ]
}
. (I.3b)
I.5.3 Definition of H j k
From the definition of H jk in eq. (I.2) and the definitions of Ri jk , Pi j , and Qi , we have
that H jk takes the following values.
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For haploids:
H jk =

Pi j when no one can resist
Pi j (1−q/2) when half can resist
Pi j (1−q) when all can resist.
Pi j is constant over i for haploids and diploids, thus the subscript i can be dropped in
H jk for those genetic systems.
For diploids with complete dominance:
H jk =

Pi j when no one can resist
Pi j (1−q/2) when half can resist
Pi j (1−3q/4) when 3/4 can resist
Pi j (1−q) when all can resist.
For diploids with additive allelic effects:
H jk =

Pi j when no one can resist
Pi j (1−q/4) when half can resist (with half ability)
Pi j (1−q/2) when 3/4 can resist (1/4 with all ability, 1/2 with half ability)
Pi j (1−q) when all can resist with all ability
Pi j (1−q/2) when all can resist with half ability
Pi j (1−3q/4) when all can resist; 1/2 with all ability, 1/2 with half ability.
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For haplodiploids with complete dominance where only females are manipulable:
H jk =

(1− s)p when no one can resist
(1− s)p(1−q/2) when half can resist
(1− s)p(1−q) when all can resist
(1− s)p(1−q) when all and only females can resist
(1− s)p(1−q) when females and half of males can resist.
For haplodiploids with complete dominance where both sexes are manipulable:
H jk =

p when no one can resist
p(1−q/2) when half can resist
p(1−q) when all can resist
p[(1− s)(1−q)+ s] when all and only females can resist
p[(1− s)(1−q)+ s(1−q/2)] when females and half of males can resist.
For haplodiploids with additive allelic effects where only females are manipulable:
H jk =

(1− s)P1, j when no one can resist
(1− s)P1, j (1−q/4) when half can resist (with half ability)
(1− s)P1, j (1−q/2) when all can resist (with half ability)
(1− s)P1, j (1−q/2) when females can resist (with half ability)
(1− s)P1, j (1−q/4) when all females and half males can resist
(half females with full ability, half with half ability;
males with half ability)
(1− s)P1, j (1−q) all can resist (females with full ability, males with half ability).
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For the haplodiploid case, Pi j is constant for i = 1, ...,16 so we just picked 1 for the
definition above.
I.5.4 Recurrence equations for gamete frequencies
Although the results in Appendix I were obtained using recurrence equations for geno-
type frequencies (eq. I.1), the dynamics can be equivalently described by recurrence
equations for gamete (haplotype) frequencies. Here we illustrate that recurrence
equations for gamete frequencies make the analysis more complicated. Let z t
i
be the
frequency of gamete i at generation t . Let ri jk be the probability that individual jk
produces gamete i . Let w jk•• be the fitness of individual jk averaged over its possible
mothers and fathers. The frequency of gamete i in the next generation is
z t+1i =
1
w¯
∑
jk
z tj z
t
kw jk••ri jk . (I.4)
Let w jk;lm,no be the fitness of individual jk whose mother and father have genotype
lm and no respectively. R jk;lm,no is the probability that genotype jk is produced by a
mother lm and a father no. The average fitness of jk over mothers and fathers is
w jk•• =
∑
lmno
w jk;lm,no (z
t−1
l z
t−1
m wlm••)(z
t−1
n z
t−1
o wno••)R jk;lm,no .
Hence, the recurrence equation (I.4) depends on the two previous time steps, which
substantially complicates the analysis.
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Appendix II
Invasion analysis of maternally
manipulated helping: evolution of
manipulated helping
II.1 Introduction
The population genetics models for the evolution of manipulated helping introduced
in Appendix I make explicit many biologically relevant details that are hidden in the
general accounts in chapters 1-3. However, the population geneticsmodels in Appendix
I only study the change in gene frequencies for fixed levels of manipulation and
resistance. That is, manipulation and resistance themselves do not evolve. In this
appendix, we introduce simplifying assumptions to the population genetics models of
Appendix I to study the change in manipulation and resistance. We do this by studying
the continuous invasion ofmutants that differ slightly from resident genes (an approach
often known as invasion analysis). This approach greatly simplifies the mathematics,
which allows for analytical treatment for haploids, diploids, and haplodiploids. Expres-
sions for relatedness and reproductive value arise from the algebra. We also consider
arbitrary sex-differential manipulation: a mother can manipulate offspring of arbitrary
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sex composition. In addition to the coevolution of manipulation and resistance, we
obtain results regarding the effect of sex-differential manipulation on the evolution of
maternallymanipulated helping.
II.2 Model
We focus on maternal rather than the broader parental manipulation because the
relevant genetic variation may be particularly available for mothers (Linksvayer and
Wade, 2005; Schwander et al., 2008; Russell and Lummaa, 2009; Uller et al., 2009;
Maestripieri and Mateo, 2009). Our approach builds upon that of Charlesworth (1978)
who developed a population genetics model for the evolution of parental manipulation
in which offspring were not allowed to resist manipulation. We consider an infinite
sexual population with a partially bivoltine life-cycle (figure II2.1). Partial bivoltinism
causes altruism and manipulation to require smaller benefit-cost ratios to evolve than
when helpers also receive help (Charlesworth, 1978, and Appendix I; see also Hunt and
Amdam, 2005). In addition, partial bivoltinismhas been found to yield high relatedness
(Seger, 1983). We assume that parents of either or both sexes provide care to young.
Adult offspring disperse from the maternal site to a common mating pool. Parents
die after the second brood is raised. Individuals at the mating pool mate singly and
randomly. This setting of dispersal before mating has been found to produce higher
relatednesses than with dispersal after mating, thus favoring altruism (Taylor, 1988).
We assume that mothers can manipulate first-brood offspring into staying in the
maternal site for a fraction of their adulthood. A mother manipulates a first-brood
offspring of sex i with probability pi . Manipulated offspring of sex i resist with
probability qi in which case they disperse without delay. Alternatively, manipulated
offspring of sex i acquiesce with probability 1 − qi and stay in the maternal site
for a fraction of their adulthood. Acquiescing offspring express parental care (e.g.,
provisioning or defense) at the maternal site increasing fitness of the second-brood
offspring.
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Figure II2.1: A mated female produces two subsequent, overlapping broods. A mother
directs her manipulation effort toward a fraction θ of the first brood. A member of this
target set of offspring is manipulated to stay with probability p. Acquiescing offspring
remain in thematernal site for some fraction of their adulthood.
We simplify the study of sex-differential manipulation by proceeding as follows. Let
p be amother’s manipulation effort (0≤ p ≤ 1) so that pi =αip where αi measures how
much of amother’smanipulationeffort translates intomanipulationof a given sex. That
is, αi measures sex-differential manipulation. Rather than studying the independent
evolution of pi , we study the evolution of manipulation effort p. A normalizedmeasure
of sex-differential manipulation is ui = αiγi1/θ, where γi1 is the probability that an
individual of sex i is in the first brood and θ = α♀γ♀1 +α♂γ♂1 is the target set of
manipulation (the fraction of the first brood that the mother intends to manipulate).
That is, ui is the fraction of manipulation effort p that goes toward sex i (u♀+u♂ = 1).
Sex-differential resistance can arise because of different ploidy levels between the sexes.
We consider three genetic systems: sexual haploid, diploid and haplodiploid. For
diploid individuals we let alleles have additive effects (i.e., the trait value is given by the
sumof the contributionsof alleles from the two chromosomes). Hence, for haploids and
diploids, we let the resistance probability be equal between the sexes: qi = q . However,
for haploidiploids sexes have different ploidy levels. Although haplodiploid males are
haploid in their germline, they may have a duplicate genome in some somatic tissues
except in basal hymenoptera and non-hymenopteran haplodiploids (Aron et al., 2005).
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Thus, we allow for the effect of dosage compensation in male haplodiploids which is
relevant because if males do not compensate dosage, with additive allelic effects, males
are half as likely to resist as females. Therefore, for haplodiploids, we let the probability
of resistance of females be q♀ = q while that of males be q♂ = 1/2d♂q . Here, d♂
measures dosage compensation, so that d♂ = 1 if males do not compensate dosage or
d♂ = 2 if they do. We study the coevolution of manipulation effort p, which we assume
to be under maternal genetic control, and resistance probability q , which we assume to
be under offspring genetic control.
Amanipulatingmother survives to produce the secondbroodwith probability 1−cm,
where cm is the cost of manipulation (Bell et al., 2012). Acquiescing offspring have
fitness 1−ca, where ca is the cost of acquiescencewhich includes both the cost of helping
and the cost being delayed at the maternal site. Resisting offspring disperse without
paying the cost of acquiescence, but theymay have reduced probabilities of completing
dispersal and events thereafter (e.g., nest building and defense) depending on how
manipulation is executed (Metcalfe andMonaghan, 2001). Thus, resisting offspring have
fitness 1−cr , where cr is the cost of resistance. The fitness benefit, if any, provided by an
acquiescing individual is distributed uniformly among all second-brood offspring. We
let the benefit depend on the sex of the helper. This intends to reflect relevant ancestral
conditions: termite ancestors may have possessed biparental care (Korb, 2008) and
hence both sexes would be similarly helpful if manipulated to stay, while ancestors to
eusocial hymenoptera may have had predominantly maternal care (Hunt, 2007) and so
females would be the primary helping sex. We thus denote by bi the benefit to second-
brood offspring provided by an acquiescing individual of sex i . The effective benefit
received by a second-brood individual is therefore
B =
b♀×# of female helpers+b♂×# of male helpers
# of recipients
. (II.1)
We let manipulation effort p and resistance probability q be controlled by one
locus each. For each locus, we consider a resident and a mutant allele, the latter of
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which slightly modifies manipulation or resistance probability. We make additional
simplifying assumptions (rare mutation, small mutation effect and no overdominance
or frequency dependent selection) so that we can study the invasion of one mutant
allele at a time (Haldane, 1927; Eshel, 1983;Metz et al., 1996; Geritz et al., 1998;Waxman
and Gavrilets, 2005). Manipulation effort p and resistance probability q can then be
taken to evolve as continuous traits (see §II.5). These assumptions yield analogous
simplifications to those of other approaches (e.g., Taylor and Frank, 1996).
The fitness of amutant of sex i that hasmother of genotype J and father of genotype
K and belongs to the first or second brood respectively is
wi1,J×K = pi (1−qi )(1−ca)+piqi (1−cr )+ (1−pi ), (II.2a)
wi2,J×K = 1+B. (II.2b)
In eq. (II.2a), the first term corresponds to the case where offspring are manipulated
and acquiesce in which case they pay the cost of acquiescence ca ; the second term
corresponds to when they are manipulated and resist in which case they pay the cost
of resistance cr ; and the third term is when offspring are not manipulated in which case
no fitness change occurs. Eq. (II.2b) gives fitness for second-brood individuals. The
fitnesses of the two broods determine the average fitness of a mutant of sex i whose
mother is J and father is K . Because a manipulating mother has a reduced probability
of producing the second brood due to the cost ofmanipulation cm , such averagemutant
fitness is
wi ,J×K = gγi1|iwi1,J×K + (1− g )γi2|i (1−cm)wi2,J×K , (II.3)
where g is the fraction of offspring that belong to the first brood and γi j |i is the
probability that a mutant in brood j is of sex i given that a mutant of sex i is produced.
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II.3 Results
The invasion analysis for the three genetic systems is shown in §II.5. Although the al-
gebra is cumbersome especially for the haplodiploid case, final results can be described
by simple expressions allowing for a straightforward interpretation.
Evolution of manipulation
For the three genetic systems, manipulation effort p increases if
b(1−q)(1−cm)> c. (II.4)
Throughout this Appendix, the overbar means averaging over sex-specific fractions ui
of manipulation effort. That is, b(1−q) = ∑i uibi (1− qi ) is the product of the benefit
bi and the probability of acquiescence 1− qi , averaged over manipulated offspring.
The quantity c = ∑i ui ci is the viability cost averaged over manipulated offspring,
where the total viability cost to sex-i offspring ci = ca(1− qi )+ cr qi depends on q and
includes both the costs of acquiescence ca and resistance cr (see Table II.1 for the values
of qi in different genetic systems). Therefore, inequality (II.4) specifies how dosage
compensation (implicit in q♂) and sex-differentialmanipulation (u♀,u♂) influence the
evolution of maternal manipulation for the three genetic systems.
The effect of sex-differentialmanipulation is specified byparametersui. Maximizing
the ratio of the left-hand side of eq. (II.4) over its right-hand side with respect to ui , we
find that the inequality is easiest to satisfy when the entire manipulation effort goes
toward the sex for which the quantity (1− qi )bi /ci is the largest. For haploids and
diploids, qi and ci values are identical for both sexes so that manipulation increases
the easiest if it is directed to the sex providing the largest benefit bi .
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Table II.1: Definition of several quantities for female andmale offspring. The proportion
of males in the population (sex ratio) is z and that of females is ζ= 1−z. The proportion
of males produced by a mating (sex allocation) is s and that of females is σ= 1− s. The
proportion of brood j that is male is s j (hence s = g s1+ (1− g )s2), and the proportion of
brood j that is female is σ j = 1− s j .
Haploids and diploids Haplodiploids
Females andmales Females Males
qi q q
1
2d♂q
di 1 1 1 or 2
vi 1 1 ζ
r̂i
1
2 ζ
1
2 + zσ2 ζ12
Evolution of acquiescence
For the three genetic systems, resistance probability q decreases (or acquiescence
probability increases) if
br̂d(1−cm)> vd(ca −cr ), (II.5)
where br̂d =∑i uibi r̂idi and vd = ∑i ui vidi (see Table II.1 for the values of di ,vi and
r̂i in different genetic systems). The quantities r̂i give the probability that first-brood
mutants of sex i share the mutant allele with second-brood individuals, averaged over
the two mutant matings (Table II.1). The quantities vi give the probability that mutant
matings produce sex-i mutants (Table II.1). We show numerically in §II.5.2 that vi
matches the reproductive value of individuals of sex i , and that r̂i matches the regression
relatedness of sex i toward the second brood times the reproductive value of recipients
averaged over the two recipient sexes. We refer to r̂i as the reproductive-value-weighted
relatedness of sex i toward the second brood. Thus, the ratio ri = r̂i/vi is the life-for-life
relatedness of sex i toward the second brood (Hamilton, 1972; Bulmer, 1994).
Sex-differential manipulation, specified by u♀ and u♂, similarly affects whether
inequality (II.5) can be satisfied. The inequality is easiest to satisfy when the entire
manipulation effort goes toward the sex for which the quantity bi ri is the largest.
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For haploids and diploids, such a sex is simply determined by the largest bi . In
contrast to the evolution of manipulation, if only one sex is manipulated, the effect of
dosage compensation cancels out. Hence, when only one sex is manipulated, dosage
compensation is only relevant for manipulation but not for acquiescence.
Evolution of spontaneous helping
To compare the evolution of manipulated helping with that of spontaneous helping, we
have also studied a model in which first-brood offspring stay at the maternal site and
help second-brood offspring without being influenced by their mother (see §II.5.3). We
refer to this as spontaneous helping. We show that the tendency of spontaneous helping
increases if
br̂d s > vd scs . (II.6)
Here the averages are given by the same expressions as in eq. (II.5) except that now
all variables correspond to spontaneous helping (as indicated by the subscript s) and
may thus be numerically different from those of acquiescence. The quantity cs is
the cost of spontaneous helping and plays an analogous role to that of the cost of
acquiescence ca . Aswith acquiescence, dosage compensation cancels out if only one sex
helps spontaneously. Also, sex-differential expression of spontaneous helping causes
inequality (II.6) to be most easily satisfied when spontaneous helping is only expressed
by the sex with the largest value of bi ,sri .
Comparison of manipulated and spontaneous helping
Manipulated helping is favored but spontaneous helping is not if inequalities (II.4)
and (II.5) are satisfied while inequality (II.6) is not. Figure II2.2 illustrates regions of
parameter values where manipulated helping is favored under less stringent conditions
(lower benefit-cost ratios) than spontaneous helping. The advantage is reduced as the
resistance probability increases, but can still be observedwith full resistance probability
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Figure II2.2: Region of advantage of manipulated helping. Let the benefit provided by helpers of sex i
be bi = hi a, where hi is the probability that an acquiescing individual of sex i provides help to the second
brood and a is the amount of benefit. Manipulation, acquiescence, and spontaneous helping are favored
when the benefit-cost ratio a/ca is greater than the respective thresholds Tm , Ta , and TA (as defined in
expressions (II.12) in the online appendix). In the light gray area, manipulated helping is selected but
spontaneous helping is not (in the wording of Ratnieks and Reeve 1992 and Ratnieks et al. 2006, potential
but no actual conflict occurs). For A and B, only females are manipulated (u♀ = 1) and they are fully
helpful (h♀ = 1). The thresholds for these two plots are the same for haploids, diploids and haplodiploids.
For C and D, thresholds are shown for haplodiploids in which males are haploid in the tissue controlling
resistance (d♂ = 1). For C, both sexes are equally manipulated (u♀ = 1/2) and both sexes are fully helpful
(h♀ = h♂ = 1), while for D only males are manipulated (u♂ = 1) and they are fully helpful (h♂ = 1). The
remaining parameter values are ca = 1 and z = s1 = s2 = 1/2. Therefore, life-for-life relatedness is 1/2 in all
cases.
in haplodiploids with helping males that do not compensate dosage (d♂ = 1). We
illustrate the conditions for existence of the advantage in two simple examples: when
resistance is absent (q = 0, which may be the case before a new form of manipulation
starts evolving) and when it is complete (q = 1, which would be the case after the
evolution of manipulation under conditions that favor resistance).
Example 1. Let resistance be absent (q = 0). While no other assumption is made
for haploids and diploids, for haplodiploids suppose further that manipulation effort
is entirely applied to female offspring (u♀ = 1) and that sex allocation to the second
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brood is even (s2 = 1/2). This produces a life-for-life relatedness of r = 1/2. Under these
conditions, the advantage of manipulated helping exists if the cost of manipulation cm
is smaller than the smallest value between cr /ca and 1/2. Thus, the advantage may
exist with substantial manipulation costs. With negligible manipulation costs (cm → 0)
and substantial resistance costs (cr > ca/2), manipulated helping may be selected with
benefit-cost ratios as low as one half of those necessary for spontaneous helping.
Example 2. Suppose instead that resistance is complete for haplodiploids (q = 1); for
haploids and diploids complete resistance preventsmanipulation from being favored at
all. Suppose further that manipulation effort is entirely applied to male offspring (u♂ =
1) and that males are haploid in the tissue that controls their resistance (d♂ = 1, thus
q = 1/2). The relevant life-for-life relatedness is again r♂ = 1/2. In this situation, the
advantage of manipulated helping exists if the cost of manipulation cm is smaller than
the smallest value among cr /ca , (1−cr /ca)/2, and 1/3. As illustrated in figure II2.2 (C-D),
the advantage of manipulated helping may still exist when males are manipulated and
resistance is complete, provided that males are haploid in the tissue controlling their
resistance. This is because males are able to resist only half as much as females under
our assumption of additive allelic effects.
Dynamics
The forms of inequalities (II.4) and (II.5) cause the dynamics of sex-differentially
manipulated helping to be almost identical to those in Chapter 1 when relatednesses
are positive. In particular, for the three genetic systems, there are two general dynamic
outcomes: 1) complete disappearance ofmanipulationas a result of offspring resistance
(p = 0) (offspring wins) and 2) evolution of maximum manipulation and complete
acquiescence of offspring (p = 1,q = 0) (mother wins). However, in the haplodiploid
case with no dosage compensation for resistance in males (k♂ = 1), there is a third
dynamic outcome: 3) evolution to a statewheremanipulation ismaximal,but resistance
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in female offspring is complete (p = 1,q = 1) with male offspring exhibiting partial
acquiescence (mother partially wins over male offspring).
As in the generalmodel of Chapter 1, for haploids and diploids and for haplodiploids
with dosage compensation, the mother wins (outcome 2) if
b(1−cm)> ca (II.7a)
q0 < q∗+p0
√
−µqR
µpζM
(II.7b)
and acquiescence is favored (inequality II.5 holds). The subscript 0 in condition (II.7b)
indicates that it is the initial value of the variable. As before, q∗ = M0 −M is the
resistance probability at which the direction of selection for manipulation changes, and
R measures selection for resistance. They are
M0 = b(1−cm)−ca (II.8a)
M =D[b(1−cm)−ca −cr ] (II.8b)
R =−[br̂d(1−cm)−vd(ca −cr )], (II.8c)
where Di = 1 for haploids, diploids, and haplodiploid females and Di = d♂/2 for
haplodiploid males. The quantities µp and µq are functions of the mutation frequency
and mutation effect of manipulation and resistance respectively. Comparison with the
results of Chapter 1 suggests that the quantity ζ in inequality (II.7b)measures life-for-life
relatedness of mother to offspring of either brood.
Figure II2.3 shows numerical solutions for two cases when the mother wins under
benefit-cost ratios that are too low for spontaneous helping to be favored. Figure II2.3A
illustrates a scenario thatmay correspond to termites in that both sexes are equally help-
ful. Figure II2.3B illustrates a scenario that may correspond to eusocial hymenoptera in
that only females are helpful.
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Figure II2.3: Numerical solutions for (A) diploids and (B) haplodiploids. For A, both
sexes are equally helpful (b♀ = b♂ = 1.2) and equally manipulated (u♀ = 0.5). For B,
only females are helpful (b♀ = 1.2, b♂ = 0) and manipulated (u♀ = 1). The remaining
parameter values are: r = 1/2, ca = 1, cr = 0.5, cm = 0.1, and g = s1 = s2 = z = 0.5. The
mother wins when manipulation effort and resistance probability fall within the gray
region. Spontaneous helping requires a benefit greater than 2 to be selected in these
conditions so it is not favored.
II.4 Discussion
Inequalities (II.5) and (II.6) show that sex-differentially manipulated helping can be
obtained under less stringent conditions than spontaneous helping. The possibility
of this advantage does not necessarily mean that manipulated helping should be
observed more frequently than spontaneous helping. Capitalizing on this advantage
may require that the mother is able to preferentially manipulate the more helping
sex. This requirement imposes biologically informative constraints on the evolution of
maternally manipulated helping. In particular, if the mother manipulates her offspring
indiscriminately, but only one sex provides help, then maternal manipulation is less
likely to be selected than if she had the ability to direct her manipulation effort toward
the helping sex. This restriction is not relevant to spontaneous helping, and it may offer
a possibility to distinguish between manipulated helping and spontaneous helping. If
mechanisms for preferential manipulation are not available even though helpers tend
to be of a particular sex, this would suggest that manipulation is an unlikely source of
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the behavior. Inversely, if mechanisms for preferential manipulation are available, but
offspring can deceive the mother into believing that they are of the sex she chooses not
to manipulate, manipulation would also be an unlikely cause. The sex determination
mechanism in haplodiploids givesmothers substantial control of the sex of her offspring
(Bull, 1983; Heimpel and de Boer, 2008; Verhulst et al., 2010), yet such an ability may
be common across taxa (Thogerson et al., 2013). This may reduce the possibility that
offspring can deceive theirmother regarding their sex, whichmay allow formanipulated
helping given an ancestral state with primarily only one helping sex. If the ancestral
state involves biparental care, as would be the case for termite ancestors (Korb, 2008),
indiscriminatemanipulation does not makemanipulated helping less likely.
II.5 Calculation details
The proportion of males in the population (sex ratio) is z and that of females is ζ= 1−z.
Assuming that mutation is rare, the average fitness of a mutant individual is
wM = ζwM ,M×R + zwM ,R×M ,
where wM ,J×K is the fitness of mutantM whose mother is J and father is K . The letters
M and R denote mutant carrier and resident, respectively. That is, the first term above
corresponds to themutant’s fitness when its mother is a carrier and the second when its
father is a carrier. The fitness of a mutant whose mother is J and father is K is
wM ,J×K = γ♀w♀,I×K +γ♂w♂,I×K ,
where γi is the probability thatmutantM is of sex i . We let s be the proportion of males
produced by a mating (sex allocation) and that of females be σ = 1− s. Thus, γ♀ = σ
and γ♂ = s in all cases except for haplodiploidswhen the father ismutant in whose case
γ♂ = 0.
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The proportion of offspring that belong to the first brood is g (0 < g < 1). The
proportion of males in brood j is s j (hence s = g s1+ (1− g )s2), and the proportion of
females in brood j is σ j = 1− s j . The probability that a mutant of sex i is in brood j is
γi j (thus, γ♀ j =σ j and γ♂ j = s j in all cases except for haplodiploids when the father is
mutant in whose case γ♂ j = 0). Considering the conditional probability of being of a
given sex, the fitness of a mutant of sex i whosemother is J and father is K is
wi ,J×K = g
γi1
γi
wi1,J×K + (1− g )
γi2
γi
(1−cm)wi2,J×K ,
where wi j ,J×K is the fitness of sex-i mutant in brood j whose parents are J × K , as
indicated by eq. II.3 in themain text. The fitness of a first- and second-brood individual
are respectively given by eqs. II.2 in the main text.
To define a mother’s total manipulation effort p, a fraction of which is directed
to each sex, we write manipulation effort toward sex-i offspring as pi = αip. The
quantities αi (0≤αi ≤ 1) give the fraction of first-brood offspring of sex i toward which
manipulation effort is targeted (e.g., α♀ = 1 means that all first-brood females are target
of manipulation). Thus, αi ’s do not necessarily add up to 1. It can be seen that the
fraction of manipulation effort toward sex i is thus ui = αiγi1/θ, where the target set
of manipulation is θ = ∑αiγi1, and then ∑ui = 1. Now, let qik denote the resistance
probability of sex i of genotype k. Denote by qi• the average resistance probability
among sex-i offspring resulting frommating J ×K . Thus, the effective benefit is
B =
b♀gσ1p♀(1−q♀•)+b♂g s1p♂(1−q♂•)
1− g
= g pθ
1− g
[
u♀b♀(1−q♀•)+u♂b♂(1−q♂•)
]
= g pθ
1− g b(1−q•),
where the overbar denotes the average over manipulated offspring (i.e., x =∑ui xi ).
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II.5.1 Haploids and diploids
Here we build the model for diploids, and the results extend to sexual haploids except
that for the latter evolutionary change is twice as fast. Consider an infinite diploid,
sexual population with a resident manipulation allele a and a resident resistance allele
b, each in a separate locus. A mother with genotype aa manipulates with probability
p a fraction θ of her first brood. Offspring with genotype bb resist with probability q .
Assuming additive allelic effects, we let each resident manipulation allele code for p/2
and each resident resistance allele code for q/2. A raremanipulation allele A codes for a
slightly different probability p ′/2, and a rare resistance allele B codes a slightly different
probability q ′/2. Thus, a manipulation-mutantmother, with genotype Aa, manipulates
with probability P ′ = (p ′+p)/2, while a resistance-mutant offspring, with genotype Bb,
resists with probabilityQ ′ = (q ′+q)/2. We study the spread of these mutant alleles.
We assume that mutation is rare enough so that when amutant allele arises, there is
enough time for it to approach an equilibrium frequency before another mutant allele
arises (see e.g., Metz et al., 1996; Geritz et al., 1998; Waxman and Gavrilets, 2005). No
evolutionary forcesmaintainingpolymorphismwill be considered (e.g., overdominance
or frequency-dependent selection), so that each allele is either lost or fixed. This allows
one to consider separately the spread of mutant alleles in each of the two loci, without
any assumption about linkage between them.
Consider first the spread of a rare manipulation allele A. Because the sex ratio is
z (and ζ = 1− z), the rare allele is involved in matings Aa× aa (females on the left)
with a probability approximately equal to ζ, and in matings aa×Aa with a probability
approximately equal to z. The viability of genotype Aa given that its mother and father
are Aa and aa, respectively, is wAa,Aa×aa. Hence, the average viability of carriers of the
mutant allele is
wAa = ζwAa,Aa×aa+ zwAa,aa×Aa.
Assuming that mutation is of small effect and that the mother produces a very large
number of offspring, the evolutionary change in manipulation effort ∆p between the
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time ofmutation and the time of fixation is approximately given by the product between
themutational processµp whichmeasures themutation frequency andmutation effect,
and the selection gradient ∂wAa/∂p ′|p ′=p (Kimura, 1965; Lande, 1979; Iwasa et al., 1991;
Dieckmann and Law, 1996).
Denotingmutantmanipulation effort toward sex i asP ′
i
=αiP ′, themutant’s viability
when themother is also mutant reduces to
wAa,Aa×aa = gσ1P ′♀(1−q)(1−ca)+ gσ1P ′♀q(1−cr )+ gσ1(1−P ′♀)
+ (1− g )σ2(1−cm)(1+B ′)
+ g s1P ′♂(1−q)(1−ca)+ g s1P
′
♂
q(1−cr )+ g s1(1−P ′♂)
+ (1− g )s2(1−cm)(1+B ′)
= 1− (1− g )cm+ gP ′θ[b(1−q)(1−cm)−c],
where the effective benefit is B ′ = gP ′θ/(1− g )b(1− q), the average benefit provided is
b = u♀b♀+u♂b♂, and the overall viability cost to offspring is c = ca(1− q)+ cr q . For
the reciprocal mating, the viability wAa,aa×Aa is constant with respect to p ′. Hence, with
a constant cost of manipulationwith respect tomanipulation effort, the fitness gradient
for manipulation is
∂wAa
∂p ′
∣∣∣
p ′=p
= 1
2
ζgθ
[
b(1−q)(1−cm)−c
]
. (II.9)
The rate of change depends on the proportion of females, ζ, as only mothers express
the mutant allele. It is also weighted by 1/2 because of our treatment of additive allelic
effects, and depends on the size of the available workforce given by the size of the first
brood, g , and the target set, θ. Manipulation probability increases if
b(1−q)(1−cm)> c.
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To determine how the direction of selection is affected by sex-differentialmanipulation,
notice that in this inequality only b depends on ui . Differentiating b with respect to
u♀ = 1− u♂, we obtain that b is maximized when the mother allocates her entire
manipulationeffort to the sex that provides the largest benefit. When both sexes provide
the same benefit, the inequality is constant with respect to u♀.
We can now look at the evolution of resistance. The average viability of mutant
carriers is
wBb = ζwBb,Bb×bb+ zwBb,bb×Bb.
Mothers are all of genotype aa, so first-brood offspring aremanipulatedwith probability
p. Offspring from a Bb× bb mating have genotype Bb or bb with equal probability,
assuming no meiotic drive. Thus, manipulated offspring from this mating resist on
average with probability (Q ′ + q)/2, and hence the effective benefit is B ′ = g pθ/(1−
g )b[1− (Q ′ + q)/2]. Therefore, the viability of a mutant carrier when its mother is a
mutant reduces to
wBb,Bb×bb = gσ1p♀(1−Q ′)(1−ca)+ gσ1p♀Q ′(1−cr )+ gσ1(1−p♀)
+ (1− g )σ2(1−cm)(1+B ′)
+ g s1p♂(1−Q ′)(1−ca)+ g s1p♂Q ′(1−cr )+ g s1(1−p♂)
+ (1− g )s2(1−cm)(1+B ′)
= 1− (1− g )cm+ g pθ
{
b
[
1− 1
2
(Q ′+q)
]
(1−cm)−c ′
}
,
where the overall viability cost to offspring is c ′ = ca(1−Q ′)+ crQ ′. The viability is the
same in the reciprocal mating. The fitness gradient for resistance is thus
∂wBb
∂q ′
∣∣∣
q ′=q
=−1
2
g pθ
[
1
2
b(1−cm)− (ca −cr )
]
. (II.10)
The rate of change is also weighted by 1/2 from our treatment of additive allelic effects,
and depends on the total probability of being manipulated, given by g pθ. Resistance
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probability decreases if
1
2
b(1−cm)> ca −cr .
As for manipulation, only b depends on sex-differential manipulation, ui , in this
inequality. Thus, when sexes are differentially helping, this inequality is of easier
satisfaction when the mother only manipulates the sex that provides the greatest
benefit.
To study the sexual haploid case, the only modification needed above is to replace
P ′ = p ′ and Q ′ = q ′ (so now each allele codes for the full trait, not just half of it). The
only effect of this is that it eliminates the 1/2 from the fitness gradients, doubling the
rate of evolutionary change for both manipulation and resistance. Thus, the haploid
and diploid case are qualitatively identical.
II.5.2 Haplodiploids
Let each resident manipulation and resistance allele code for a manipulation effort
p/2 and resistance probability q/2, respectively. Allow males, which are haploid, to
compensate dosage (Aron et al., 2005) so that the resistance probability for a resident
male is dq/2, where d = 1 without dosage compensation, or d = 2 with dosage
compensation (indeed, dosage compensation can also be thought of as switching from
adding to averaging gene effects in males; Gardner, 2012). A mutant female for the
respective locus has a manipulation effort of P ′ = (p ′+p)/2 or a resistance probability
ofQ ′ = (q ′+q)/2. A mutant male has a resistance probability of dq ′/2.
First, consider the evolution ofmanipulation effort. The average viability of amutant
is
wA = ζwA ,Aa×a+ zwA ,aa×A
wherewA ,J×K = γ♀wAa,J×K +γ♂wA,J×K . For thematingAa×a, we have that γ♀ =σ and
γ♂ = s, while for the reciprocal mating aa×A, γ♀ = σ and γ♂ = 0 because no mutant
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males are produced. Thus, offspring viabilities for the first mating are
wAa,Aa×a = g
σ1
σ
P ′♀(1−q)(1−ca)+ g
σ1
σ
P ′♀q(1−cr )+ g
σ1
σ
(1−P ′♀)
+ (1− g )σ2
σ
(1−cm)(1+B ′)
= σ2
σ
+ g
(σ1
σ
− σ2
σ
)
−cm
σ2
σ
(1− g )+ gP ′θ
[
σ2
σ
b(1−q)(1−cm)−
u♀
σ
c♀
]
wA,Aa×a = g
s1
s
P ′
♂
(
1−d q
2
)
(1−ca)+ g
s1
s
P ′
♂
d
q
2
(1−cr )+ g
s1
s
(1−P ′
♂
)
+ (1− g ) s2
s
(1−cm)(1+B ′)
= s2
s
+ g
( s1
s
− s2
s
)
−cm
s2
s
(1− g )+ gP ′θ
[
s2
s
b(1−q)(1−cm)−
u♂
s
c♂
]
,
where the effective benefit for this mating is
B ′ = gP
′θ
1− g
[
u♀b♀(1−q)+u♂b♂
(
1−d q
2
)]
= gP
′θ
1− g b(1−q),
the overall cost paid by female offspring is c♀ = ca(1− q)+ crq , and by male offspring
is c♂ = ca
(
1−dq/2
)
+ crdq/2. Adding these two viabilities with their corresponding
weights as specified by the definition of wA ,Aa×a, we obtain
wA ,Aa×a = 1−cm(1− g )+ gP ′θ
[
b(1−q)(1−cm)−c
]
,
where the average cost to offspring viability is c = u♂c♂+u♀c♀. The mutant viability
from the reciprocal mating is constant with respect to p ′. With a constant cost of
manipulationwith respect to manipulation effort, the fitness gradient is
∂wA
∂p ′
∣∣∣
p ′=p
= 1
2
ζgθ
[
b(1−q)(1−cm)−c
]
, (II.11)
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which is analogous to that for haploids and diploids. Manipulationprobability increases
if
b(1−q)(1−cm)> c.
To determine how the direction of selection is affected by sex-differential manipula-
tion, we notice that now both b(1−q) and c depend on ui . Differentiating with respect
to u♀, we find that b(1−q)/c is maximized when manipulation effort goes entirely to
the sex determined by the larger side of the inequalities
b♀
c♀
(1−q)≷
b♂
c♂
(
1−d q
2
)
.
Regarding the evolution of resistance, the averagemutant viability for the resistance
allele is as before
wB = ζwB ,Bb×b+ zwB ,bb×B,
where wB ,J×K = γ♀wBb,J×K +γ♂wB,J×K , with γ♀ =σ and γ♂ = s except for the mating
bb×Bwhere γ♂ = 0. The viabilities for mutant offspring from the first mating are
wBb,Bb×b = g
σ1
σ
p♀(1−Q ′)(1−ca)+ g
σ1
σ
p♀Q
′(1−cr )+ g
σ1
σ
(1−p♀)
+ (1− g )σ2
σ
(1−cm)(1+B ′)
= σ2
σ
+ g
(σ1
σ
− σ2
σ
)
−cm
σ2
σ
(1− g )+ g pθ
[
σ2
σ
b(1−q ′•)(1−cm)−
u♀
σ
c ′♀
]
wB,Bb×b = g
s1
s
p♂
(
1−d q
′
2
)
(1−ca)+ g
s1
s
p♂d
q ′
2
(1−cr )+ g
s1
s
(1−p♂)
+ (1− g ) s2
s
(1−cm)(1+B ′)
= s2
s
+ g
( s1
s
− s2
s
)
−cm
s2
s
(1− g )+ g pθ
[
s2
s
b(1−q ′•)(1−cm)−
u♂
s
c ′
♂
]
,
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where the effective benefit is
B ′ = g pθ
1− g
{
u♀b♀
[
1− 1
2
(
Q ′+q
)]
+u♂b♂
[
1− 1
2
(
d
q ′
2
+d q
2
)]}
= g pθ
1− g b(1−q
′•),
the average cost to females is c ′♀ = ca(1−Q ′)+crQ ′, and the average viability cost tomales
is c ′
♂
= ca(1−dq ′/2)+ crdq ′/2. Adding these two viabilities with their corresponding
weights we obtain
wB ,Bb×b = 1−cm(1− g )+ g pθ
[
b(1−q ′•)(1−cm)−c ′
]
,
where the average cost to offspring viability is c ′ = u♂c ′♂ + u♀c
′
♀. The viability for
the reciprocal mating wBb,bb×B is almost the same as that obtained for the first mating
except that B ′ is replaced by
B ′′ = g pθ
1− g [u♀b♀(1−Q
′)+u♂b♂
(
1−d q
2
)
]
= g pθ
1− g b(1−q
′′• )
because now all female offspring are mutant, while nomale offspring are:
wBb,bb×B = g
σ1
σ
p♀(1−Q ′)(1−ca)+ g
σ1
σ
p♀Q
′(1−cr )+ g
σ1
σ
(1−p♀)
+ (1− g )σ2
σ
(1−cm)(1+B ′′)
= σ2
σ
+ g
(σ1
σ
− σ2
σ
)
−cm
σ2
σ
(1− g )+ g pθ
[
σ2
σ
b(1−q ′′• )(1−cm)−
u♀
σ
c ′♀
]
.
Performing the necessary computations, the selection gradient now takes the form
∂wB
∂q ′
∣∣∣
q ′=q
=−1
2
g pθ
[
br̂d(1−cm)−vd(ca −cr )
]
,
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where br̂d = u♀b♀r̂♀d♀+u♂b♂r̂♂d♂ and vd = u♀v♀d♀+u♂v♂d♂, where in turn
d♀ = 1 and d♂ = d . The quantities r̂i give the probability that first-brood mutants
of sex i share the mutant allele with second brood individuals, averaged over the two
mutant matings. The quantities vi give the probability that mutant matings produce
sex-i mutants. They are
r̂♀ = ζ
1
2
+ zσ2, v♀ = 1
r̂♂ = ζ
1
2
, v♂ = ζ.
Resistance probability decreases if
br̂d(1−cm)> vd(ca −cr ).
To determine how sex-differential manipulation affects the direction of selection, we
maximize the ratio br̂d/vd . This ratio is maximized when manipulation effort is
directed only to the sex determined by the larger side of the inequalities
b♀r♀≷ b♂r♂,
where ri = r̂i/vi .
The quantities r̂i and vi can be interpreted in standard kin selection terms. We
check this numerically for a few cases. Let sex ratio be even (z = 1/2). With even sex
allocation to the second brood (s2 = 1/2), we have that r̂♀ = 1/2 and r̂♂ = 1/4 (this
corresponds to the case of females and males helping both sexes in equal proportion).
If sex allocation to the second brood is completely female-skewed (s2 = 0), then r̂♀ = 3/4
(this corresponds to the case of females helping full sisters). If sex allocation to the
second brood is completely male-skewed (s2 = 1), then r̂♀ = 1/4 (this corresponds to
females helping full brothers). Quantities vi match the reproductive value of individuals
of sex i (v♀ = 1 and v♂ = 1/2; Price, 1970). These values indicate that r̂i refers to the
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Table II.2: Numerical comparison of r̂i with standard relatedness coefficients for
haplodiploids under single mating and outbreeding. Regression relatedness times the
reproductive value of the recipient matches r̂i . Life-for-life relatedness matches r̂i/vi .
Regression Regression r̂i Life-for-life r̂i/vi
relatedness relatedness relatedness
×vrecipient
Female to sister 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
Female to brother 1/2 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Male to sister 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/2 1/2
Male to brother 1/2 1/4 1/4 1/2 1/2
regression definition of relatedness times the reproductive value of the recipient, while
r̂i/vi refers to the life-for-life definition of relatedness (Hamilton, 1972; Bulmer, 1994,
Table II.2). Indeed, let
ρ =
 ζ12 + z 12
ζ12
1
2
 .
The entries ρi j match numerically the regression relatedness of first-brood sex i toward
second-brood sex j (females are in row and column 1). It can be checked that r̂i =∑
j f j v jρi j , where f j gives the frequency of recipients of sex j . In our model, f♀ = σ2
and f♂ = s2.
II.5.3 Spontaneous helping
Consider the same scenario but now first-brood individualsmay opt to stay a fraction of
their adulthood in thematernal site, without any influence from their mother. Let pii be
the probability that a first-brood offspring of sex i spontaneously stays in the maternal
site. Let cs be the cost of spontaneously staying in the maternal site (0≤ cs ≤ 1). Let bi ,s
be the benefit provided by spontaneously staying individuals of sex i . The reasoning
closely follows that of acquiescence. As before, rather than studying independently
the evolution of female and male spontaneous helping, we consider a spontaneously
staying tendency, pi (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1), a fraction of which is expressed by each sex. Thus, we
write pii = βipi, where βi measures the tendency of first-brood offspring of sex i to stay
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spontaneously (e.g., β♀ = 1,β♂ = 0 means that females stay but males do not). The
fraction of the tendency to stay spontaneously corresponding to sex i is Ui = βiγi1/Θ
whereΘ=∑βiγi1 is the fraction of first-brood offspringwho have a tendency to stay, so∑
Ui = 1. Let c be a resident allele for the tendency of staying pi, and let C be a mutant
allele. For diploids, the staying tendency of a mutant of sex i is Π′
i
= (pi′
i
+pii )/2. For
haplodiploids, the staying tendency of a mutant female is Π′♀ = (pi′♀+pi♀)/2 and that of
a mutantmale is dpi′
♂
/2. Here, pi′
i
=βipi′.
Denote by piik the probability of staying of sex i of genotype k, and by pii• the
probability of staying of sex-i offspring averaged over the sex-i genotypes arising from a
J ×K mating. Denote by piik,T the staying tendency in sex i of genotype k; for instance,
for resident females pi♀R,T =pi and for resident haplodiploidmales pi♂R,T = dpi/2. Thus,
piik = βipiik,T , and pii•,T is the average piik,T over the genotypes of sex i arising from a
J ×K mating. Hence, the effective benefit corresponding to spontaneous helping is
Bs =
b♀,sgσ1pi♀•+b♂,sg s1pi♂•
1− g
= gΘ
1− g (U♀b♀,spi♀•,T +U♂b♂,spi♂•,T )
= gΘ
1− g bspi•,T .
For haploids and diploids we have:
wCc,Cc×cc = gσ1Π′♀(1−cs)+ gσ1(1−Π′♀)+ (1− g )σ2(1+B ′s)
+ g s1Π′♂(1−cs)+ g s1(1−Π
′
♂
)+ (1− g )s2(1+B ′s)
= 1+ gΘ
{
bs
[
1
2
(Π′+pi)
]
−Π′cs
}
,
where
B ′s =
gR
1− g bs
[
1
2
(Π′+pi)
]
.
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Since wCc,cc×Cc =wCc,Cc×cc, the fitness gradient is
∂wCc
∂pi′
∣∣∣
pi′=pi
= 1
2
gΘ
(
1
2
bs −cs
)
.
The haploid case is identical, except that the 1/2 affecting the rate of selection for
diploids disappears.
For haplodiploids we have:
wCc,Cc×c = g
σ1
σ
Π
′
♀(1−cs)+ g
σ1
σ
(1−Π′♀)+ (1− g )
σ2
σ
(1+B ′s)
= σ2
σ
+ g
(σ1
σ
− σ2
σ
)
+ g
(σ2
σ
Θbspi′•−
σ1
σ
β♀Π
′cs
)
wC,Cc×c = g
s1
s
d
pi′
♂
2
(1−cs)+ g
s1
s
(
1−d
pi′
♂
2
)
+ (1− g ) s2
s
(1+B ′s)
= s2
s
+ g
( s1
s
− s2
s
)
+ g
(
s2
s
Θbspi′•−
s1
s
β♂d
pi′
2
cs
)
,
where
B ′s =
gΘ
1− g
[
U♀b♀,s
1
2
(Π′+pi)+U♂b♂,s
1
2
(
d
pi′
2
+d pi
2
)]
= gΘ
1− g bspi
′•.
Adding these two viabilities with their corresponding weights we obtain
wC ,Cc×c = 1+ gΘ
(
bspi′•−pi′cs
)
,
where pi′ =U♀Π′+U♂dpi′/2. For the reciprocal mating,
wCc,cc×C = g
σ1
σ
Π
′
♀(1−cs)+ g
σ1
σ
(1−Π′♀)+ (1− g )
σ2
σ
(1+B ′′s )
= σ2
σ
+ g
(σ1
σ
− σ2
σ
)
+ g
[σ2
σ
Θbspi′′• −
σ1
σ
β♀Π
′cs
]
,
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where
B ′′s =
gΘ
1− g
(
U♀b♀,sΠ
′+U♂b♂,sd
pi
2
)
= gΘ
1− g bspi
′′• .
Performing the indicated computations, the selection gradient is now
∂wC
∂pi′
∣∣∣
pi′=pi
= 1
2
gΘ
(
bs r̂ d −vdcs
)
,
where bs r̂ d and vd are defined as for resistance with terms accordingly reinterpreted.
II.5.4 Comparison of manipulated and spontaneous helping
We first write the benefit provided by helpers of sex i as bi = hia, where hi is the
probability that an acquiescing individual of sex i provides help to the second brood
(helping probability). The quantity a gives the amount of benefit. Assume that sex-
differential manipulation and spontaneous helping, the benefit from acquiescence
and spontaneous helping, and the costs of acquiescence and spontaneous helping are
correspondingly approximately the same (i.e., ui ≈Ui , bi ≈ bi ,s , and ca ≈ cs). Then, from
inequalities (II.4), (II.5) and (II.6), manipulation and acquiescence are selected while
spontaneous helping is not if the benefit-cost ratio satisfies the following conditions:
a
ca
> 1
h(1−q)
c
ca(1−cm)
= Tm (II.12a)
a
ca
> vd
hrd
1−cr /ca
1−cm
= Ta (II.12b)
a
ca
< vd
hrd
= TA. (II.12c)
Following our notation, here h(1−q) = ∑uihi (1 − qi ), vd = ∑ui vidi and hrd =∑
uihi ridi . For inequalities (II.12) to be satisfied simultaneously, it is required that
TA > Tm ,Ta . We thus define the ratio of thresholds for selection of spontaneous helping
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relative to manipulated helping as
H =

TA/Ta if Tm < Ta
TA/Tm otherwise.
(II.13)
The quantity H measures the extent to which spontaneous helping is “harder” to
select than manipulated helping. Manipulated helping requires smaller benefit-cost
ratios than spontaneous helping if H > 1, in which case we say that the advantage of
manipulated helping occurs. Substituting (II.12) into (II.13), we obtain
H =

1−cm
1−cr /ca if cr < ca (1− A1)
A2
1−cm
1−q+qcr /ca otherwise,
where
A1 =
hrd
vd h(1−q)+hrk q
A2 =
vd h(1−q)
hrd
.
Therefore, if acquiescence is harder to select than manipulation (Tm < Ta), the
advantage of manipulated helping exists when
cacm < cr < ca (1− A1) (II.14a)
and cm < 1− A1. (II.14b)
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If manipulation is harder to select than acquiescence (Tm > Ta), the advantage of
manipulated helping exists when
ca (1− A1)< cr < ca
1
q
[
(1−cm)A2− (1−q)
]
(II.15a)
and cm < 1−
1
A2
(
1−qA1
)
. (II.15b)
As expected, inequalities (II.14) and (II.15) show that the advantage of manipulated
helping is more likely to exist as the cost of manipulation cm decreases and the cost
of resistance cr increases up to a limit.
II.5.4.1 Example 1
Suppose that resistance is absent (q = 0). For haplodiploids, suppose further that
manipulation effort is entirely applied to female offspring (u♀ = 1), and that sex
allocation to the second brood is even (s2 = 1/2). These conditions lead to r♀ = 1/2,
vd = 1 and hrd = h/2. Then, A1 = 1/2 and A2 = 2. Hence, the ratio of thresholds for
selection of spontaneous helping relative to manipulated helping reduces to
H =

1−cm
1−cr /ca if cr <
1
2ca
2(1−cm) otherwise.
Hence, the advantage of manipulated helping exists if cm < 1/2 and
cacm < cr <
1
2
ca
or cr >
1
2
ca .
The top line corresponds to the case inwhich acquiescence is “harder” to select (requires
larger benefit cost ratios) than manipulation. The bottom line corresponds to that in
which manipulation is harder to select than acquiescence. From this, it follows that a
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sufficient condition for the advantage to exist in this case is that the cost ofmanipulation
cm is smaller than the smallest value between cr /ca and 1/2.
II.5.4.2 Example 2
Suppose instead that resistance is complete for haplodiploids (q = 1). Suppose further
thatmanipulationeffort is entirely applied tomale offspring (u♂ = 1) and thatmales are
haploid in the tissue that controls their resistance (d♂ = 1, thus q = 1/2). It follows that
vd = ζ and that the relevant relatedness is r♂ = ζ/2. Then, A1 = 2/3 and A2 = 1. Hence,
the ratio of thresholds in this case is
H =

1−cm
1−cr /ca if cr <
1
3ca
2 1−cm1+cr /ca otherwise.
Hence, the advantage of manipulated helping exists if cm < 1/3 and
cacm < cr <
1
3
ca
or
1
3
ca < cr < ca(1−2cm).
Again, the top line corresponds to the case in which acquiescence is harder to select
than manipulation, while the bottom line corresponds to the reverse case. A sufficient
condition for the advantage to exist is that the cost of manipulation cm is smaller than
the smallest value among cr /ca , (1−cr /ca)/2, and 1/3.
II.5.5 Dynamics
The expressions for fitness gradients for haploids and diploids (II.9) and (II.10) are
generalized by those for haplodiploids (II.11) and (II.5.2), so it is sufficient to look at
the haplodiploid case. We rewrite the condition for the evolution of manipulation
(II.4) as M0− qM > 0, where both terms M0 and M are independent of the resistance
probability q . These terms are defined in eqs. (II.8). The termM0 measures selection for
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manipulationwhen there is no resistance. The termM1 =M0−M measures selection for
manipulationwhen there is full resistance. The termM =M0−M1 measures the effect of
acquiescence on selection for manipulation. The direction of selection of manipulation
changes at the resistance probability q∗ = M0/M . The term R measures selection for
resistance.
Manipulation effort remains constant on the line q = q∗ = M0/M . Resistance
probability remains constant on the line p = 0. There is thus a single equilibrium point
(0,q∗). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at the equilibrium point specify the
global dynamics because the system is linear. They are
λ=±1
2
gθ
√
−µpµqζMR
dropping 1/2 for haploids. The corresponding eigenvectors are
(
∓
√
µpζM
−µqR
,1
)T
The separatrixes are thus
q = q∗±p
√
−µqR
µpζM
. (II.16)
Figure II2.4 illustrates qualitatively the different dynamic regimes for haploids and
diploids while Figure II2.5 shows possible dynamics for haplodiploids.
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Figure II2.4: Coevolutionary dynamics for haploids and diploids. The legend of figure
1.2 applies. The case M0 <M1 and R < 0 is not possible since M > −R for haploids and
diploids. For these genetic systems,M1 < 0. The mother wins when manipulation effort
and resistance probability fall within the gray region.
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Figure II2.5: Coevolutionary dynamics for haplodiploids. There are three additional
columns with respect to haploids and diploids that occur only if d♂ = 1 as required by
M1 > 0. Themotherwinswhenmanipulation effort and resistance probability fall within
the gray region. Numerical values satisfying the phase portraits in the second row with
second and third column have not been found.
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Appendix III
Invasion analysis of maternally
manipulated helping: evolution of the
benefit
III.1 Introduction
In this appendix, I give an invasion analysis treatment to the evolution of the benefits
and costs as considered in chapters 2 and 3. The invasion analysis approach yields the
same results with the clarity yet less generality brought by complete genetic treatment. I
consider the simultaneous evolution of the offspring-controlled benefit (Chapter 2) and
of the maternally-controlled benefit (Chapter 3). This consideration generates more
complicated mathematics which prevents one from reaching many of the analytical
results of chapters 2 and 3. Consequently, I use numerical explorations in this appendix.
III.2 Model
I extend the model in Appendix II. The model considers a population where mothers
produce two subsequent broods and one or both parents provide parental care. A
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mother manipulates some of her first-brood offspring to delay dispersal (for instance,
by feeding them poorly, or by disrupting their development physiologically or psycho-
logically). Manipulated offspringmay or may not resist manipulation. If they resist they
disperse without delay, or if they acquiesce they stay for a fraction of their adulthood.
Acquiescing offspring may or may not help raise the second brood while they are
delayed. I thus consider the evolution of three traits: offspring dispersal, helping, and
the extent of the delay. Mother and offspring influence the expression of each trait.
A mother directs her manipulation effort toward a fraction θ of her first brood.
This target set may be constituted by females, males or some combination of them.
Manipulation effort is the fraction p of the target set that the mother manipulates to
stay. Manipulating mothers pay an manipulation cost cm measuring their reduced
probability to survive to produce the second brood. Manipulated offspring may resist
by dispersingwithout delay with probability q in which case they pay the resistance cost
cr . Alternatively, manipulated offspringmay acquiesce by stayingwith probability 1−q ,
and thus pay the acquiescence cost ca . Acquiescing offspring stay in the maternal site
for a fraction δ of their adulthood, andmay express parental care, providing the second
brood with a viability benefit b. The benefit b depends on the condition in which the
mother leaves second-brood offspring and on the extent in which acquiescing offspring
help.
The help provided by an acquiescing individual increases the viability ofmembers of
the second brood by an amount b. This fitness benefit is distributed uniformly among
all second brood individuals. I allow the sexes to have different helping probabilities.
Let b♀ and b♂ be the benefit provided by females and males, respectively. The effective
benefit received by second-brood offspring of a given genotype is thus
bE =
b♀×# of female helpers+b♂×# of male helpers
# of recipients
. (III.1)
The benefit provided by sex i is bi = aihi , where hi is the helping probability of sex
i which gives the probability that an acquiescing individual of sex i provides help to
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the second brood. The quantity ai is the amount of benefit provided, which includes
ecological factors and factors that may be under maternal or offspring control: for
example, ai may be a function of the number of offspring that a mother does not fully
raise herself, and of the fraction of adulthood that she attempts to delay hermanipulated
offspring. I write ai = δi (a0+ e) where e is a part of the benefit under maternal control
relating to the condition inwhich themother leaves the offspring (I let 0≤ e ≤ emax), and
a0 is the baseline amount of benefit which includes any remaining components of ai .
The benefit provided bi may also affect the cost of acquiescence ca because helping
effort may affect reproductive success. I thus expand ca in terms of b. The effect of
helping may be different before dispersal and after dispersal. For example, a helping
individualmay have reduced reproductive outputbefore dispersal since it allocates time
and energy to alloparenting, but after dispersal it may have enhanced reproductive
output if it learned parenting skills as a former alloparent. I thus split the cost of
acquiescence to offspring of sex i into the cost of acquiescence before dispersal (cδ) and
after dispersal (cδ):
cai = δi cδi + (1−δi )cδi . (III.2)
Before dispersal, the cost to an acquiescing offspring that helps isκδh and the cost to one
that does not help is κδ¬h . For example, if by not helping an acquiescing individual can
exploit resources and reproduce at the maternal site, κδ¬h would be negative reflecting
a fitness gain. After dispersal, the cost to a previously acquiescing offspring that helped
is κδh and the cost to one that did not is κδ¬h. So, if by helping, an acquiescing
individual learns useful parenting skills, κδh would also be negative. Since I am
interested in cases of permanent sterility, I will consider 0≤ κi j ≤ 1. Finally, I normalize
the amount of benefit provided as bi/bmax, where bmax is the maximum benefit that
offspring can provide, and will be referred to as offspring helping efficiency. Then, the
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cost of acquiescence before dispersal and after dispersal are
cδi =
bi
bmax
κδh+
(
1− bi
bmax
)
κδ¬h (III.3a)
cδi =
bi
bmax
κδh+
(
1− bi
bmax
)
κδ¬h. (III.3b)
Rearranging, the cost of acquiescence becomes
cai =
bi
bmax
chi +
(
1− bi
bmax
)
c¬hi , (III.4)
where the costs for helping and for not helping are
chi = δiκδh+ (1−δi )κδh (III.5a)
c¬hi = δiκδ¬h + (1−δi )κδ¬h. (III.5b)
The cost of acquiescence thus depends on the amount of benefit provided and on
costs (κδh,κδ¬h,κδh,κδ¬h) that depend on the ecology. The extent of delay δ is under
shared control: δ= δm−δo where δm is undermaternal control andδo is under offspring
control (Frank and Crespi, 2011). Therefore, each trait is under the influence of mother
and offspring: dispersal (whose maternal effect is p and offspring effect is q), helping
(maternal effect is e , offspring effect is h) and delay (maternal effect is δm , offspring
effect is δo). Finally, I let the helping probability evolve independently for each sex:
the helping probability of sex i is hi . This produces 7 coevolving subtraits (p, q , e , h♀,
h♂, δm , and δo). The population is assumed to be either sexual haploid, diploid, or
haplodiploid. Further details of the model are described in §III.5.
III.3 Results
Each subtrait is assumed to be controlled by a separate locus with a continuum of
alleles and I study the invasion of mutant alleles. This yields the selection gradient for
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each subtrait (§III.5.1–III.5.3). Numerical solutions of the system produce evolutionary
dynamics of the kind illustrated in Figs. III3.1A,B. Fig. III3.1B shows that the evolution
of resistance can be reverted by the evolution of maternally induced benefits. I refer to
such a phenomenon as a rescue of eusociality by maternally induced benefits. There-
fore, under initial conditions in which altruism is not favored, maternal manipulation
can produce altruism due to the evolution of the benefit.
To illustrate how maternally induced benefits relate to specific features controlled
by the mother, let e refer to a part of the benefit that depends on the condition in which
offspring are left by the mother (West Eberhard, 1975). I model this in a simple way
by assuming that the mother provisions her second-brood offspring with full maternal
care up to an offspring after which she provides no maternal care (§III.5.7). This
results in e = e0(n − j0), where e0 is the benefit that a minimal-condition (i.e., when
provisioned with no maternal care) individual obtains when helped, n is the number of
second-brood offspring, and j0 is the second-brood offspring at which themother stops
providing care. Both n and j0 are assumed to be under maternal control. Substituting
this form of e in the system produces rescues with dynamics as in Fig. III3.1C–E. As
a result, maternally induced benefits can arise if the mother stops caring for some of
her offspring (i.e., if she reduces j0; Figs. III3.1C and D), or if she produces additional
offspring someofwhich shewill not raise herself (i.e., if she increasesn; Figs. 2D and 2E).
Which of these regimes is observed depends on how close amother is from reaching her
maximum fertility. Extreme division of reproductive labor is obtained as in Fig. III3.1E,
where the mother becomes highly fertile and refrains from providing any maternal care
to the second brood, which is cared for by her acquiescing offspring.
To disentangle the reasons for the rescue, I obtain analytical conditions for the
increase in each variable (Fig. III3.2). Three different Alexander-Trivers (Alexander,
1974; Trivers, 1974) rules are obtained for the maternally controlled subtraits, and three
different Hamilton’s rules (Hamilton, 1964b) for the offspring controlled subtraits. The
inequalities for maternal manipulation p and offspring resistance q recover previous
results (González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012). The maternally induced benefits e are
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Figure III3.1: Rescue of eusociality by the maternally induced benefit. Numerical
solutions for haplodiploids are shown. Dispersal is in red, helping in black and delay
in blue. Offspring controlled subtraits are in dashed lines. (A) Resistance evolves
and eliminates manipulated helping since all offspring leave without delay (in this
panel, emax = 9). (B) Resistance is eliminated by the evolution of maternally induced
benefits once the Hamilton’s rule for dispersal is satisfied (in this panel emax = 10).
(C–E) Three regimes of rescues depending on initial conditions. The number of
second-brood offspring, n (dark grey), and the offspring at which the mother stops
provisioning, j0 (light grey), start (C) at their maximum, (D) at an intermediate value
and (E) at a low value. For C–E the same scenario of A and B is used except that
emax = 20 for illustration. Life-for-life relatedness of actors toward recipients is 1/2
throughout numerical solutions. The timescale is rescaled, and the original timescale
is to be obtained by dividing the x-axis by themagnitude of themutational process (i.e.,
mutation rate andmutation effect).
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favored ifmanipulation effort p is favored and themaximummaternally induced benefit
emax is large. A large emax does not refer to large actual benefits, but to the lack
of constraints in the mother to evolve them. For the evolution of offspring helping
hi the difference between the cost of helping ch and the cost of not helping c¬h is
weighted by offspring helping efficiency bmax. That is, increasing helping efficiency,
reduces selection against helping. As for maternally induced benefits, selection for
helping does not depend on actual benefits, but on offspring’s efficiency to provide
them. The evolution of delay (δm and δo) depends on the difference between the cost
of acquiescence and its component after dispersal (ca − cδ), and on the former and
its component from not helping (ca − c¬h). Such differences between costs allow for
offspring controlled subtraits to evolve with zero relatedness, despite positive costs:
acquiescence evolves with zero relatedness if resistance is costlier than acquiescing
(ca < cr ) (González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012); helping does if not helping is costlier
than helping (ch < c¬h); and delay does if both not helping is costlier than helping
(ch < c¬h) and the cost after dispersal is greater than before dispersal (cδ < cδ). In
consequence, maternally induced helping does not require relatedness to be stable,
despite positive costs, if it is costlier to rebel againstmanipulation. However, relatedness
does facilitate the evolution of maternally induced helping. Finally, the occurrence of
three different Hamilton’s rules suggests a reason for the rescue to happen: even if the
Hamilton’s rule for dispersal is not satisfied, theHamilton’s rule for helping or delaymay
be satisfied and thus allow for the benefit to increase.
In order to determine if any of the subtraits is a particular facilitator of rescues, I
determined whether it was necessary that a given subtrait be favored at the start of
the process for there to be a rescue. This was done numerically for a set of parameter
combinations (§III.5.5-III.5.6). I find that for rescues to occur, the offspring helping
subtraithmust be initially selected for (Fig. III3.3A). In addition,maternalmanipulation
p, offspring helping h, and the maternal effect on delay δm had to be initially easier
to select for (i.e., require lower benefits) than offspring resistance q (Fig. III3.3B). If
manipulationeffort is directed entirely to sex-i offspring, the latter necessary conditions
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Figure III3.2: Conditions for increase in each of the subtraits considered. The overbars
indicate averages taken over the manipulated offspring of a mother (i.e., x = ∑i ui xi ,
where ui is the fraction of manipulation effort that goes toward sex-i offspring). cm =
(1− g )cm + g pθ
[
c¬h(1−q)+cr q
]
is the reduction in mother’s fertility due to wasted
effort and ∆e∞ = g pθδh(1−q) [1−cm − (ch −c¬h)/bmax] is proportional to the selection
gradient for e when emax  ∞ (§III.5.2.2.1). ri is the reproductive-value-weighted
relatedness of sex i toward the second brood, vi is the reproductive value of sex i , ri/vi
is the life-for-life relatedness of sex i toward the second brood (Hamilton, 1972), ki is the
dosage compensation of sex i (§III.5.3), and g is the fraction of offspring that belong to
the first brood.
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Figure III3.3: Tests for necessary conditions. Inequalities in Fig. III3.2 define thresholds,
Ti , so that the condition for subtrait i to be selected for is a0 + e > Ti (section 4 in SI
Appendix). The histograms give the probability that the threshold for a given subtrait at
the start of a run is (A) greater than a0+ e and (B) smaller than Tq . Total runs: 310,692.
Total rescues: 11,354. For a rescue to occur, a condition had to be necessarily met at the
start of numerical solutions if the bar height is 1.
(i.e., that initiallyTp ,Th,Tδm < Tq) reduce to cr < cai A1,c¬hi ,cai−A2 for some quantities
A1 and A2 (§III.5.6). That is, the cost of resistance must be sufficiently small for rescues
to occur, otherwise resistance would not be favored in the first place (González-Forero
and Gavrilets, 2012). As a result, a driving force for the rescue is not a cost of resistance,
but the selection for helping even though resistance is favored. This indicates that
it is the lack of conflict over helping that allows for the conflict over dispersal to be
eliminated. The mother can thus capitalize on the helping available, opening the
possibility that the rescue proceeds. On the other hand, no sufficient conditions could
be identified in terms of the initial values of the thresholds (Fig. III3.6).
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III.4 Discussion
Advanced eusociality evolves here in the following steps: 1) mothers cause delayed
dispersal; 2) when a mother-offspring conflict over dispersal occurs and offspring
are still favored to help, maternally induced benefits can be favored; 3) maternally
induced benefits can evolve to a point where offspring are selected to stay voluntarily;
4) when the mother is not constrained to small fertility, extreme fertility is produced.
The evolution of helping produces division of reproductive labor and eliminates any
incentive to disperse if manipulated. Maternal manipulation can therefore produce
two major features of advanced eusociality: non-conflictive social determination of
reproductive status and extreme fertility in reproductives.
Even though the winner of a conflict is often expected to be the party that pays
smaller costs (Clutton-Brock, 1998), the rescue can still occur when maternal ma-
nipulation is costlier than offspring resistance (Fig. III3.1B). In addition, maternally
manipulated behavior that would otherwise be unstable can be rescued by maternally
induced benefits. For example, if a mother disrupts psychologically some of her
offspring, disruptedoffspringmay initially acquiesce and stay. If the cost of resistance to
psychological disruption is small, resistance to disruption would be favored. However,
if disrupted offspring express sufficient help, maternally induced benefits may win the
race eliminating resistance to disruption. Eusociality via maternally induced disruption
would thus be a feasible possibility, which otherwise would have been too subtle to be
stable.
The capacity to be hyperfertile is present in non-eusocial insects (Kamakura, 2011),
and thus it is not sufficient to produce eusociality. This is consistent with the present
model in that it is also necessary that there is parental care and the ability of mothers to
direct manipulation effort to helping offspring (González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012).
Hyperfertility would only be beneficial if help is available. Maternal manipulation
makes help available, allowing hyperfertility to evolve. In this light, social determination
of reproductive status would act as inducing some offspring to develop into workers,
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while inducing others (queens) to take advantage of the helpmade available. Regarding
polyandry, with the evolution of maternally induced benefits, delayed dispersal can be
selected for with increasingly smaller relatedness. Thus, if polyandry is favored (Mattila
and Seeley, 2007), already advanced eusocial colonies can evolve polyandry without
reverting to subsociality. In such a case, polyandry would be an effect rather than a
cause of advanced eusociality. Yet, as polyandry evolves, policing would also be favored
in hymenopterans (Ratnieks, 1988).
Advanced eusociality is often considered to be a maximal expression of sociality
(Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009). Here advanced eusociality evolves via socially ma-
nipulated behavior. The inequalities found for trait evolution offer insights into the
evolutionary dynamics, illustrating for example how relatedness may not be necessary
even if it is favorable. These results offer a distinct form of conflict resolution with
applicability to settings other than mother-offspring interactions, for instance when
relatedness arises as a phenotypic correlation (Frank, 1998).
III.5 Calculation details
III.5.1 Model
The model extends that in Appendix II. I consider a very large sexual population where
mated females produce two subsequent, overlapping broods. Young offspring receive
parental care. Parents die after the second brood is raised. Adult offspring disperse from
the maternal site to a commonmating pool. Individuals at the mating pool mate singly
and randomly. A mother manipulates a fraction p of a target set θ of the first brood
to stay as adults. p is referred to as manipulation effort. Manipulated offspring may
acquiesce by staying in the maternal site or alternatively, they may resist and disperse
without delay. The probability that amanipulatedoffspring disperseswithout delay is q .
Acquiescing offspring stay for a fraction δ of their adulthood during which they express
some form of helping with some probability.
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A manipulating mother pays the cost of manipulation cm which measures her
reduced probability of surviving to produce the second brood. Acquiescing offspring
pay the cost of acquiescence ca that measures their diminished reproductive success
because of delayed dispersal and helping effort. A resisting individual disperses without
paying the cost of acquiescence, but pays the cost of resistance cr which measures its
reduced probability to complete dispersal and events thereafter (e.g., nest founding).
I seek to study the coevolution of maternal manipulation p, offspring resistance
q , and the maternally induced benefit e . As seen above, the evolution of e affects
the benefit of helping as well as the cost of acquiescence. Such benefit and cost also
depend on the evolution of helping probabilities hi , and on the extent of delay δ.
Thus, an adequate dynamical study of the coevolution of manipulation, resistance, and
maternally induced benefits should consider the evolution of helping probabilities and
delay. Therefore, I study the coevolution of p, q , e , hi , and δ. I consider p and e to be
under maternal control, q and hi under offspring control, and δ under shared control.
Thus, I express the delay of sex i as δi = δm −δoi where δm is under maternal control
while δoi is under offspring control. This produces 7 coevolving subtraits (p, q , e , h♀,
h♂, δm , and δo).
I consider each subtrait to be controlled by a separate locus. I assume that mutation
is rare enough so thatwhen amutant allele arises, there is enough time for it to approach
an equilibrium frequency before another mutant allele arises (see e.g., Metz et al., 1996;
Geritz et al., 1998; Waxman and Gavrilets, 2005). This allows one to consider separately
the spread of mutant alleles in each of the loci, without any specific assumption about
linkage among them. I do not consider mechanisms that produce polymorphism
(such as overdominance or frequency dependent selection), so the allelic equilibrium
frequency is always either zero or one. I denote by ai and Ai the resident and mutant
alleles for the locus i respectively. For a resident subtrait value x, I denote by x′ the
mutant subtrait value.
The proportion of males produced by a mating is s (sex allocation) and that of
females isσ= 1−s. The proportionof offspring that belong to the first brood is g . I allow
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for a different sex allocation to each brood, with si being the sex allocation to brood i , so
that s = g s1+ (1− g )s2. The allocation into females for brood i is σi = 1− si . A resident
mother manipulates first brood female- and male offspring with effort p♀ = αp and
p♂ = βp (where 0 ≤ p,α,β ≤ 1). The quantities α and β are proportionality constants
of the manipulation effort p that goes toward males or females respectively. A resident
mother directs hermanipulation effort toward a fraction of the first brood θ =σ1α+s1β.
Thus, the fraction of manipulation effort that goes to females and males is respectively
u♀ = σ1α/θ and u♂ = s1β/θ (so u♀+u♂ = 1). I now write a general definition of the
effective benefit in the model. Let xi j denote the subtrait value of sex i of genotype j .
Denote by xi• the average over the offspring genotypes of sex i that arise from a given
mating. Then, the effective benefit takes the form
bE =
b♀•gσ1p♀(1−q♀•)+b♂•g s1p♂(1−q♂•)
1− g
= g pθ
1− g
[
u♀b♀•(1−q♀•)+u♂b♂•(1−q♂•)
]
= g pθ
1− g b•(1−q•).
Because mutation is rare, themutant allele is involved only inmatingsM×R (where
M is a mutant carrier, and R is a resident; females on the left) or in matings R ×M .
Denote by wI ,J×K the viability of a mutant individual I given that its mother and father
are J and K , respectively. Hence, the average viability of mutants is
wM = ζwM ,M×R
(
1− eM
emax
)
+ zwM ,R×M
(
1− eR
emax
)
, (III.6)
where ζ = 1− z and z are the respective frequencies of females and males (sex ratio) in
the population, corresponding to the frequency of mutant parents of a given sex. The
factor 1− e/emax captures the reduction of mother’s fertility as the number of offspring
that she does not raise herself increases. Assuming that mutation is of small effect and
that the mother produces a very large number of offspring, the evolutionary change in
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subtrait x is proportional to its selection gradient given by ∂wM/∂x′|x′=x (Kimura, 1965;
Lande, 1979; Iwasa et al., 1991; Dieckmann and Law, 1996).
As indicated, acquiescing individuals of sex i pay the cost of acquiescing cai and
provide second-brood individuals with a viability benefit bE . Resisting individuals pay
the cost of resistance cr . Then, the viability of amutant individual I given that itsmother
and father are J and K is
wI ,J×K = gσ1p♀(1−q♀)(1−ca♀)+ gσ1p♀q♀(1−cr )+ gσ1(1−p♀) (III.7a)
+ (1− g )σ2(1−cm)(1+bE ) (III.7b)
+ g s1p♂(1−q♂)(1−ca♂)+ g s1p♂q♂(1−cr )+ g s1(1−p♂) (III.7c)
+ (1− g )s2(1−cm)(1+bE ). (III.7d)
Lines (III.7a) and (III.7b) correspond towhen I is a female, while lines (III.7c) and (III.7d)
correspond to when I is a male. The first term in (III.7a) and (III.7c) gives the fitness
payoff 1− cai when the mutant offspring belongs to the first brood (with probability g ),
it is of sex i (σ1 or s1 for females and males), it is manipulated (with probability pi )
and it does not resist (with probability 1−qi ). The second term gives the fitness payoff
1−cr in the same situation, but when themutant resists. The third term gives the fitness
payoff 1 when such an offspring is in the first brood but it is not manipulated. The term
in (III.7b) and (III.7d) gives the payoff 1+bE when themutant offspring is in the second
brood, weighted by the probability 1−cm that themother survives to produce the second
brood. Rearranging yields
wI ,J×K = 1− (1− g )cm+ g pθ
[
b•(1−q•)(1−cm)−c
]
, (III.7e)
where c = ca(1−q)+cr q, or equivalently c =
∑
i ui ci where ci = cai (1−qi )+crqi . Special
considerations need to bemade for haplodiploids since in the secondmating (when the
father is mutant) no mutantmales are produced.
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III.5.2 Haploids and diploids
III.5.2.1 Evolution of dispersal
III.5.2.1.1 Maternal effect (maternal manipulation) In this section I study the evo-
lution of manipulation effort p. Consider for now a sexual haploid genetic system.
The average viability for manipulation mutants wAp is obtained from equation (III.6).
Female and male mutants occur in proportion to ζ and z. Since I am considering
mutants for themanipulation subtrait only, then eAp = eap = e . Themutant’s viability for
the firstmatingwAp ,Ap×ap is obtained from equation (III.7e) by replacing p for p
′. For the
reciprocal mating, the mother is resident and thus the viability is constant with respect
to p ′. The evolutionary change inmanipulationeffort between the time ofmutation and
the time of fixation∆p is then proportional to the selection gradient
∂wAp
∂p ′
∣∣∣
p ′=p
= ζgθ
[
b(1−q)(1−cm)−c
](
1− e
emax
)
.
The rate of change depends on the proportion of females ζ as only mothers express
the mutant allele. It also depends on the size of the first brood g , the fraction of
offspring subject to manipulation θ, the probability of acquiescing 1−q (which means
that complete resistance will prevent any change in manipulation), and the maternally
induced benefit e . The direction of change can only be modified by the term within
square brackets. Thus, manipulation effort increases if
b(1−q)(1−cm)> c, (III.8)
which recovers previous results (Alexander, 1974; Trivers, 1974; Charlesworth, 1978;
González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012). As long as the inequality holds, manipulation
effort p increases to 1; otherwise it decreases to 0. These bounds occur because the
mutation rate for a larger or smaller p is zero. When p = 1, the entire proportion θ of the
first brood is manipulated to stay.
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III.5.2.1.2 Offspring effect (offspring resistance) I now look at the evolution of
resistance probability q . Consider a resident resistance allele, aq . A rare resistance allele
Aq causes offspring to resist with a slightly different probability q ′. Again, eAq = eaq = e .
Mothers are all of genotype ap , so first-brood offspring are manipulated with effort p.
The mutant’s viability for the first mating wAq ,Aq×aq is obtained from equation (III.7e)
by replacing q• for the average resistance probability in offspring from this mating:
1
2(q
′+ q), assuming no meiotic drive. Also, for the average cost c in equation (III.7e),
the resistance probability q is replaced by q ′. The mutant’s viability for the reciprocal
mating is the same.
Thus, the evolutionary change in resistance probability ∆q is proportional to the
selection gradient
∂wAq
∂q ′
∣∣∣
q ′=q
=−g pθ
[
1
2
b−
(
ca −cr
)](
1− e
emax
)
,
where ca = u♀ca♀ + u♂ca♂. This gradient shows that there is selection pressure for
resistance as long as there is somemanipulation (p 6= 0) and themoremanipulation the
faster the change in resistance. Resistance probability decreases if
1
2
b > ca −cr , (III.9)
which recovers a form of Hamilton’s rule.
III.5.2.2 Evolution of help
III.5.2.2.1 Maternal effect I now look at the maternally induced benefit e . Consider
a resident maternally controlled allele ae that causes a maternally induced benefit e .
A rare maternally-controlled allele Ae causes a mother to produce a slightly different
benefit e ′. Thus, themutant’s viabilitywAe is obtained from equation (III.6) by replacing
eM with e ′ and eR with e , and by replacing e with e ′ in the first-mating viabilitywAe ,Ae×ae .
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Since themother for the reciprocalmating is not a carrier of themutant allele, the fitness
wAe ,ae×Ae is constant with respect to e
′.
Hence, the evolutionary change in extra fertility ∆e is proportional to the selection
gradient
∂wAe
∂e ′
∣∣∣
e ′=e
=ζ
[
∆e∞
(
1− a0
emax
−2 e
emax
)
− 1−Cm
emax
]
,
where
∆e∞ = g pθδh(1−q)
(
1−cm −
ch −c¬h
bmax
)
(III.10)
is the selection gradient of e (divided by ζ) as emax→∞ andCm = cm(1−g )+g pθ[c¬h(1−
q)+ cr q] is the reduction of mother’s fertility due to wasted effort (wasted effort due
to offspring not produced as a result of the cost of manipulation, and of acquiescing
offspring that pay the cost of not helping or resisting offspring that pay the cost of
resisting). The number 2 in front of e arises from the quadratic fitness form with
respect to e ′ that results from the linear expense of e in equation (III.6) (an expense
of degree γ would replace 2 by 1+γ plus terms of lower degree). Since Cm ≤ 1, a zero
manipulation effort makes the selection gradient negative. This shows that without
help, maternally induced benefits are selected against. Manipulation effort introduces
a selection pressure for maternally induced benefits, which increase if
e < 1
2
(
emax−a0−
1−Cm
∆e∞
)
(III.11)
when ∆e∞ > 0, otherwise the inequality is reversed. We have that ∆e∞ > 0 when cm <
1− (ch−c¬h)/bmax. The condition (III.8) for increase of maternalmanipulation p can be
rewritten as cm < 1−c/[b(1−q)] and it can be checked that c/[b(1−q)]≥ (ch−c¬h)/bmax.
Therefore, if maternalmanipulation is favored, inequality (III.11) gives the condition for
increase ofmaternally induced benefits e . We have that ∂2wAe/∂e
′2|e ′=e =−2ζ∆e∞/emax,
so the equilibrium e∗ defined by inequality (III.11) is stable if ∆e∞ > 0.
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III.5.2.2.2 Female-offspring effect Now I evaluate the evolution of female helping
probabilityh♀. The resident allele ah♀ codes for female helping probabilityh♀while the
mutant alleleAh♀ causes a female to have a slightly different helpingprobabilityh
′
♀. The
mutant’s viability from the first mating wAh♀ ,Ah♀×ah♀
is obtained from equation (III.7e)
replacing b♀• by the average benefit provided by female offspring from this mating:
a(h′♀+h♀)/2. The cost of acquiescence to female offspring is thus
ca♀ =
1
2
(h′♀+h♀)
a
bmax
ch +
(
1− 1
2
(h′♀+h♀)
a
bmax
)
c¬h .
The evolutionary change of female-helping probability ∆h♀ is proportional to the
selection gradient
∂wAh♀
∂h′♀
∣∣∣
h′
♀
=h♀
= u♀agpθ(1−q)
(
1
2
(1−cm)−
ch −c¬h
bmax
)(
1− e
emax
)
.
Female-helping probability increases if
1
2
(1−cm)>
ch −c¬h
bmax
. (III.12)
The benefit does not appear in this Hamilton’s rule as it only affects the rate and not
the direction of selection. Instead, it is the maximumbenefit bmax or maximumhelping
efficiency that appears. A large maximum helping efficiency reduces the strength of
selection against helping by scaling down the cost of helping relative to the cost of not
helping (ch −c¬h).
III.5.2.2.3 Male-offspring effect Now I evaluate the evolution of male helping prob-
ability h♂. The resident allele ah♂
codes for male helping probability h♂ while the
mutant alleleAh
♂
causes amale to have a slightly different helping probabilityh′
♂
. The
mutant’s viability from the firstmatingwAh
♂
,Ah
♂
×ah
♂
is obtained fromequation (III.7e)
replacing b♂• by the average benefit provided by male offspring from this mating:
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a(h′
♂
+h♂)/2. The cost of acquiescence to male offspring is
ca♂ =
1
2
(h′
♂
+h♂)
a
bmax
ch +
(
1− 1
2
(h′
♂
+h♂)
a
bmax
)
c¬h . (III.13)
The evolutionary change of female-helping probability ∆h♂ is proportional to the
selection gradient
∂wAh
♂
∂h′
♂
∣∣∣
h′
♂
=h
♂
= u♂agpθ(1−q)
(
1
2
(1−cm)−
ch −c¬h
bmax
)(
1− e
emax
)
,
as for females.
III.5.2.3 Evolution of delay
III.5.2.3.1 Maternal effect I now look at the evolution of the maternal effect on
offspring’s delay δm . Consider a resident allele aδm that causes a mother to push
for delay with effort δm . A rare allele Aδm that causes a mother to push with a
slightly different effort δ′m . Thus, the mutant’s viability from the first-mating viability
wAδm ,Aδm×aδm is obtained fromequation (III.6)by setting bi•= bi , q• = q , andδ= δ′m−δo .
Since the mother for the reciprocal mating is not a carrier of the mutant allele, fitness
wAδm ,aδm×Aδm is constant with respect to δ
′
m .
Hence, the evolutionary change in the maternal effect on delay ∆δm is proportional
to the selection gradient
∂wAδm
∂δ′m
∣∣∣
δ′m=δm
=ζg pθ(1−q)
[
b
δ
(1−cm)−
1
δ
(
ca −cδ+ca −c¬h
)](
1− e
emax
)
.
The maternal effect on delay increases if
b(1−cm)> ca −cδ+ca −c¬h .
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III.5.2.3.2 Offspring effect I now look at the evolution of the offspring effect on delay
δo . Consider a resident allele aδo that causes an offspring to oppose the maternally
caused delay with effort δo . A rare allele Aδo causes an offspring to oppose delay
with a slightly different effort δ′o . The mutant’s viability from the first-mating viability
wAδo ,Aδo×aδo is obtained from equation (III.6) by setting bi• = hi (a′ + a)/2 and a′ =
(δm −δ′o)(a0+ e). The benefit provided a is replaced by a′ in the expression (III.4) for
the cost of acquiescence. Themutant’s viability for the reciprocal mating is the same.
The evolutionary change in the offspring effect on delay ∆δo is proportional to the
selection gradient
∂wAδo
∂δ′o
∣∣∣
δ′o=δo
=− g pθ(1−q)
[
1
2
b
δ
(1−cm)−
1
δ
(
ca −cδ+ca −c¬h
)](
1− e
emax
)
.
In contrast to thematernal effect on delay, this gradient is notmultipliedby ζ and hence
the offspring effect on delay evolves faster. Offspring controlled delay decreases if
1
2
b(1−cm)> ca −cδ+ca −c¬h .
The analysis for diploids is entirely analogous and only requires replacing x′ by X ′ =
(x′+ x)/2 assuming additive genetic effects. The only effect of this change is to reduce
by half the rate of evolutionary dynamics for each subtrait.
III.5.3 Haplodiploids
The average mutant’s viability (equation (III.6)) now takes the form
wA = ζwA ,Aa×a+ zwA ,aa×A, (III.14)
where wA ,i× j = σwAa,i× j + swA,i× j . Since no mutant males are produced from the
second mating, we have that wA ,aa×A = σwAa,aa×A. Because now sexes differ in
genotypes, the viabilities are conditional on the probability of being of the given sex.
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Let d be the dosage compensation in males. Thus, d = 1 if males are haploid in the
tissue controlling their resistance or delay, or d = 2 if males are diploid in such a tissue.
Hence, including these modifications, the viabilities for the first mating are as before:
wAa,Aa×a = g
σ1
σ
p♀(1−q♀)(1−ca♀)+ g
σ1
σ
p♀q♀(1−cr )+ g
σ1
σ
(1−p♀)
+ (1− g )σ2
σ
(1−cm)(1+bE )
wA,Aa×a = g
s1
s
p♂
(
1−q♂
)
(1−ca♂)+ g
s1
s
p♂q♂(1−cr )+ g
s1
s
(1−p♂)
+ (1− g ) s2
s
(1−cm)(1+bE ).
After rearranging, the viability from the first mating wA ,Aa×a equals that in equation
(III.7e). However, male-offspring-controlled subtrait values are now q♂ = dq/2 and
δo♂ = dδo/2 (and I let q♀ = q and δo♀ = δo). I thus now make use of the notation of
delay for sex i as δi = δm−δoi and the amount of benefit provided by it as ai = δi (a0+e).
For a resident subtrait value x for females and dx/2 for males, themutant subtrait value
for females is X ′ = (x′+x)/2 and for males is dx′/2, assuming additive genetic effects.
For maternal effect subtraits, the viability from the reciprocal mating wAa,aa×A is
constant with respect to the mutant subtrait value x′. However, in contrast to haploids
and diploids, such viability is not equal to that of the reciprocal mating for offspring
effect subtraits. It differs in that the viability applies only to female offspring and that
the effective benefit is different. Themutant viability for females from this mating is
wAa,aa×A = g
σ1
σ
p♀(1−q♀)(1−ca♀)+ g
σ1
σ
p♀q♀(1−cr )+ g
σ1
σ
(1−p♀)
+ (1− g )σ2
σ
(1−cm)(1+b′′E ), (III.15a)
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which differs only by the effective benefit b′′E . The different form of b
′′
E is seen for each
subtrait below. Rearranging yields
wAa,aa×A =
σ2
σ
+ g
(σ1
σ
− σ2
σ
)
− (1− g )cm
σ2
σ
+ g pθ
[
σ2
σ
b•(1−q•)
′′
(1−cm)−
u♀
σ
c♀
]
,
(III.15b)
where c♀ = ca♀(1− q)+ cr q and “ ′′ ” indicates that this corresponds to the second
mutantmating.
III.5.3.1 Evolution of dispersal
III.5.3.1.1 Maternal effect (maternal manipulation) Proceeding as before, we have
that the evolutionary change in manipulation effort ∆p is proportional to the selection
gradient
∂wAp
∂p ′
∣∣∣
p ′=p
= 1
2
ζgθ
[
b(1−q)(1−cm)−c
](
1− e
emax
)
.
The 1/2 comes from the additive allelic effects and diploidmothers. Manipulation effort
increases if
b(1−q)(1−cm)> c. (III.16)
III.5.3.1.2 Offspring effect (offspring resistance) For the first mating, wee have that
q♀• = (Q ′+q)/2, whereQ ′ = (q ′+q)/2, and that q♂• = (dq ′/2+dq/2)/2. This is used to
obtain
bE =
g pθ
1− g b(1−q•).
In contrast, for the reciprocal mating we have that q♀• =Q ′ and that q♂• = dq/2. This
produces a different
b′′E =
g pθ
1− g b(1−q
′′• ).
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Then, the evolutionary change in resistance probability ∆q is proportional to the
selection gradient
∂wAq
∂q ′
∣∣∣
q ′=q
=−1
2
g pθ
[
brd −vd (ca −cr )
](
1− e
emax
)
.
where brd = u♀b♀r♀d♀ + u♂b♂r♂d♂. The quantities ri give the probability that
manipulated individuals of sex i share the mutant allele with individuals in the second
brood. The quantities vi give the probability that mutant matings produce sex-i
mutants. They are
r♀ = ζ
1
2
+ zσ2, v♀ = 1 (III.17)
r♂ = ζ
1
2
, v♂ = ζ. (III.18)
The quantities di give the dosage compensation of sex i : d♀ = 1 and d♂ = d . It can
be checked that vi gives the reproductive value of sex i individuals and that ri is the
regression relatedness toward sex i averaged over first-brood offspring, weighted by
first-brood offspring’s reproductive value (González-Forero and Gavrilets, 2012). Thus,
ri/vi is the life-for-life relatedness of first brood offspring toward secondbrood offspring
of sex i (Hamilton, 1972; Bulmer, 1994). Resistance probability decreases if
brd > vd (ca −cr ). (III.19)
For haploids and diploids, we had that ri = 1/2, di = 1 and vi = 1 for sex i offspring.
III.5.3.2 Evolution of help
III.5.3.2.1 Maternal effect The evolutionary change in extra fertility ∆e is propor-
tional to the selection gradient
∂wAe
∂e ′
∣∣∣
e ′=e
= 1
2
ζ
[
∆e∞
(
1− a0
emax
−2 e
emax
)
− 1−Cm
emax
]
,
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where again
∆e∞ = g pθδh(1−q)
(
1−cm −
ch −c¬h
bmax
)
(III.20)
gives the selection gradient of e (divided by ζ) as emax → ∞, and Cm = cm(1− g )+
g pθ
[
c¬h(1−q)+cr q
]
gives the loss of maternal fertility due to wasted effort. As
before, since Cm ≤ 1, a zero manipulation effort makes this selection gradient negative.
Therefore, manipulation effort introduces a selection pressure for maternally induced
benefits which increase if
e < 1
2
(
emax−a0−
1−Cm
∆e∞
)
, (III.21)
if ∆e∞ > 0; otherwise the inequality is reversed. Similarly,∆e∞ > 0 when
cm < 1−
dh(1−q) ch−c¬h
bmax
dh(1−q)
.
The condition for increase in maternal manipulation p can be rewritten as cm < 1−
c/[b(1−q)] and it can be checked that
c
b(1−q)
≥
dh(1−q) ch−c¬h
bmax
dh(1−q)
.
Therefore, if maternalmanipulation is favored, inequality (III.21) gives the condition for
increase inmaternally induced benefits e . We have that ∂2wAe/∂e
′2|e ′=e =−2ζ∆e∞/emax,
so the equilibrium e∗ defined by inequality (III.21) is stable if ∆e∞ > 0.
III.5.3.2.2 Female-offspring effect For the first mating, we have that b♀• = a♀(H ′♀+
h♀)/2, where H
′
♀ = (h′♀ +h♀)/2. This is used to obtain bE = g pθb•(1−q)/(1− g ). In
contrast, for the reciprocal mating we have that b♀• = a♀H ′♀. This produces a different
b′′
E
= g pθb′′• (1−q)/(1− g ).
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Thus, the evolutionary change of female-helping probability ∆h♀ is proportional to
the selection gradient
∂wAh♀
∂h′♀
∣∣∣
h′
♀
=h♀
= 1
2
u♀a♀g pθ(1−q)
(
r♀(1−cm)−
ch♀−c¬h♀
bmax
)(
1− e
emax
)
.
Female-helping probability increases if
r♀(1−cm)>
ch♀−c¬h♀
bmax
. (III.22)
III.5.3.2.3 Male-offspring effect For the first mating, we have that b♂• = a♂(h′♂+
h♂)/2. For the reciprocalmating,we have that b♂• = a♂h♂. This produces an effective
benefit b′′
E
= g pθb′′• (1−q)/(1− g ) that is constant with respect to h′♂.
Hence, the evolutionary change of male-helping probability ∆h♂ is proportional to
the selection gradient
∂wAh
♂
∂h′
♂
∣∣∣
h′
♂
=h
♂
= u♂a♂g pθ
(
1− q
2
)(
r♂(1−cm)−v♂
ch♂−c¬h♂
bmax
)(
1− e
emax
)
,
which is the analogous to that for females. Male-helping probability increases if
r♂(1−cm)> v♂
ch♂−c¬h♂
bmax
. (III.23)
III.5.3.3 Evolution of delay
III.5.3.3.1 Maternal effect I replace δ′m in equation (III.7e) by D
′
m = (δ′m + δm)/2.
Then, the evolutionary change in the maternally effect on offspring delay ∆δm is
proportional to the selection gradient
∂wAδm
∂δ′m
∣∣∣
δ′m=δm
=1
2
ζg pθ(1−q)
[
b
δ
(1−cm)−
1
δ
(ca −cδ+ca −c¬h)
](
1− e
emax
)
.
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Then, maternally effect on delay increases if
b
δ
(1−q)(1−cm)>
1
δ
(1−q) (ca −cδ+ca −c¬h). (III.24)
III.5.3.3.2 Offspring effect I replace in equation (III.7e) δ′
o♀
= (δ′o +δo)/2 and δ′o♂ =
δ′o/2. I thus denote δ
′
i
= δm−δ′oi and a′i = δ′i (ao+e). Hence, for the first mating, we have
that bi• = hi (a′i +ai )/2. For the reciprocal mating, we have that b♀• = a′♀h♀ and b♂• is
constant with respect to δ′o .
The evolutionary change in the offspring controlled delay∆δo is hence proportional
to the selection gradient
∂wAδo
∂δ′o
∣∣∣
δ′o=δo
=− 1
2
g pθ(1−q)
[
brd
δ
(1−cm)−
vd
δ
(ca −cδ+ca −c¬h)
](
1− e
emax
)
.
Therefore, offspring controlled delay decreases if
brd
δ
(1−q)(1−cm)>
vd
δ
(1−q) (ca −cδ+ca −c¬h).
III.5.4 Thresholds
The inequalities for increase of subtrait i define thresholds, Ti , such that if a0+ e > Ti
then subtrait i increases. They are given in Table III.1.
III.5.5 Numerical solutions
In long time scales, the change in population subtrait value ∆x between the time of
mutation and the time of fixation is approximately given by dx/dt . Thus, the selection
gradients found above specify systems of differential equations of the form (Kimura,
1965; Lande, 1979; Iwasa et al., 1991; Dieckmann and Law, 1996)
dx
dt
=µx
∂wAx
∂x′
∣∣∣
x′=x
,
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Table III.1: For the corresponding subtrait to evolve, a0+e is required to be greater than
the above quantities. Th gives the threshold for increase of h. A = (1−Cm)/∆e∞.
Tp
c
δh(1−q)(1−cm )
Tq
vd(ca−cr )
δhrd (1−cm )
Te 2(a0+e)− 12(emax+a0− A)
Th
a0+e
bmax
v(ch−c¬h )
r (1−cm )
Tδm
1
δ
(1−q)(ca−cδ+ca−c¬h )
h(1−q)(1−cm )
Tδo
vd
δ
(1−q)(ca−cδ+ca−c¬h )
hrd(1−q)(1−cm )
where µx is a function of the mutation rate and themutation effect. Each subtrait x was
defined to be bounded (e.g., 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ e ≤ emax). For numerical solutions, µx is
thus set equal to zero when the next time step x(t +1) is out of bounds. In such a case,
x(t +1)= x(t ). Within bounds, I assume µx to be equal among all subtraits. I thus solve
numerically the system
dx
dτ
= ∂wAx
∂x′
∣∣∣
x′=x
,
where τ= tµx . I define a rescue to occur when at the first time step both manipulation
effort and resistance increase (p(1)> p(0) and q(1)> q(0)) and at the last time step both
manipulation effort and maternally induced benefits are substantial but resistance is
not (p(end) > 0.1, e(end) > 0.1, and q(end) < 0.1). The solver was let run for 106 time
steps.
A necessarily restrictive set of parameter values was chosen, on the basis that rescues
would be expected to happen (Table III.2). This produced a number of runs and
rescues (Fig. III3.4). Rescues occurred only in a narrow zone of the parameter space
(Fig. III3.5). Sufficiency tests failed to suggest sufficient conditions for the rescue in
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Table III.2: Initial conditions and parameter values. The values shown in the table were
implemented for the three genetic systems. For Fig. III3.1, the values are the following.
Initial conditions: h♀(0) = 1, h♂(0) = 0, δm(0) = 0.5, δo(0) = 0. Parameter values: for
differential manipulation: α = 1, β = 0; for costs: cr = 0, cm = 0.1, κδh = 1, κδ¬h = 0.5,
κδh = 0, κδ¬h = 0; and for dosage compensation: d = 2.
p(0) 0.1
q(0) 0.1
e(0) 0
h♀(0) 0, 0.5, 1
h♂(0) 0.5, 1, if h♀(0)= 0
0, 0.5, 1, otherwise
δm(0) 0.5, 1
δo(0) 0, 0.5, if δm(0)= 0.5
0, 0.5, 1, otherwise
a0 1
s1 0.5
g 0.5
s2 0.5
s g s1+ (1− g )s2
z s
emax 1, 10, 20
cr 0, 0.1
cm 0, 0.1
α 0, 1
β 1, if α= 0
0, 1, otherwise
κδh 0.5, 1
κδ¬h 0, 0.5, 1
κ
δh 0, 0.5, 1
κδ¬h 0, 0.5
d 1, 2
bmax a0+emax
terms of the initial values of the thresholds (Fig. III3.6). Out of the 66 different initial
threshold arrangements evaluated (Fig. III3.5; 47 occurring in haploids and diploids,
and 66 occurring in haplodiploids), only 9 of them produced rescues (Figs. III3.7 and
III3.8). As only even relatedness was considered, even though haplodiploids showed
a larger number of rescues (Fig. III3.4), outcomes of advanced eusociality unique to
haplodiploids only occurred when there was no dosage compensation in males (Fig.
III3.9). Absence of dosage compensation makes males half as able as females to resist
and to oppose delay.
III.5.6 Necessary conditions
For the numerical solutions evaluated, it was necessary for rescue that initiallyTp,Th,Tδm <
Tq (Fig. III3.3B). When manipulation effort goes only to sex i , these conditions
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Runs Rescues0
1
2
3
x 105
310692
11354
h d HD0
1000
2000
3000
4000 3582 3628
4144
Figure III3.4: Runs and rescues. (A) Total runs and rescues. One third of the runs
is for each genetic system. (B) Rescues per genetic system. h: haploid rescues; d:
diploid rescues; HD: haplodiploid rescues. No error bars are included because this is
a deterministic system.
respectively reduce to
cr < cai
(1−qi )(vi − ri )
ri + (1−qi )(vi − ri )
(III.25)
cr < c¬hi (III.26)
cr < cai −
ri
vi
(cai −cδi +cai −c¬hi ) . (III.27)
III.5.7 Maternally induced benefits as reduced maternal investment
or extra maternal fertility
Let the maternally induced benefit to a second-brood individual j be e j = e0(1− y j ),
where y j is the condition in which the mother leaves offspring j (0 ≤ y j ≤ 1) and e0 is
the benefit that a minimal-condition individual receives when helped. In turn, let the
condition of j be y j = 1 for j < j0 and y j = 0 for j ≥ j0, where j0 is the second-brood
offspring at which the mother stops providing care. The maternally induced benefit is
e =
∫n
0 e jd j , where n is the number of second-brood offspring. Then, e = e0(n− j0).
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Figure III3.5: Number of runs and rescues against the initial arrangement of thresholds
and howmany of themwere initiallymet. The right-handhorizontal axis gives the initial
arrangement of thresholds, obtained bynumbering the permutations of the 6 thresholds
(i.e., permutations of Ti1 ≤ Ti2 ≤ Ti3 ≤ Ti4 ≤ Ti5 ≤ Ti6 produces 720 of them). The left-
hand horizontal axis gives the number of thresholds that are initially met for a given
permutation. Left-columnpanels give the number of runs and right-columnpanels give
the number of rescues.
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Tp not Tq Th Tdm Tdo0
0.5
1
Probability of rescue given that the thresholds were initially met
0.13 0.0484 0.038 0.059 0.0404
Tp, Th not Tq, Th Tdm, Th Tdo, Th0
0.5
1
0.139 0.0496 0.0608 0.0408
Tp, not Tq, Th Tp, Tdm, Th Tp, Tdo, Th0
0.5
1
0.457
0.139 0.0997
Tp, not Tq, Th, Tdm Tp, not Tq, Th, Tdo0
0.5
1
0.572 0.466
Tp, not Tq; Th, Tdm<Tp Tp, not Tq; Th, Tdm, Tdo<Tp0
0.5
1
0.434 0.461
Tp, not Tq, Th, Tdm, Tdo0
0.5
1
0.458
Figure III3.6: Tests for sufficient conditions. The bars give the probability of rescue
given that the indicated thresholds were initially met. The probability is calculated
as P (x|y) = # rescues with thresholdsmet/# runs with thresholdsmet. Te was never
met initially, therefore the probabilities involving it are undefined. A probability of 1
indicates that the condition is sufficient for rescue. For the fifth panel, the conditions
after the semicolon are that the indicated thresholds are smaller than Tp . None of the
evaluated conditions was entirely sufficient to produce a rescue.
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Haploids
Tdm Th Tdo Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 112 212 0
Tdm Tdo Th Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 0 8 0
Th Tdm Tp Tq Tdo Te
0
500
1000
0 0 88 0 0
Th Tdm Tp Tdo Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 56
530
14 0
Th Tdm Tdo Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 112
276
0
Th Tdm Tdo Te Tp Tq
0
500
1000
0
532
0 0 0
Th Tp Tdm Tq Tdo Te
0
500
1000
82 0
556
0 0
Tdo Tdm Th Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 128
876
0
Diploids
Tdm Th Tdo Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 120 212 0
Tdm Tdo Th Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 0 8 0
Th Tdm Tp Tq Tdo Te
0
500
1000
0 0 88 0 0
Th Tdm Tp Tdo Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 64
546
14 0
Th Tdm Tdo Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 120 276 0
Th Tdm Tdo Te Tp Tq
0
500
1000
0
536
0 0 0
Th Tp Tdm Tq Tdo Te
0
500
1000
88 0
548
0 0
Tdo Tdm Th Tp Tq Te
0
500
1000
0 0 132
876
0
Figure III3.7: Threshold arrangements that produced rescues in haploids and diploids.
The horizontal axis is a0 + e and the relative position of the thresholds at the start of
numerical solutions is shown (i.e., Ti1 ≤ Ti2 ≤ Ti3 ≤ Ti4 ≤ Ti5 ≤ Ti6 even though they
are shown as necessarily unequal for computational ease). The bars give the number
of rescues in which initially Ti ≤ a0 + e < Ti−1. For example, for the upper left panel,
112 rescues occurred in which initially only Tδm , Th and Tδo were satisfied. The fact
that p increases in cases in which Tp is not satisfied is because the numerical solver
(the standard Runge-Kutta (4,5) method (Dormand and Prince, 1980)) uses midpoints
between integration limits to calculate the value at the next time step. Thus, the
thresholds may change in the midpoints so that a variable may increase at the next
integration time step even though the threshold was initially not satisfied. Notice that
initially Th must be satisfied and that Tp ,Th,Tδm < Tq for rescues to occur.
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Figure III3.8: Threshold arrangements that produced rescues in haplodiploids. The
legend of Fig. III3.7 applies. The only unique threshold arrangement relative to haploids
and diploids is the eighth panel.
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Figure III3.9: Unique advanced eusocial outcomes. Unique advanced eusocial
outcomes were defined as occurring when, for a given parameter combination,
advanced eusociality was obtained in some but not all three genetic systems (advanced
eusociality defined aswhen e(end)> 0.1). The bars give the number of unique advanced
eusocial outcomes for the genetic systems indicated (h: haploid, d: diploid, HD:
haplodiploid). Although a larger number of unique advanced eusociality occurs in
haplodiploids (top panel), this is due to the absence of dosage compensation (d = 1) and
thus the half ability to resist among males (middle panel). With dosage compensation
(d = 2), advanced eusociality that occurs only in diploids and haplodiploids was most
common (bottom panel).
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III.5.8 Artificialities
In the numerical solutions, sex ratio is assumed to be constant and the time scalemay at
times be unrealistically large. Also, it is assumed that offspring helping efficiency keeps
up with maternally induced benefits (i.e., bmax is assumed to be a0+emax).
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